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Bond v. United States 
12-158 
Ruling Below: United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2012), cert granted, 133 S.Ct.  978 
(U.S. 2013). 
Defendant was convicted by guilty plea in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania of possessing and using a chemical weapon and mail theft, and she 
appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and certiorari was granted. The Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded the holding that defendant lacked standing to challenge the 
conviction.  On remand, upon considering the constitutional merits, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act did not exceed Congress' 
power under Necessary and Proper Clause and the conviction was upheld. 
Question Presented: (1) Whether the Constitution’s structural limits on federal authority impose 
any constraints on the scope of Congress’ authority to enact legislation to implement a valid 
treaty, at least in circumstances where the federal statute, as applied, goes far beyond the scope 
of the treaty, intrudes on traditional state prerogatives, and is concededly unnecessary to satisfy 
the government’s treaty obligations; and (2) whether the provisions of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention Implementation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 229, can be interpreted not to reach ordinary 
poisoning cases, which have been adequately handled by state and local authorities since the 
Framing, in order to avoid the difficult constitutional questions involving the scope of and 
continuing vitality of this Court’s decision in Missouri v. Holland. 
 
 
UNITED STATES of America 
v. 
Carol Anne BOND, Appellant. 
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit 
Decided on May 3, 2012 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge 
This case is before us on remand from the 
Supreme Court, which vacated our earlier 
judgment that Appellant Carol Anne Bond 
lacked standing to challenge, on Tenth 
Amendment grounds, her conviction under 
the penal provision of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 
1998, (the “Act”), which implements the 
 345 
1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (the 
“Convention”). The Supreme Court 
determined that Bond does have standing to 
advance that challenge, and returned the 
case to us to consider her constitutional 
argument. 
In her merits argument, Bond urges us to set 
aside as inapplicable the landmark decision 
Missouri v. Holland, which is sometimes 
cited for the proposition that the Tenth 
Amendment has no bearing on Congress's 
ability to legislate in furtherance of the 
Treaty Power in Article II, § 2 of the 
Constitution. Cognizant of the widening 
scope of issues taken up in international 
agreements, as well as the renewed vigor 
with which principles of federalism have 
been employed by the Supreme Court in 
scrutinizing assertions of federal authority, 
we agree with Bond that treaty-
implementing legislation ought not, by 
virtue of that status alone, stand immune 
from scrutiny under principles of federalism. 
However, because the Convention is an 
international agreement with a subject 
matter that lies at the core of the Treaty 
Power and because Holland instructs that 
“there can be no dispute about the validity of 
[a] statute” that implements a valid treaty, 
we will affirm Bond's conviction. 
I. Factual Background and Procedural 
History 
A. Facts 
Bond's criminal acts are detailed in our prior 
opinion, and in the Supreme Court's opinion, 
Bond v. United States (“Bond II”), so we 
provide only a brief recitation here. Suffice 
it to say that, while Bond was employed by 
the chemical manufacturer Rohm and Haas, 
she learned that her friend Myrlinda Haynes 
was pregnant and that Bond's own husband 
was the baby's father. Bond became intent 
on revenge. To that end, she set about 
acquiring highly toxic chemicals, stealing 
10–chlorophenoxarsine from her employer 
and purchasing potassium dichromate over 
the Internet. She then applied those 
chemicals to Haynes's mailbox, car door 
handles, and house doorknob. Bond's 
poisonous activities were eventually 
discovered and she was indicted on two 
counts of acquiring, transferring, receiving, 
retaining, or possessing a chemical weapon, 
in violation of the Act. She was, in addition, 
charged with two counts of theft of mail 
matter, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. 
B. Procedural History 
Bond filed a motion to dismiss the counts 
that alleged violations of the Act. She 
argued that the Act was unconstitutional, 
both facially and as applied to her. More 
particularly, she said that the Act violated 
constitutional “fair notice” requirements, 
that it was inconsistent with the Convention 
it was meant to implement, and that it 
represented a breach of the Tenth 
Amendment's protection of state 
sovereignty. Emphasizing that last point, 
Bond contended that neither the Commerce 
Clause, nor the Necessary and Proper Clause 
in connection with the Treaty Power, could 
support the expansive wording of the statute, 
let alone her prosecution. The government's 
response has shifted over time, but it has 
been consistent in maintaining that the Act 
is a constitutional exercise of Congress's 
authority to enact treaty-implementing 
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legislation under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. The District Court accepted that 
argument and denied Bond's motion to 
dismiss. 
We affirmed on appeal, concluding that 
Bond lacked standing to pursue her Tenth 
Amendment challenge and that the Act was 
neither unconstitutionally vague nor 
unconstitutionally overbroad. The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to address the 
question of “[w]hether a criminal defendant 
convicted under a federal statute has 
standing to challenge her conviction on 
grounds that, as applied to her, the statute is 
beyond the federal government's enumerated 
powers and inconsistent with the Tenth 
Amendment.” Ultimately, the Court 
concluded that Bond “does have standing to 
challenge the federal statute.” The case was 
remanded to us to address the “issue of the 
statute's validity” which, as the Court 
instructed, “turns in part on whether the law 
can be deemed ‘necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution’ the President's 
Article II, § 2 Treaty Power.”  
II. Discussion 
In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court 
declared that, if a treaty is valid, “there can 
be no dispute about the validity of the statute 
[implementing it] under Article 1, Section 8, 
as a necessary and proper means to execute 
the powers of the Government.” Implicit in 
that statement is the premise that principles 
of federalism will ordinarily impose no 
limitation on Congress's ability to write laws 
supporting treaties, because the only 
relevant question is whether the underlying 
treaty is valid. Reasoning that a reading of 
Holland that categorically rejects federalism 
as a check on Congress's treaty-
implementing authority is of questionable 
constitutional validity, Bond asks us to 
invalidate her conviction because the Act is 
unconstitutional as applied to her. She says 
that to hold otherwise would offend the 
Constitution's balance of power between 
state and federal authority by “intrud [ing] ... 
on the traditional state prerogative to punish 
assaults.” 
A. Constitutional Avoidance 
Bond first argues, however, that we should 
avoid reaching the constitutional question by 
construing the Act not to apply to her 
conduct at all. 
Her avoidance argument begins with the text 
of the Act itself, which provides, in pertinent 
part, that “it shall be unlawful for any person 
knowingly ... to develop, produce, otherwise 
acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, 
receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or 
use, or threaten to use, any chemical 
weapon.” The term “chemical weapon” is 
defined broadly to include any “toxic 
chemical and its precursors,” and “[t]he term 
‘toxic chemical’ means any chemical which 
through its chemical action on life processes 
can cause death, temporary incapacitation or 
permanent harm to humans or animals.” 
Congress did put some limit on the sweep of 
the Act by excluding from the definition of 
“chemical weapon” any chemicals and 
precursors “intended for a purpose not 
prohibited under this chapter as long as the 
type and quantity is consistent with such a 
purpose.” The phrase “purpose not 
prohibited under this chapter,” is then 
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defined, in part, as “[a]ny peaceful purpose 
related to an industrial, agricultural, 
research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity 
or other activity.” It is that “peaceful 
purpose” language that Bond urges us to 
take as our interpretive lodestar. 
Specifically, Bond argues that, by looking to 
the “peaceful purpose” exception, we can 
employ a “common sense interpretation of § 
229” that avoids “mak[ing] every malicious 
use of a household chemical”—including 
her own—a federal offense. All we need do 
is “interpret the statute ... to reach [only the 
kind of acts] that would violate the 
Convention if undertaken by a signatory 
state.” In other words, as Bond sees it, the 
modifier “peaceful” should be understood in 
contradistinction to “warlike” and, when so 
understood, the statute will not reach 
“conduct that no signatory state could 
possibly engage in—such as using 
chemicals in an effort to poison a romantic 
rival,” as Bond did. That interpretation is 
tempting, in light of the challenges inherent 
in the Act's remarkably broad language, but, 
as we held the first time we had this case, 
Bond's behavior “clearly constituted 
unlawful possession and use of a chemical 
weapon under § 229.”  
That holding is in better keeping with the 
Act's use of the term “peaceful purpose” 
than the construction Bond would have us 
give it. The ordinary meaning of “peaceful” 
is “untroubled by conflict, agitation, or 
commotion,” “of or relating to a state or 
time of peace,” or “devoid of violence or 
force,” and Bond's “deploy [ment of] highly 
toxic chemicals with the intent of harming 
Haynes,” can hardly be characterized as 
“peaceful” under that word's commonly 
understood meaning. The term “peaceful,” 
moreover, does not appear in isolation: the 
Act only excludes from its ambit “peaceful 
purpose[s] ... related to an industrial, 
agricultural, research, medical, or 
pharmaceutical activity or other activity.” 
Bond's attacks on Haynes—even if non-
warlike—were certainly not “related to an 
industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or 
pharmaceutical activity.”  Nor can her use of 
chemicals be said to be a “peaceful purpose[ 
] ... related to an ... other activity,” because 
regarding her assaultive behavior as such 
would improperly expand § 229F(7)(A)'s 
scope.  
Thus, while one may well question whether 
Congress envisioned the Act being applied 
in a case like this, the language itself does 
cover Bond's criminal conduct. And, given 
the clarity of the statute, we cannot avoid the 
constitutional question presented. It is not 
our prerogative to rewrite a statute, and we 
see no sound basis on which we can accept 
Bond's construction of the Act without 
usurping Congress's legislative role. Though 
we agree it would be better, if possible, to 
apply a limiting construction to the Act 
rather than consider Bond's argument that it 
is unconstitutional, the statute speaks with 
sufficient certainty that we feel compelled to 
consider the hard question presented in this 
appeal. 
B. Constitutionality of the Act as Applied 
Understanding whether application of the 
Act to Bond violates the structural limits of 
federalism begins with the Tenth 
Amendment, which Bond cites and which 
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provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people.” 
That text, as the Supreme Court has 
observed, “confirms that the power of the 
Federal Government is subject to limits that 
may ... reserve power to the States.” Thus, it 
encapsulates the principles of federalism 
upon which our nation was founded.  
Endeavoring to discover what impact the 
Tenth Amendment may have on treaty-
implementing legislation immediately leads, 
as we have indicated, to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Missouri v. Holland. The statute 
at issue in that case, the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act, implemented a treaty between 
the United States and Great Britain that 
banned the hunting of migratory birds 
during certain seasons. The State of 
Missouri brought suit against a U.S. game 
warden, arguing that the statute 
unconstitutionally interfered with the rights 
reserved to Missouri by the Tenth 
Amendment because Missouri was free to 
do what it wished with the birds while they 
were within its borders. The Supreme Court, 
speaking through Justice Holmes, rejected 
that argument, reasoning that “it is not 
enough to refer to the Tenth Amendment, 
reserving the powers not delegated to the 
United States, because by Article 2, Section 
2, the power to make treaties is delegated 
expressly.”  
As noted earlier, the Court made it clear that 
Congress may, under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, legislate to implement a valid 
treaty, regardless of whether Congress 
would otherwise have the power to act or 
whether the legislation causes an intrusion 
into what would otherwise be within the 
state's traditional province. While the Court 
did allow that there may be “qualifications 
to the treaty-making power,” it also said, 
somewhat obscurely, that they had to be 
found “in a different way” than one might 
find limitations on other grants of power to 
the federal government. After implying that 
Congress's powers are particularly sweeping 
when dealing with “matters requiring 
national action,” the Court suggested one 
limitation on the Treaty Power: if the 
implementation of a treaty “contravene[s] 
any prohibitory words to be found in the 
Constitution,” then it may be 
unconstitutional. Since the treaty in question 
did not do that, the only remaining question 
was “whether it [was] forbidden by some 
invisible radiation from the general terms of 
the Tenth Amendment.” The Court 
concluded that it was not. Finally, the Court 
assumed without further discussion that, 
because the treaty was valid, so was the 
implementing statute.  
In sum, Holland teaches that, when there is a 
valid treaty, Congress has authority to enact 
implementing legislation under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, even if it 
might otherwise lack the ability to legislate 
in the domain in question. The legislation 
must, of course, meet the Necessary and 
Proper Clause's general requirement that 
legislation implemented under that Clause 
be “rationally related to the implementation 
of a constitutionally enumerated power.” In 
the treaty context, that requirement has been 
understood to mean that a treaty and its 
implementing legislation must be rationally 
related to one another. Thus, as long as “the 
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effectuating legislation bear[s] a rational 
relationship to” a valid treaty, the arguable 
consequence of Holland is that treaties and 
associated legislation are simply not subject 
to Tenth Amendment scrutiny, no matter 
how far into the realm of states' rights the 
President and Congress may choose to 
venture.  
Bond vigorously disputes the implications of 
that conclusion. Specifically, she argues that 
legal trends since the Supreme Court's 1920 
decision in Holland make it clear that the 
Tenth Amendment should not be treated as 
irrelevant when examining the validity of 
treaty-implementing legislation. Concluding 
otherwise, she asserts, would make “nothing 
... off-limits” in a world where, more and 
more, “international treaties govern[ ] a 
virtually unlimited range of subjects and 
intrud[e] deeply on internal concerns.” That 
latter point is not without merit. Juxtaposed 
against increasingly broad conceptions of 
the Treaty Power's scope, reading Holland 
to confer on Congress an unfettered ability 
to effectuate what would now be considered 
by some to be valid exercises of the Treaty 
Power runs a significant risk of disrupting 
the delicate balance between state and 
federal authority. 
Those concerns notwithstanding, Bond does 
not argue that the Convention itself is 
constitutionally infirm. On the contrary, she 
admits “that a treaty restricting chemical 
weapons is a ‘proper subject[ ] of 
negotiations between our government and 
other nations.’ ” Accordingly, we need not 
tackle, head on, whether an arguably invalid 
treaty has led to legislation encroaching on 
matters traditionally left to the police powers 
of the states. Nevertheless, resolving the 
argument Bond does lodge against her 
prosecution requires at least some 
consideration of whether the Convention is, 
in fact, valid. We therefore turn briefly to 
whether the Convention falls within the 
Treaty Power's appropriate scope, bearing in 
mind that Bond seems to accept that it does. 
1. The Convention's Validity 
The Constitution does not have within it any 
explicit subject matter limitation on the 
power granted in Article II, § 2. That section 
states simply that the President has the 
“Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur.” Throughout much of American 
history, however, including when Holland 
was handed down, it was understood that the 
Treaty Power was impliedly limited to 
certain subject matters.  
Contemporaneous records such as the 
Virginia Ratifying Convention show that the 
Founders generally accepted that the 
purpose of treaties was, as James Madison 
put it, to regulate “intercourse with foreign 
nations,” and that the “exercise” of the 
Treaty Power was expected to be “consistent 
with” those “external” ends. As Madison 
later explained, if there was 
no limitation on the Treaty-making power 
..., it might admit of a doubt whether the 
United States might not be enabled to do 
those things by Treaty which are forbidden 
to be done by Congress ...; but no such 
consequence can follow, for it is a sound 
rule of construction, that what is forbidden 
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to be done by all the branches of 
Government conjointly, cannot be done by 
one or more of them separately. 
Early cases followed that reasoning and 
indicated that the Treaty Power is confined 
to matters traditionally understood to be of 
international concern.  
That is not to say, however, that any treaty 
encroaching on matters ordinarily left to the 
states was considered to be beyond the 
Treaty Power's permissible ambit. On the 
contrary, so long as the subject matter 
limitation was satisfied—which it 
undoubtedly was in cases involving 
“subjects [such as] peace, alliance, 
commerce, neutrality, and others of a similar 
nature,” or, as Jay put it, “war, peace, and 
commerce,”—it was accepted that treaties 
could affect domestic issues. Many early 
decisions of the Supreme Court upheld 
treaties of that nature, including treaties 
regarding the ownership and transfer of 
property. Still, it was widely accepted that 
the Treaty Power was inherently limited in 
the subject matter it could properly be used 
to address, and that the purpose of limiting 
the Treaty Power to matters which “in the 
ordinary intercourse of nations had usually 
been made subjects of negotiation and 
treaty” was to ensure that treaties were 
“consistent with ... the distribution of 
powers between the general and state 
governments.”  
Despite the long history of that view of the 
Treaty Power, the tide of opinion, at least in 
some quarters, has shifted decisively in the 
last half-century. Many influential voices 
now urge that there is no limitation on the 
Treaty Power, at least not in the way 
understood from the founding through to the 
middle of the Twentieth Century. That 
change is reflected in the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States (1987) (the “Third 
Restatement”), which declares flatly that, 
“[c]ontrary to what was once suggested, the 
Constitution does not require that an 
international agreement deal only with 
‘matters of international concern.’ ” 
Whatever the Treaty Power's proper bounds 
may be, however, we are confident that the 
Convention we are dealing with here falls 
comfortably within them. The Convention, 
after all, regulates the proliferation and use 
of chemical weapons. One need not be a 
student of modern warfare to have some 
appreciation for the devastation chemical 
weapons can cause and the corresponding 
impetus for international collaboration to 
take steps against their use. Given its 
quintessentially international character, we 
conclude that the Convention is valid under 
any reasonable conception of the Treaty 
Power's scope. In fact, as we discuss at 
greater length herein, because the 
Convention relates to war, peace, and 
perhaps commerce, it fits at the core of the 
Treaty Power.  
2. Interpreting Holland 
Because Holland clearly instructs that “there 
can be no dispute about the validity of [a] 
statute” that implements a valid treaty, the 
constitutionality of Bond's prosecution 
would seem to turn on whether the Act goes 
beyond what is necessary and proper to 
carry the Convention into effect, or, in other 
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words, whether the Act fails to “bear a 
rational relationship to” the Convention. 
According to Bond, however, only a 
simplistic reading of Holland could lead one 
to think that the Supreme Court was saying 
that “Congress's power to implement treaties 
is subject to no limit other than affirmative 
restrictions on government power like the 
First Amendment.”  
The problem with Bond's attack is that, with 
practically no qualifying language in 
Holland to turn to, we are bound to take at 
face value the Supreme Court's statement 
that “[i]f the treaty is valid there can be no 
dispute about the validity of the statute ... as 
a necessary and proper means to execute the 
powers of the Government.” A plurality of 
the Supreme Court itself apparently gave 
that passage the simplistic reading Bond 
denounces when it said, in Reid v. Covert, 
that: 
The Court [in Holland ] was concerned 
with the Tenth Amendment which 
reserves to the States or the people all 
power not delegated to the National 
Government. To the extent that the 
United States can validly make treaties, 
the people and the States have delegated 
their power to the National Government 
and the Tenth Amendment is no barrier. 
It is true that Justice Holmes spoke later in 
Holland in language that implies a balancing 
of the national interest against the interest 
claimed by the State, but that was in the 
context of assessing the validity of the 
Migratory Bird Treaty itself, not the 
implementing statute. That the latter was 
constitutional in light of the validity of the 
former seemed to the Supreme Court to 
require no further comment at all. 
That does not mean, of course, that the 
Holland court would have spoken in the 
same unqualified terms had it foreseen the 
late Twentieth Century's changing claims 
about the limits of the Treaty Power, or had 
it been faced with a treaty that transgressed 
the traditional subject matter limitation. It 
may well have chosen to say more about 
how to assess the validity of a treaty, and 
hence of coextensive treaty-implementing 
legislation. Perhaps Holland's vague 
comment about “invisible radiation[s] from 
the general terms of the Tenth Amendment” 
would have been given some further 
explication. As we have previously 
described, when Holland was decided, and, 
more importantly, when the Founders 
created the Treaty Power, it was generally 
understood that treaties should concern only 
matters that were clearly “international” in 
character, matters which, in Holland's 
words, invoke a national interest that “can 
be protected only by national action in 
concert with that of another [sovereign 
nation].” All the authors of The Federalist 
Papers, along with others from that era, 
considered the Treaty Power to be a 
necessary attribute of the central 
government for the important but limited 
purpose of permitting our “intercourse with 
foreign nations,” and thereby allowing for 
compacts “especially as [they] relate[ ] to 
war, peace, and commerce.” It was not a 
general and unlimited grant of power to the 
federal government. 
Because an implied subject matter limitation 
on the Treaty Power was a given at the time 
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Holland was written, it was enough to 
answer the states' rights question in that case 
by pointing out that the Tenth Amendment 
only reserves those powers that are not 
delegated and that “the power to make 
treaties is delegated expressly.” Thus, 
Holland's statement that “there can be no 
dispute about the validity” of a statute 
implementing a valid treaty, sensible in 
context and, in any event, binds us. We do 
not discount the significance of the Supreme 
Court's emphasis on the important role that 
federalism plays in preserving individual 
rights, and it may be that there is more to 
say about the uncompromising language 
used in Holland than we are able to say, but 
that very direct language demands from us a 
direct acknowledgement of its meaning, 
even if the result may be viewed as 
simplistic. If there is nuance there that has 
escaped us, it is for the Supreme Court to 
elucidate. 
3. The Necessary and Proper Clause 
Thus, because the Convention falls 
comfortably within the Treaty Power's 
traditional subject matter limitation, the Act 
is within the constitutional powers of the 
federal government under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause and the Treaty Power, unless 
it somehow goes beyond the Convention. 
Bond argues that it does. 
She says that the Act covers a range of 
activity not actually banned by the 
Convention and thus cannot be sustained by 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Whether 
that argument amounts to a facial or an as-
applied attack on the Act, it fails. We stated 
in Bond I that “Section 229 ... closely 
adheres to the language of the ... 
Convention,” and so it does. True, as Bond 
notes, the Convention bans persons from 
using, developing, acquiring, stockpiling, or 
retaining chemical weapons, while the Act 
makes it unlawful to “receive, stockpile, 
retain, own, possess, use, or threaten to use” 
a chemical weapon, but those differences in 
wording do not prove that the Act has 
materially expanded on the Convention. The 
meaning of the list in the former seems 
rather to fairly encompass the latter (with 
the possible exception of the “threaten to 
use” provision of the Act) and, if the Act 
goes beyond the Convention at all, does not 
do so in the “use” aspect at issue here. 
So while Bond's prosecution seems a 
questionable exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, and indeed appears to justify her 
assertion that this case “trivializes the 
concept of chemical weapons” the treaty that 
gave rise to it was implemented by 
sufficiently related legislation.  
In short, because the Convention pertains to 
the proliferation and use of chemical 
weapons, which are matters plainly relating 
to war and peace, we think it clear that the 
Convention falls within the Treaty Power's 
core. Consequently, we cannot say that the 
Act disrupts the balance of power between 
the federal government and the states, 
regardless of how it has been applied here.  
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
judgment of conviction. 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
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I fully agree with the Majority's reasoning 
and result. I write separately to cast the issue 
before us in a somewhat different light, by 
expanding upon two aspects of the 
Majority's reasoning which, I believe, decide 
this case. As it crystallized before us at oral 
argument, Ms. Bond's challenge has little to 
do with the validity of the Convention. Her 
problem lies with the Act. She contends that 
the structure of federal-state relations is such 
that the Act should not apply to her actions, 
namely, conduct involving a domestic 
dispute that could be prosecuted under state 
law. But, as the Majority rightly concludes, 
the Act is a valid exercise of Congress's 
Necessary and Proper Power. Moreover, no 
jurisprudential principle, grounded in 
federalism or elsewhere, saves her from the 
Act's reach. 
I consider two questions raised by her 
argument: What is legally wrong with the 
Act, which reaches Ms. Bond's conduct?; 
and, What is wrong with the Act's 
application to Ms. Bond, given the structure 
of federal-state relations? The answer to 
both is: Nothing. 
As to the first question, nothing “wrong” 
occurred at the moment Congress passed the 
Act. As the Majority has thoroughly 
discussed, the Convention itself is valid—
indeed, Ms. Bond unequivocally concedes 
that point. In turn, the Act, which 
implements the Convention, is valid as an 
exercise of Congress's Necessary and Proper 
Power. That is because the Necessary and 
Proper Clause affords Congress “ ‘ample 
means' ” to implement the Convention, and 
gives Congress the authority “to enact laws 
that are ‘convenient, or useful’ or 
‘conducive’ ... to the ‘beneficial exercise’ ” 
of the federal government's Treaty Power. 
There is no question that the Act is 
rationally related to the Convention; it 
faithfully tracks the language of the 
Convention. Enacting a statute that 
essentially mirrors the terms of an 
underlying treaty is plainly a means which is 
“reasonably adapted to the attainment of a 
legitimate end”—ensuring that the United 
States complies with our international 
obligations under a valid treaty.  
In examining the constitutionality of 
Congress's exercise of its Necessary and 
Proper Power, we need not consider whether 
the prosecution of Ms. Bond is necessary 
and proper to complying with the 
Convention, as she would have us do. In 
other words, she argues that no nation-state 
would submit that the United States has 
failed to comply with its obligations under 
the Convention if the federal government 
did not prosecute Ms. Bond under the Act. 
But that is not the appropriate test. 
Examining the scope of Congress's 
Necessary and Proper Power by definition 
requires us to examine the Act, not its 
enforcement. To determine if the Act is 
necessary and proper, we ask whether it 
bears a rational relationship to the 
Convention. Ms. Bond's actions fall plainly 
within the terms of the Act, and the Act 
bears a rational relationship to the 
Convention. So ends the Necessary and 
Proper inquiry. 
The foregoing conclusion is enough to 
affirm Ms. Bond's conviction. As the 
Majority correctly reasons, Missouri v. 
Holland forecloses challenging a valid 
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statute implementing a valid treaty on 
Necessary and Proper grounds or federalism 
grounds.  
But even if Ms. Bond were able to assert a 
federalism challenge to her conviction, she 
proposes no principle of federalism that 
would limit the federal government's 
authority to prosecute her under the Act. 
Thus, as to the second question, Ms. Bond 
argues that if the statute is applied to her, 
and, is thus read to “criminalize every 
malicious use of poisoning,” then principles 
of federalism are violated by disturbing the 
division of power between the federal 
government and the states. As appealing as 
the argument sounds—that a federal statute 
should not reach an essentially local offense 
like this—there is in fact no principled 
reason to limit the Act's reach when her 
conduct is squarely prohibited by it. The fact 
that an otherwise constitutional federal 
statute might criminalize conduct considered 
to be local does not render that particular 
criminalization unconstitutional. As the 
Supreme Court explained in Gonzales v. 
Raich, when “the class of activities is 
regulated and that class is within the reach 
of federal power, the courts have no power 
to excise, as trivial, individual instances of 
the class.” The fact that the Act, which 
properly implements a valid treaty, reaches 
non-terrorist uses of chemical weapons 
leaves us powerless to excise such an 
individual instance. True, Raich involved 
Congress's Commerce Clause Power. But 
the Majority is correct to apply its principle 
to this case, particularly in light of the 
Supreme Court's rejection, in Holland, of 
federalism as a basis to challenge a statute 
implementing an otherwise valid treaty.  
Ms. Bond continues to urge otherwise, 
asking us to consider the “world where the 
Supreme Court recognizes that the Tenth 
Amendment is primarily about protecting 
individual liberty,” in which the Supreme 
Court recognized that some acts of 
Congress, even if they are otherwise valid 
under an enumerated power, can run afoul of 
the Tenth Amendment. But this case is not 
like New York or Printz, in which Congress 
wrongfully commandeered states' legislative 
processes and public officials. Nothing in 
those cases suggests a principle of 
federalism that would apply to this case. 
Moreover, it is not enough to urge, as Ms. 
Bond does, that Pennsylvania law and 
authorities are equally able to handle, and 
punish, this conduct so that, from a 
federalism standpoint, we should leave the 
matter to Pennsylvania. That view simply 
misstates the law. We have a system of dual 
sovereignty. Instances of overlapping 
federal and state criminalization of similar 
conduct abound. But Ms. Bond argues that 
here, unlike the case with other federal 
crimes, no federal interest is being served by 
prosecuting every malicious use of a 
chemical. That argument fails for two 
reasons. First, there exists nowhere in the 
law a rule requiring that a statute 
implementing a treaty contain an element 
explicitly tying the statute to a federal 
interest so as to ensure that a particular 
application of the statute is constitutional. 
Second, even if we were to require that there 
be a clear federal interest, Ms. Bond 
incorrectly characterizes the federal interest 
that is represented by her prosecution as one 
in prosecuting every malicious use of a 
chemical. Rather, the federal interest served 
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is twofold: combating the use and 
proliferation of chemical weapons, and 
complying with the United States' 
obligations under a valid treaty. 
Additionally, whether there is a distinction, 
and where that distinction lies, between 
combating the use and proliferation of 
chemical weapons and prosecuting the 
malicious use of a chemical, is exceedingly 
difficult to discern. 
In sum, Congress passed the Act, which is 
constitutionally sound legislation, to 
implement the Convention, a 
constitutionally sound treaty. Ms. Bond's 
appeal generally to federalism, rather than to 
a workable principle that would limit the 
federal government's authority to apply the 
Act to her, is to no avail. 
The real culprits here are three. First, the 
fact pattern. No one would question a 
prosecution under the Act if the defendant 
were a deranged person who scattered 
potassium dichromate and 10–chloro–10H–
phenoxarsine, the chemicals which Ms. 
Bond used, on the seats of the New York 
subway cars. While that defendant could be 
punished under state law, applying the Act 
there would not offend our sensibilities. The 
application, however, to this “domestic 
dispute,” somehow does. 
Second, the “use” of chemical weapons as 
prescribed in the Act has an admittedly 
broad sweep. Because the Act tracks the 
Convention, however, Congress had the 
power to criminalize all such uses. Perhaps, 
in carrying out the United States' treaty 
obligations, Congress could have created a 
more expansive exception for “peaceful 
purposes,” but it did not. 
Lastly, the decision to prosecute is troubling. 
The judgment call to prosecute Ms. Bond 
under a chemical weapons statute rather than 
allowing state authorities to process the case 
is one that we question. But we see that 
every day in drug cases. Perhaps lured by 
the perception of easier convictions and 
tougher sentences, prosecutors opt to 
proceed federally. There is no law against 
this, or principle that we can call upon, to 
limit or regulate it. 
While the Majority opinion explores 
arguments regarding the limits of the Treaty 
Power, I find Ms. Bond's argument to be 
much more limited in scope, although 
equally unsupportable. I agree that we 
should affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
I concur in the result reached by Judge 
Jordan's thoughtful opinion. I write 
separately to urge the Supreme Court to 
provide a clarifying explanation of its 
statement in Missouri v. Holland that “[i]f 
[a] treaty is valid there can be no dispute 
about the validity of the statute 
[implementing that treaty] under Article 1, 
Section 8, as a necessary and proper means 
to execute the powers of the Government.”  
Absent that undertaking, a blank check 
exists for the Federal Government to enact 
any laws that are rationally related to a valid 
treaty and that do not transgress affirmative 
constitutional restrictions, like the First 
Amendment. This acquirable police power, 
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however, can run counter to the fundamental 
principle that the Constitution delegates 
powers to the Federal Government that are 
“few and defined” while the States retain 
powers that are “numerous and indefinite.”  
Since Holland, Congress has largely resisted 
testing the outer bounds of its treaty-
implementing authority. But if ever there 
were a statute that did test those limits, it 
would be Section 229. With its shockingly 
broad definitions, Section 229 federalizes 
purely local, run-of-the-mill criminal 
conduct. The statute is a troublesome 
example of the Federal Government's 
appetite for criminal lawmaking. Sweeping 
statutes like Section 229 are in deep tension 
with an important structural feature of our 
Government: “ ‘The States possess primary 
authority for defining and enforcing the 
criminal law.’ ”  
I hope that the Supreme Court will soon 
flesh out “[t]he most important sentence in 
the most important case about the 
constitutional law of foreign affairs,” and, 
doing so, clarify (indeed curtail) the 
contours of federal power to enact laws that 
intrude on matters so local that no drafter of 
the Convention contemplated their inclusion 
in it. 
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“Chemical Weapon or Just Poison? Supreme Court Takes Case” 
Reuters 
Jonathan Stempel & Terry Baynes 
January 18, 2013 
The Supreme Court on Friday agreed to hear 
a new appeal by a woman convicted under a 
federal law intended to combat chemical 
weapons in a case where she admitted trying 
to poison a former friend who had an affair 
with her husband. 
At the center of the case is a 1998 U.S. law 
banning the use of chemical weapons other 
than for a "peaceful purpose." 
That law grew out of the 1993 Chemical 
Weapons Convention, an international 
agreement designed to keep rogue countries 
and terrorists from obtaining weapons of 
mass destruction. 
Carol Anne Bond, a trained microbiologist 
who once worked at the chemical company 
Rohm and Haas Co, admitted to trying to 
poison her former best friend Myrlinda 
Haynes after learning that Haynes, a single 
mother, became pregnant by Bond's 
husband. 
The toxic chemicals were taken from Rohm 
& Haas, and lethal compounds were 
sprinkled on Haynes' mailbox, car door 
handles and house doorknob on several 
occasions between November 2006 and June 
2007. 
Such cases are normally handled by local 
prosecutors under traditional criminal laws, 
but Bond was prosecuted under the federal 
chemical weapons law. 
The case could give the court a chance to 
revisit a 1920 precedent written by Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes that gave Congress 
broad authority to adopt laws implementing 
treaties. 
It also presents an unusual clash between the 
desire to enforce international treaty norms, 
including provisions designed to thwart 
terrorism, and the 10th Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, which limits federal 
power. 
Bond, a Pennsylvania resident, was 
sentenced to six years in prison after 
entering a guilty plea that gave her a right to 
appeal the use of that law in her case. Bond 
said its use invaded the powers reserved to 
U.S. states under the 10th Amendment. 
In 2011, the Supreme Court said Bond had 
standing to fight her conviction, without 
deciding the merits, and sent the case to the 
3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Philadelphia. 
CACHE IN EACH CUPBOARD 
In May, the 3rd Circuit upheld the 
conviction, despite finding that the law 
"turns each kitchen cupboard and cleaning 
cabinet in America into a potential chemical 
weapons cache." 
The 3rd Circuit said the 1920 Supreme 
Court precedent, Missouri v. Holland, 
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limited its review to whether the federal law 
was rationally related to a valid treaty. 
"The arguable consequence of Holland is 
that treaties and associated legislation are 
simply not subject to Tenth Amendment 
scrutiny, no matter how far into the realm of 
states' rights the president and Congress may 
choose to venture," it found. 
In her latest Supreme Court appeal, Bond, 
represented by former Solicitor General Paul 
Clement, claimed that the federal 
government overreached in trying to 
criminalize "purely local conduct" by 
implementing the chemical weapons treaty. 
The U.S. government opposed the appeal, 
saying Congress had authority under the 
Constitution's Commerce Clause and 
Necessary and Proper Clause to enact the 
1998 law. 
It also said Bond could not escape the law 
"because her actions were anything but 
peaceful." 
The court could hear the appeal in April, and 
if it does would likely issue a decision by 
the end of June. 
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 “Jilted Suburbanite To Fight Terrorism Conviction In The Supreme Court” 
Business Insider 
Erin Fuchs 
January 22, 2013 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Friday to 
hear an unusually dramatic dispute: the case 
of a Pennsylvania suburbanite who allegedly 
tried to poison her husband's pregnant 
mistress. 
The nation's highest court will reexamine 
the conviction of Carol Anne Bond 
for allegedly spreading poison around the 
home of her husband's mistress, who was 
also her best friend. 
In 2011, the Supreme Court ruled 
Bond could challenge her conviction under a 
federal anti-terrorism law, and an appeals 
court ultimately upheld her six-year prison 
term. 
Now the Supreme Court will hear the case a 
second time, this time reviewing the merits 
of the prosecution including whether 
prosecutors had a right to charge Bond 
under the Chemical Weapons 
Implementation Act. 
The justices will consider Bond's argument 
that U.S. prosecutors had no business 
jumping into a "domestic dispute," 
especially using a law designed to police 
chemical weapons of mass destruction. 
Bond is represented by legal superstar Paul 
Clement, who's best known for opposing 
Obamacare and spearheading the legal battle 
to preserve the anti-gay Defense of Marriage 
Act. 
Clement's Supreme Court petition in the 
case paints a sad and intimate story of the 
alleged betrayal that led to a 42-year-old 
suburbanite's conviction under a federal 
anti-terror law. 
The drama began to unfold in 2006, when 
Bond's best friend Myrlinda Haynes 
announced her pregnancy. Bond, who 
couldn't have biological children of her own, 
was initially happy for her best friend. 
But then she learned her own husband was 
the father, the petition claims. 
"This double betrayal brought back painful 
memories of her father's infidelities, and 
petitioner suffered an emotional 
breakdown," the petition states. Her hair fell 
out. She had panic attacks. 
During the emotional breakdown, she 
bought potassium dichromate from 
Amazon.com and spread it around Haynes' 
house with the intention of giving her 
former best friend a rash, Bond's lawyers 
say. 
Ultimately, Haynes suffered only a tiny 
chemical burn on her thumb, according to 
Bond. 
Federal prosecutors then overstepped their 
authority by prosecuting Bond under an 
international arms-control treaty meant to 
stop the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, her lawyers argue. 
 360 
"Domestic disputes resulting from marital 
infidelities and culminating in a thumb burn 
are appropriately handled by local law 
enforcement authorities," the petition stated. 
The government argues Bond's conduct fell 
squarely within the anti-terrorism 
law. Haynes suffered 24 "chemical attacks" 
during a three-month period, forcing her to 
constantly have to check the area around her 
house for chemicals, the government says in 
its brief. 
The government goes on to say that Bond 
"vowed revenge and promised she would 
make Haynes' life a living hell." 
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“Once More Unto the Treaty-Power Breach” 
Cato Institute 
Ilya Shapiro & Trevor Burrus 
May 16, 2013 
The Carol Anne Bond saga continues. Now 
in her second trip to the Supreme Court—
and with Cato’s support for the fourth 
time—Bond is still hoping to avoid federal 
punishment stemming from her attempts to 
get back at her erstwhile best friend for 
having an affair with her husband. 
Bond, a microbiologist, spread toxic 
chemicals on her friend’s car and mailbox. 
Postal inspectors discovered this plot after 
they caught Bond on film stealing from the 
woman’s mailbox. Rather than leave this 
caper to local law enforcement, however, a 
federal prosecutor reached into his bag of 
tricks and charged Bond with violating a 
statute that implements U.S. treaty 
obligations under the 1993 Chemical 
Weapons Convention. 
Yes, rather than being charged with 
attempted murder and the like, Bond is 
essentially accused of chemical warfare. 
Bond challenged the federal government’s 
power to charge her with a crime, arguing 
that Congress lacks constitutional authority 
to pass general criminal statutes and cannot 
somehow acquire that authority through a 
treaty. Before a court could reach this issue, 
however, there was a question whether Bond 
could even make that argument under the 
Tenth Amendment, which reaffirms that any 
powers not delegated to Congress are 
reserved to the states or to the people. On 
Bond’s first trip to the Supreme Court, the 
Court unanimously accepted the argument, 
offered in an amicus brief by Cato and the 
Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, that 
there’s no reason in constitutional structure 
or history that someone can’t use the Tenth 
Amendment to challenge the 
constitutionality of the statute under which 
she was convicted. 
On remand to the Philadelphia-based U.S 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and 
now with standing to challenge that law, 
Bond raised the argument that Congress’s 
limited and enumerated powers cannot be 
increased by treaties. We again filed in that 
case in support of Bond. The Third Circuit 
disagreed, however—if reluctantly—based 
on one sentence written by Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes in the 1920 case 
of Missouri v. Holland, which has been 
interpreted to mean that treaties can indeed 
expand Congress’s powers. With Cato 
supporting her bid to return to the Supreme 
Court on that treaty power question, Bond’s 
case reached the high court. 
Now, in a brief authored by professor 
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz and joined by 
the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, 
the Atlantic Legal Foundation, and former 
attorney general Edwin Meese III—in what 
we hope will be our final filing in the case—
we argue that a treaty cannot give Congress 
the constitutional authority to charge Bond. 
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Allowing Congress to broaden its powers 
via treaties is an astounding manner in 
which to interpret a document that creates a 
federal government of limited powers. 
Not only would this mean that the president 
has the ability to expand federal power by 
signing a treaty, but it would mean 
that foreign governments could change 
federal power by abrogating previously 
valid treaties—thus removing the 
constitutional authority from certain laws. 
This perverse result makes Missouri v. 
Holland a doctrinal anomaly that the Court 
must either overrule or clarify. We also 
point out how the most influential argument 
supporting Holland is based on a clear 
misreading of constitutional history that has 
been repeated without question. 
Although Holland is nearly 100 years old, 
there is thus no reason to adhere to a 
precedent that is not only blatantly incorrect, 
but could severely threaten our system of 
government. We’re in a constitutional 
quagmire with respect to the treaty power, 
one that can only be escaped by limiting or 
overturning Missouri v. Holland. 
The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments 
in Bond v. United States in October. 
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UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, 
v. 
Brima WURIE, Defendant, Appellant. 
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit 
Decided on May 17, 2013 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted] 
STAHL, Circuit Judge 
This case requires us to decide whether the 
police, after seizing a cell phone from an 
individual's person as part of his lawful 
arrest, can search the phone's data without a 
warrant. We conclude that such a search 
exceeds the boundaries of the Fourth 
Amendment search-incident-to-arrest 
exception. Because the government has not 
argued that the search here was justified by 
exigent circumstances or any other 
exception to the warrant requirement, we 
reverse the denial of defendant-appellant 
Brima Wurie's motion to suppress, vacate 
his conviction, and remand his case to the 
district court. 
I. Facts & Background 
On the evening of September 5, 2007, 
Sergeant Detective Paul Murphy of the 
Boston Police Department (BPD) was 
performing routine surveillance in South 
Boston. He observed Brima Wurie, who was 
driving a Nissan Altima, stop in [a] parking 
lot … pick up a man later identified as Fred 
Wade, and engage in what Murphy believed 
was a drug sale in the car. Murphy and 
another BPD officer subsequently stopped 
Wade and found two plastic bags in his 
pocket, each containing 3.5 grams of crack 
cocaine. Wade admitted that he had bought 
the drugs from “B,” the man driving the 
Altima [and] that “B” lived in South Boston 
and sold crack cocaine. 
Murphy notified a third BPD officer, who 
was following the Altima. After Wurie 
parked the car, that officer arrested Wurie 
for distributing crack cocaine, read him 
Miranda warnings, and took him to the 
police station. When Wurie arrived at the 
station, two cell phones, a set of keys, and 
$1,275 in cash were taken from him. 
Five to ten minutes after Wurie arrived at 
the station, but before he was booked, two 
other BPD officers noticed that one of 
Wurie's cell phones, a gray Verizon LG 
phone, was repeatedly receiving calls from a 
number identified as “my house” on the 
external caller ID screen on the front of the 
phone. The officers were able to see the 
caller ID screen, and the “my house” label, 
in plain view. After about five more 
minutes, the officers opened the phone to 
look at Wurie's call log. Immediately upon 
opening the phone, the officers saw a 
photograph of a young black woman holding 
a baby, which was set as the phone's 
“wallpaper.” The officers then [determined] 
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the phone number associated with the “my 
house” caller ID reference. 
One of the officers typed that phone number 
into an online white pages directory, which 
revealed that the address associated with the 
number was on Silver Street... The name 
associated with the address was Manny 
Cristal. 
Sergeant Detective Murphy then gave Wurie 
a new set of Miranda warnings and asked 
him a series of questions. Wurie said, among 
other things, that he lived at an address on 
Speedwell Street in Dorchester and that he 
had only been “cruising around” in South 
Boston. He denied having stopped at the... 
store, having given anyone a ride, and 
having sold crack cocaine. 
Suspecting that Wurie was a drug dealer, 
that he was lying about his address, and that 
he might have drugs hidden at his house, 
Murphy took Wurie's keys and, with other 
officers, went to the Silver Street address 
associated with the “my house” number. 
One of the mailboxes at that address listed 
the names Wurie and Cristal. Through the 
first-floor apartment window, the officers 
saw a black woman who looked like the 
woman whose picture appeared on Wurie's 
cell phone wallpaper. The officers entered 
the apartment to “freeze” it while they 
obtained a search warrant. Inside the 
apartment, they found a sleeping child who 
looked like the child in the picture on 
Wurie's phone. After obtaining the warrant, 
the officers seized from the apartment, 
among other things, 215 grams of crack 
cocaine, a firearm, ammunition, four bags of 
marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and $250 in 
cash. 
Wurie was charged with possessing with 
intent to distribute and distributing cocaine 
base and with being a felon in possession of 
a firearm and ammunition. He filed a motion 
to suppress the evidence obtained as a result 
of the warrantless search of his cell phone; 
the parties agreed that the relevant facts 
were not in dispute and that an evidentiary 
hearing was unnecessary. The district court 
denied Wurie's motion to suppress, and, 
after a four-day trial, the jury found Wurie 
guilty on all three counts. He was sentenced 
to 262 months in prison. This appeal 
followed. 
II. Analysis 
In considering the denial of a motion to 
suppress, we review the district court's 
factual findings for clear error and its legal 
conclusions de novo.  
…Today, a warrantless search is per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, 
unless one of “a few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions” applies. 
One of those exceptions allows the police, 
when they make a lawful arrest, to search 
“the arrestee's person and the area within his 
immediate control.” In recent years, courts 
have grappled with the question of whether 
the search-incident-to-arrest exception 
extends to data within an arrestee's cell 
phone. 
A. The legal landscape 
The modern search-incident-to-arrest 
doctrine emerged from Chimel v. California, 
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in which the Supreme Court held that a 
warrantless search of the defendant's entire 
house was not justified by the fact that it 
occurred as part of his valid arrest. The 
Court found that the search-incident-to-
arrest exception permits an arresting officer 
“to search for and seize any evidence on the 
arrestee's person in order to prevent its 
concealment or destruction” and to search 
“the area into which an arrestee might reach 
in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary 
items.” The justifications underlying the 
exception, as articulated in Chimel, were 
protecting officer safety and ensuring the 
preservation of evidence.  
Four years later, in United States v. 
Robinson, the Supreme Court examined how 
the search-incident-to-arrest exception 
applies to searches of the person. Robinson 
was arrested for driving with a revoked 
license, and in conducting a pat down, the 
arresting officer felt an object that he could 
not identify in Robinson's coat pocket. He 
removed the object, which turned out to be a 
cigarette package, and then felt the package 
and determined that it contained something 
other than cigarettes. Upon opening the 
package, the officer found fourteen capsules 
of heroin. The Court held that the 
warrantless search of the cigarette package 
was valid, explaining that the police have 
the authority to conduct “a full search of the 
person” incident to a lawful arrest.  
Robinson reiterated the principle, discussed 
in Chimel, that “[t]he justification or reason 
for the authority to search incident to a 
lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need 
to disarm the suspect in order to take him 
into custody as it does on the need to 
preserve evidence on his person for later use 
at trial.” However, the Court also said the 
following: 
The authority to search the person 
incident to a lawful custodial arrest, 
while based upon the need to disarm and 
to discover evidence, does not depend on 
what a court may later decide was the 
probability in a particular arrest situation 
that weapons or evidence would in fact 
be found upon the person of the suspect. 
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on 
probable cause is a reasonable intrusion 
under the Fourth Amendment; that 
intrusion being lawful, a search incident 
to the arrest requires no additional 
justification. 
The following year, the Court decided 
United States v. Edwards. Edwards was 
arrested on suspicion of burglary and 
detained at a local jail. After his arrest, 
police realized that Edwards's clothing, 
which he was still wearing, might contain 
paint chips tying him to the burglary. The 
police seized the articles of clothing and 
examined them for paint fragments. The 
Court upheld the search, concluding that 
once it became apparent that the items of 
clothing might contain destructible evidence 
of a crime, “the police were entitled to take, 
examine, and preserve them for use as 
evidence, just as they are normally permitted 
to seize evidence of crime when it is 
lawfully encountered.”  
The Court again addressed the search-
incident-to-arrest exception in United States 
v. Chadwick, abrogated on other grounds by 
California v. Acevedo, this time 
emphasizing that not all warrantless 
searches undertaken in the context of a 
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custodial arrest are constitutionally 
reasonable. In Chadwick, the defendants 
were arrested immediately after having 
loaded a footlocker into the trunk of a car. 
The footlocker remained under the exclusive 
control of federal narcotics agents until they 
opened it, without a warrant and about an 
hour and a half after the defendants were 
arrested, and found marijuana in it. The 
Court invalidated the search, concluding that 
the justifications for the search-incident-to-
arrest exception—the need for the arresting 
officer “[t]o safeguard himself and others, 
and to prevent the loss of evidence”—were 
absent. The search “was conducted more 
than an hour after federal agents had gained 
exclusive control of the footlocker and long 
after respondents were securely in custody” 
and therefore could not “be viewed as 
incidental to the arrest or as justified by any 
other exigency.”  
Finally, there is the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Arizona v. Gant. Gant involved 
the search of an arrestee's vehicle... Once 
again, the Court reiterated the twin 
rationales underlying the exception, first 
articulated in Chimel… Relying on [] safety 
and evidentiary justifications, the Court 
found that a search of a vehicle incident to 
arrest is lawful “when the arrestee is 
unsecured and within reaching distance of 
the passenger compartment at the time of the 
search.”  
Courts have struggled to apply the Supreme 
Court's search-incident-to-arrest 
jurisprudence to the search of data on a cell 
phone seized from the person. The searches 
at issue in the cases that have arisen thus far 
have involved everything from simply 
obtaining a cell phone's number, to looking 
through an arrestee's call records, text 
messages, or photographs. 
Though a majority of these courts have 
ultimately upheld warrantless cell phone 
data searches, they have used a variety of 
approaches. Some have concluded that, 
under Robinson and Edwards, a cell phone 
can be freely searched incident to a 
defendant's lawful arrest, with no 
justification beyond the fact of the arrest 
itself. Others have, to varying degrees, relied 
on the need to preserve evidence on a cell 
phone. The Seventh Circuit discussed the 
Chimel rationales more explicitly in Flores–
Lopez, assuming that warrantless cell phone 
searches must be justified by a need to 
protect arresting officers or preserve 
destructible evidence, and finding that 
evidence preservation concerns outweighed 
the invasion of privacy at issue in that case, 
because the search was minimally invasive. 
A smaller number of courts have rejected 
warrantless cell phone searches, with 
similarly disparate reasoning. In United 
States v. Park, for example, the court 
concluded that a cell phone should be 
viewed not as an item immediately 
associated with the person under Robinson 
and Edwards but as a possession within an 
arrestee's immediate control under 
Chadwick, which cannot be searched once 
the phone comes into the exclusive control 
of the police, absent exigent 
circumstances… 
B. Our vantage point 
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We begin from the premise that, in the 
Fourth Amendment context, “[a] single, 
familiar standard is essential to guide police 
officers, who have only limited time and 
expertise to reflect on and balance the social 
and individual interests involved in the 
specific circumstances they confront.”… 
Thus, we find it necessary to craft a bright-
line rule that applies to all warrantless cell 
phone searches, rather than resolving this 
case based solely on the particular 
circumstances of the search at issue. 
The government seems to agree, urging us to 
find that a cell phone, like any other item 
carried on the person, can be thoroughly 
searched incident to a lawful arrest. The 
government's reasoning goes roughly as 
follows: (1) Wurie's cell phone was an item 
immediately associated with his person…; 
(2) such items can be freely searched 
without any justification beyond the fact of 
the lawful arrest; (3) the search can occur 
even after the defendant has been taken into 
custody and transported to the station house; 
and (4) there is no limit on the scope of the 
search, other than the Fourth Amendment's 
core reasonableness requirement. 
This “literal reading of the Robinson 
decision” fails to account for the fact that the 
Supreme Court has determined that there are 
categories of searches undertaken following 
an arrest that are inherently unreasonable 
because they are never justified by one of 
the Chimel rationales: protecting arresting 
officers or preserving destructible evidence. 
As we explain below, this case therefore 
turns on whether the government can 
demonstrate that warrantless cell phone 
searches, as a category, fall within the 
boundaries laid out in Chimel. 
The government admitted at oral argument 
that its interpretation of the search-incident-
to-arrest exception would give law 
enforcement broad latitude to search any 
electronic device seized from a person 
during his lawful arrest... The search could 
encompass things like text messages, emails, 
or photographs, though the officers here 
only searched Wurie's call log. Robinson 
and Edwards, the government claims, 
compel such a finding. 
We suspect that the eighty-five percent of 
Americans who own cell phones and “use 
the devices to do much more than make 
phone calls,” would have some difficulty 
with the government's view that “Wurie's 
cell phone was indistinguishable from other 
kinds of personal possessions, like a 
cigarette package, wallet, pager, or address 
book, that fall within the search incident to 
arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement.” In reality, “a modern 
cell phone is a computer,” and “a computer 
... is not just another purse or address 
book.”… 
 That information is, by and large, of a 
highly personal nature: photographs, videos, 
written and audio messages (text, email, and 
voicemail), contacts, calendar appointments, 
web search and browsing history, purchases, 
and financial and medical records. It is the 
kind of information one would previously 
have stored in one's home and that would 
have been off-limits to officers performing a 
search incident to arrest…  
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In short, individuals today store much more 
personal information on their cell phones 
than could ever fit in a wallet, address book, 
briefcase, or any of the other traditional 
containers that the government has 
invoked… [T]he government's proposed 
rule would give law enforcement automatic 
access to “a virtual warehouse” of an 
individual's “most intimate communications 
and photographs without probable cause” if 
the individual is subject to a custodial arrest, 
even for something as minor as a traffic 
violation…  
It is true that Robinson speaks broadly, and 
that the Supreme Court has never found the 
constitutionality of a search of the person 
incident to arrest to turn on the kind of item 
seized or its capacity to store private 
information. In our view, however, what 
distinguishes a warrantless search of the data 
within a modern cell phone from the 
inspection of an arrestee's cigarette pack or 
the examination of his clothing is not just 
the nature of the item searched, but the 
nature and scope of the search itself. 
In Gant, the Court emphasized the need for 
“the scope of a search incident to arrest” to 
be “commensurate with its purposes,” which 
include “protecting arresting officers and 
safeguarding any evidence of the offense of 
arrest that an arrestee might conceal or 
destroy.” Inspecting the contents of a 
cigarette pack can (and, in Robinson, did) 
preserve destructible evidence (heroin 
capsules). It is also at least theoretically 
necessary to protect the arresting officer, 
who does not know what he will find inside 
the cigarette pack. Examining the clothing 
an arrestee is wearing can (and, in Edwards, 
did) preserve destructible evidence (paint 
chips). Thus, the searches at issue in 
Robinson and Edwards were the kinds of 
reasonable, self-limiting searches that do not 
offend the Fourth Amendment, even when 
conducted without a warrant. The same can 
be said of searches of wallets, address 
books, purses, and briefcases, which are all 
potential repositories for destructible 
evidence and, in some cases, weapons. 
When faced, however, with categories of 
searches that cannot ever be justified under 
Chimel, the Supreme Court has taken a 
different approach. In Chadwick, the Court 
struck down warrantless searches of 
“luggage or other personal property not 
immediately associated with the person of 
the arrestee” that the police have “reduced ... 
to their exclusive control,” because such 
searches are not necessary to preserve 
destructible evidence or protect officer 
safety. The searches at issue in Chadwick 
[was] general, evidence-gathering search, 
not easily subject to any limiting principle, 
and the Fourth Amendment permits such 
searches only pursuant to a lawful warrant. 
We therefore find it necessary to ask 
whether the warrantless search of data 
within a cell phone can ever be justified 
under Chimel. The government has provided 
little guidance on that question. [T]he 
government has included just one, notably 
tentative footnote in its brief attempting to 
place warrantless cell phone data searches 
within the Chimel boundaries. We find 
ourselves unconvinced. 
The government does not argue that cell 
phone data searches are justified by a need 
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to protect arresting officers. Wurie concedes 
that arresting officers can inspect a cell 
phone to ensure that it is not actually a 
weapon, but we have no reason to believe 
that officer safety would require a further 
intrusion into the phone's contents… 
The government has, however, suggested 
that the search here was “arguably” 
necessary to prevent the destruction of 
evidence. Specifically, the government 
points to the possibility that the calls on 
Wurie's call log could have been overwritten 
or the contents of his phone remotely wiped 
if the officers had waited to obtain a 
warrant. The problem with the government's 
argument is that it does not seem to be 
particularly difficult to prevent overwriting 
of calls or remote wiping of information on 
a cell phone today. Arresting officers have at 
least three options. First, in some instances, 
they can simply turn the phone off or 
remove its battery. Second, they can put the 
phone in a Faraday enclosure, a relatively 
inexpensive device…Third, they may be 
able “to ‘mirror’ (copy) the entire cell phone 
contents, to preserve them should the phone 
be remotely wiped, without looking at the 
copy unless the original disappears.” 
Indeed, if there is a genuine threat of remote 
wiping or overwriting, we find it difficult to 
understand why the police do not routinely 
use these evidence preservation methods, 
rather than risking the loss of the evidence 
during the time it takes them to search 
through the phone… While the measures 
described above may be less convenient for 
arresting officers than conducting a full 
search of a cell phone's data incident to 
arrest, the government has not suggested 
that they are unworkable, and it bears the 
burden of justifying its failure to obtain a 
warrant.  
Instead of truly attempting to fit this case 
within the Chimel framework, the 
government insists that we should disregard 
the Chimel rationales entirely, for two 
reasons. 
First, the government emphasizes that 
Robinson rejected the idea that “there must 
be litigated in each case the issue of whether 
or not there was present one of the reasons 
supporting the authority for a search of the 
person incident to a lawful arrest.” That 
holding was predicated on an assumption, 
clarified in Chadwick, that “[t]he potential 
dangers lurking in all custodial arrests” are 
what “make warrantless searches of items 
within the ‘immediate control’ area 
reasonable without requiring the arresting 
officer to calculate the probability that 
weapons or destructible evidence may be 
involved.”… [H]owever, we are not 
suggesting a rule that would require 
arresting officers or reviewing courts to 
decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether a 
particular cell phone data search is justified 
under Chimel. Rather, we believe that 
warrantless cell phone data searches are 
categorically unlawful under the search-
incident-to-arrest exception, given the 
government's failure to demonstrate that 
they are ever necessary to promote officer 
safety or prevent the destruction of 
evidence. We read Robinson as compatible 
with such a finding. 
Second, the government places great weight 
on a footnote at the end of Chadwick stating 
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that searches of the person, unlike “searches 
of possessions within an arrestee's 
immediate control,” are “justified by ... 
reduced expectations of privacy caused by 
the arrest.” …  
Yet the Court clearly stated in Robinson that 
“[t]he authority to search the person incident 
to a lawful custodial arrest” is “based upon 
the need to disarm and to discover 
evidence,” and Chadwick did not alter that 
rule. When the Court decided Robinson in 
1973 and Chadwick in 1977, any search of 
the person would almost certainly have been 
the type of self-limiting search that could be 
justified under Chimel. The Court, more 
than thirty-five years ago, could not have 
envisioned a world in which the vast 
majority of arrestees would be carrying on 
their person an item containing not physical 
evidence but a vast store of intangible 
data—data that is not immediately 
destructible and poses no threat to the 
arresting officers. 
In the end, we therefore part ways with the 
Seventh Circuit, which also applied the 
Chimel rationales in Flores–Lopez. Though 
the court described the risk of evidence 
destruction as arguably “so slight as to be 
outweighed by the invasion of privacy from 
the search,” it found that risk to be 
sufficient, given the minimal nature of the 
intrusion at issue (the officers had only 
searched the cell phone for its number). That 
conclusion was based, at least in part, on 
Seventh Circuit precedent allowing a 
“minimally invasive” warrantless search.  
We are faced with different precedent and 
different facts, but we also see little room 
for a case-specific holding, given the 
Supreme Court's insistence on bright-line 
rules in the Fourth Amendment context.… 
[W]hile the search of Wurie's call log was 
less invasive than a search of text messages, 
emails, or photographs, it is necessary for all 
warrantless cell phone data searches to be 
governed by the same rule… 
We therefore hold that the search-incident-
to-arrest exception does not authorize the 
warrantless search of data on a cell phone 
seized from an arrestee's person, because the 
government has not convinced us that such a 
search is ever necessary to protect arresting 
officers or preserve destructible evidence. 
Instead, warrantless cell phone data searches 
strike us as a convenient way for the police 
to obtain information related to a defendant's 
crime of arrest—or other, as yet 
undiscovered crimes—without having to 
secure a warrant. We find nothing in the 
Supreme Court's search-incident-to-arrest 
jurisprudence that sanctions such a “general 
evidence-gathering search.”  
There are, however, other exceptions to the 
warrant requirement that the government has 
not invoked here but that might justify a 
warrantless search of cell phone data under 
the right conditions. Most importantly, we 
assume that the exigent circumstances 
exception would allow the police to conduct 
an immediate, warrantless search of a cell 
phone's data where they have probable cause 
to believe that the phone contains evidence 
of a crime, as well as a compelling need to 
act quickly that makes it impracticable for 
them to obtain a warrant-for example, where 
the phone is believed to contain evidence 
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necessary to locate a kidnapped child or to 
investigate a bombing plot or incident.  
C. The good-faith exception 
That leaves only the government's belated 
argument, made for the first time in a 
footnote in its brief on appeal, that 
suppression is inappropriate here under the 
good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule. The government bears the “heavy 
burden” of proving that the good-faith 
exception applies, and it did not invoke the 
exception before the district court. 
… In this case, [] we do not believe that 
ground should be one with respect to which 
the government bore the burden of proof and 
entirely failed to carry that burden below, 
despite the fact that the issue was ripe for 
the district court's review. 
III. Conclusion 
… Today, many Americans store their most 
personal “papers” and “effects,” in 
electronic format on a cell phone, carried on 
the person. Allowing the police to search 
that data without a warrant any time they 
conduct a lawful arrest would, in our view, 
create “a serious and recurring threat to the 
privacy of countless individuals.” 
We therefore reverse the denial of Wurie's 
motion to suppress, vacate his conviction, 
and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
HOWARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
Undoubtedly, most of us would prefer that 
the information stored in our cell phones be 
kept from prying eyes, should a phone be 
lost or taken from our hands by the police 
during an arrest. One could, individually, 
take protective steps to enhance the phone's 
security settings with respect to that 
information, or for that matter legislation 
might be enacted to make such unprotected 
information off-limits to finders or to the 
police unless they first obtain a warrant to 
search the phone. But the question here is 
whether the Fourth Amendment requires this 
court to abandon long-standing precedent 
and place such unprotected information 
contained in cell phones beyond the reach of 
the police when making a custodial arrest. I 
think that we are neither required nor 
authorized to rule as the majority has. 
Instead, this case requires us to apply a 
familiar legal standard to a new form of 
technology…. In this exercise, consistency 
is a virtue… Having scrutinized the relevant 
Supreme Court decisions, as well as our own 
precedent, I find no support for Wurie's 
claim that he had a constitutional right 
protecting the information obtained during 
the warrantless search. Nor do I believe that 
we possess the authority to create such a 
right. Therefore, I respectfully dissent… 
We have long acknowledged that police 
officers can extract this type of information 
from containers immediately associated with 
a person at the time of arrest. In United 
States v. Sheehan, police arrested a 
suspected bank robber and then searched his 
wallet, which included a piece of paper 
bearing several names and telephone 
numbers. The police officers copied this 
piece of paper, which action Sheehan 
challenged as an unconstitutional seizure. 
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The claim is made that Sheehan is 
inapposite to the present case because it 
concerned a challenge to the seizure, not the 
search. We, however, did not address the 
warrantless search in Sheehan because its 
legality was beyond dispute… 
The police officers' limited search of one 
telephone number in Wurie's call log was 
even less intrusive than the searches in these 
cases. The police observed, in plain view, 
multiple calls from “my house”… to Wurie's 
cell phone. Only then did they initiate their 
search and only for the limited purpose of 
retrieving the actual phone number 
associated with “my house.” The police did 
not rummage through Wurie's cell phone, 
unsure of what they could find… The 
additional step of identifying the actual 
telephone number hardly constituted a 
further intrusion on Wurie's privacy 
interests, especially since that information is 
immediately known to the third-party 
telephone company. This case fits easily 
within existing precedent. 
Nor are there any other persuasive grounds 
for distinguishing this case from our 
previous decisions. That the container the 
police searched was a cell phone is not, by 
itself, dispositive, for “a constitutional 
distinction between ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ 
containers would be improper.” We made a 
similar observation in United States v. 
Eatherton, where we upheld the warrantless 
search of a briefcase incident to an arrest…  
Even assuming that cell phones possess 
unique attributes that we must consider as 
part of our analysis, none of those attributes 
are present in this case. Though we do not 
know the storage capacity of Wurie's cell 
phone, we know that the police did not 
browse through voluminous data in search 
of general evidence. Nor did they search the 
“cloud,” or other applications containing 
particularly sensitive information. Instead, 
they conducted a focused and limited search 
of Wurie's electronic call log. If the 
information that they sought had been 
written on a piece of paper, as opposed to 
stored electronically, there would be no 
question that the police acted 
constitutionally, so I see no reason to hold 
otherwise in this case. The constitutionality 
of a search cannot turn solely on whether the 
information is written in ink or displayed 
electronically. 
The issue of warrantless cell phone searches 
has come before a number of circuits. None 
of them have adopted the majority's 
categorical bar on warrantless cell phone 
searches. Instead, they unanimously have 
concluded that the cell phone searches 
before them did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
I reach the same conclusion here…. 
In my view, there is another rationale, 
apparent from the record, for upholding this 
search: the risk that others might have 
destroyed evidence after Wurie did not 
answer his phone. Wurie received repeated 
calls from “my house” in the span of a few 
minutes after his arrest. His failure to answer 
these phone calls could have alerted Wurie's 
confederates to his arrest, prompting them to 
destroy further evidence of his crimes. The 
majority asserts that this scenario would be 
present “in almost every instance of a 
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custodial arrest,” giving police an ever-ready 
justification to search cell phones. On the 
contrary, the justification is based on the 
specific facts of this case. The fact that “my 
house” repeatedly called Wurie's cell phone 
provided an objective basis for enhanced 
concern that evidence might be destroyed 
and thus gave the police a valid reason to 
inspect the phone…  
Wurie himself suffered no constitutional 
violation during the search. If we are to 
fashion a rule, it cannot elide the facts 
before us. “The constitutional validity of a 
warrantless search is pre-eminently the sort 
of question which can only be decided in the 
concrete factual context of the individual 
case.” Yet the competing analysis focuses 
on hypothetical searches that have not 
emerged in any case or controversy before 
this court… 
The majority gets around this problem by 
requiring the government to “demonstrate 
that warrantless cell phone searches, as a 
category, fall within the boundaries laid out 
in Chimel.” … The Supreme Court [has 
held] on two occasions, neither of which 
involved the search of items held by the 
arrestee, that certain types of searches 
require a warrant because they lack any 
Chimel justification. But the Supreme Court 
has not extrapolated from those cases a 
general rule that the government justify each 
category of searches under Chimel, nor a 
requirement that the appellate courts 
conduct this sort of analysis. 
Indeed, if the Supreme Court wishes us to 
look at searches incident to arrest on a 
categorical basis, it is curious that the Court 
has offered absolutely no framework for 
defining what constitutes a distinct category. 
… Yet no relevant criteria are articulated for 
establishing these categories… 
Thus, either we are drastically altering the 
holding in United States v. Robinson by 
forcing the government to provide a Chimel 
rationale for practically every search, or we 
are putting ourselves in the position of 
deciding, without any conceptual basis, 
which searches are part of a distinct 
“category” and which are not. This runs the 
risk of spreading confusion in the law 
enforcement community and multiplying, 
rather than limiting, litigation pertaining to 
these searches… 
As the government points out, the Supreme 
Court cases treat searches of the arrestee and 
the items on the arrestee—as is the case 
here—as either not subject to the Chimel 
analysis, or at a least subject to a lower level 
of Chimel scrutiny. These cases, unlike 
Chimel and Gant, are on point with Wurie's 
case, and we are not free to disregard them 
in favor of the principles enunciated in 
Gant… 
In Robinson, the Supreme Court drew a 
sharp distinction between two types of 
searches pursuant to an arrest: searches of 
the arrestee and searches of the area within 
his control. “The validity of the search of a 
person incident to a lawful arrest has been 
regarded as settled from its first enunciation, 
and has remained virtually unchallenged.... 
Throughout the series of cases in which the 
Court has addressed the second [type of 
search,] no doubt has been expressed as to 
the unqualified authority of the arresting 
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authority to search the person of the 
arrestee.” The Supreme Court did state that 
the basis of this authority is “the need to 
disarm and to discover evidence,” but in the 
next sentence clarified that “[a] custodial 
arrest of a suspect based on probable cause 
is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth 
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a 
search incident to the arrest requires no 
additional justification,”  
Indeed, the Court could not rely on a Chimel 
justification in Robinson, as the arresting 
officer conceded that he “did not in fact 
believe that the object in [Robinson]'s coat 
pocket was a weapon” and that he gave no 
thought to the destruction of evidence either. 
Robinson may not have rejected Chimel in 
the context of searches of an arrestee and 
items on the arrestee, but it did establish that 
these searches differ from other types of 
searches incident to arrest… 
Even in Chadwick, where the Supreme 
Court did require the police to obtain a 
warrant for a category of searches, it 
continued to treat the search of an arrestee 
and items immediately associated with him 
as independently justified by “reduced 
expectations of privacy caused by the 
arrest.”… These cases, taken together, 
establish that items immediately associated 
with the arrestee—as a category—may be 
searched without any Chimel justification. 
The majority seeks a bright-line rule to 
govern cell phone searches, but denies the 
fact that such a rule—covering all items on 
the arrestee's person—already exists. 
But even if searches of items on an arrestee 
required Chimel justifications, I cannot see 
why cell phones fail to meet this standard if 
wallets, cigarette packages, address books, 
briefcases, and purses do… 
One argument is that these other items, 
unlike cell phones, all theoretically could 
contain “destructible” evidence, which 
justifies examining them. But the evidence 
in a cell phone is just as destructible as the 
evidence in a wallet: with the press of a few 
buttons, accomplished even remotely, cell 
phones can wipe themselves clean of data. 
Any claim that the information is not 
destructible strikes me as simply wrong… 
Another argument is that because cell phone 
searches are not “self-limiting,” they always 
require a warrant. The majority does not 
precisely define the term “self-limiting,” but 
I gather that it refers to the danger that cell 
phones, because of their vast storage 
capabilities, are susceptible to “general, 
evidence-gathering searches.” As an initial 
matter, this has never been the focus of 
Supreme Court cases discussing the search 
incident to arrest exception for items 
immediately associated with the 
arrestee.Thus, I am reluctant to give it much 
weight in assessing Wurie's constitutional 
claim. 
Nonetheless, if we are concerned that police 
officers will exceed the limits of 
constitutional behavior while searching cell 
phones, then we should define those limits 
so that police can perform their job both 
effectively and constitutionally. Instead, the 
majority has lumped all cell phone searches 
together, even while perhaps acknowledging 
that its broad rule may prohibit some 
otherwise constitutional searches… 
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Still, I share many of the majority's concerns 
about the privacy interests at stake in cell 
phone searches. While the warrantless 
search of Wurie's phone fits within one of 
our “specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions,” due to the rapid 
technological development of cell phones 
and their increasing prevalence in society, 
cell phone searches do pose a risk of 
depriving arrestees of their protection 
against unlawful searches and seizures. 
There must be an outer limit to their legality. 
In Flores–Lopez, Judge Posner suggested 
that courts should balance the need to search 
a cell phone against the privacy interests at 
stake. 
[E]ven when the risk either to the police 
officers or to the existence of the 
evidence is negligible, the search is 
allowed, provided it's no more invasive 
than, say, a frisk, or the search of a 
conventional container, such as 
Robinson's cigarette pack, in which 
heroin was found. If instead of a frisk it's 
a strip search, the risk to the officers' 
safety or to the preservation of evidence 
of crime must be greater to justify the 
search. 
I believe that cell phone searches should 
follow this formula. That is not to say that 
the police must prove a risk to officer safety 
or destruction of evidence in every case. 
There is, inherent in every custodial arrest, 
some minimal risk to officer safety and 
destruction of evidence. Moreover, 
Chadwick states that the arrest itself 
diminishes the arrestee's privacy rights over 
items “immediately associated” with the 
arrestee. But the invasion of the arrestee's 
privacy should be proportional to the 
justification for the warrantless search… 
[W]hile Robinson's principles generally 
authorize cell phone searches, and certainly 
encompass the search in this case, there are 
reasonable limits to Robinson that we should 
not hesitate to enforce, especially in light of 
a cell phone's unique technological 
capabilities, for “[i]t would be foolish to 
contend that the degree of privacy secured to 
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been 
entirely unaffected by the advance of 
technology.”… 
But ultimately the question of what 
constitutes an unreasonable cell phone 
search should be left for another day. The 
majority has outlined some of the more 
troubling privacy invasions that could occur 
during a warrantless search. So long as they 
remain in the hypothetical realm, I think it 
premature to draw the line. Suffice it to say 
that, for the reasons I have stated, the search 
in this case fell on the constitutional side of 
that line. 
I respectfully dissent. 
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“U.S. Appeals on Cellphone Privacy” 
SCOTUS Blog 
Lyle Denniston 
August 16, 2013 
The Obama administration, taking the 
advice of two judges to rush the issue to the 
Supreme Court, has moved quickly to ask 
the Justices to rule that police are free to 
look through the contents of a private 
cellphone they take from an individual they 
arrest, and to do so without a judge’s 
approval. 
About two weeks after the First Circuit 
Court voted to leave intact a ruling that such 
searches are unconstitutional if police do not 
have a search warrant, the government on 
Thursday asked the Supreme Court to 
overturn that decision.  The government 
could have taken three months to begin an 
appeal.  The case is United States v. Wurie 
(docket 13-212).  An earlier post on the 
constitutional controversy can be read here. 
The key to the government’s argument is 
that police have long had the authority, 
without a warrant, to search items that are 
found on a person whom they arrest.  That 
has been “a bright-line rule,” the petition 
said, that as long as the arrest was valid, 
items that person was carrying should be 
open to search by officers. 
Creating exceptions to that rule, on an 
“item-by-item” basis, would undercut that 
rule and complicate police enforcement 
activity.  “No sound rule justifies excluding 
cellphones, the contents of which are far 
more susceptible to destruction than most 
other evidence,” the petition argued.   There 
are no exceptions for wallets, calendars, 
address books, pagers, and pocket diaries, 
and none should be created for hand-held 
telephones, the government contended. 
The issue, however, has divided lower 
courts, the petition noted.  In fact, the First 
Circuit Court ruling requiring a warrant for 
officers to search an arrestee’s cellphone 
conflicts directly with an opposite ruling by 
the highest court of Massachusetts.  
Massachusetts, of course, is in the 
geographic area of the First Circuit, so the 
petition said that the conflict between the 
two courts in that area leaves police with 
“the task of making sense” of their legal 
duty. 
The petition added: “Particularly given the 
ubiquity of cellphone use by drug traffickers 
and other serious offenders, and the 
important law-enforcement consequences of 
unsettling search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, 
the question presented now ‘requires an 
authoritative answer from the Supreme 
Court,’” the petition said, quoting a judge on 
the First Circuit Court. 
The same issue raised in the case is already 
on file at the Court, in Riley v. California 
(docket 12-132).  With the widening conflict 
among lower courts, review of the issue by 
the Justices is highly likely, during the new 
Term that opens in October.   The new 
government petition mentions the Riley case 
in a final footnote, but implied that the 
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Wurie case would present a better test of the 
constitutional issues.  (A reader has 
suggested that the government may have 
rushed to file its own appeal in order to give 
it an added chance to be considered in 
competition with the Riley case.) 
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“What Seized Cellphones and Leftovers Have in Common” 
Wall Street Journal 
Jacob Gershman 
August 26, 2013 
We think of Reynolds Wrap as the stuff used 
to cover last night’s roast chicken. 
In a new paper, law professor Adam 
Gershowitz of William & Mary Law School 
explains how aluminium foil can be used to 
literally foil criminal suspects. 
The paper concerns one of the most hotly 
debated legal questions of the day – whether 
the U.S. Constitution permits police to 
search a suspect’s cellphone at the time of 
arrest. 
Mr. Gershowitz thinks that police should be 
allowed to seize a phone. But, absent a 
specific exigency, he thinks police should 
have to get a warrant before searching its 
contents. 
A problem for authorities is that 
smartphones come with remote-erase 
features that allow a suspect to wipe 
evidence from a seized phone. 
In a forthcoming article in the William & 
Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Mr. Gershowitz 
lays out how police can minimize that risk 
without stepping over constitutional lines. 
One option, he says, is using a data 
extraction device to copy the phone’s 
contents. Those devices cost tens of 
thousands of dollars, making it unrealistic 
for police to carry a bunch of them around 
on patrol. 
Here’s where his paper starts to read like 
those old “Bet You Can” science books for 
kids. 
Mr. Gershowitz suggests that police shield 
store the device in a signal-blocking Faraday 
bag, which you can buy on Amazon.com for 
$58. 
An even cheaper option can be found in any 
kitchen cabinet — aluminum foil. 
“When the police seize a phone, they simply 
have to wrap the phone in a few layers of 
aluminum foil and the chance of remote 
wiping of the phone will be almost 
completely eliminated,” writes Mr. 
Gershowitz. 
The bag and foil tricks aren’t foolproof. 
They won’t save data that has been pre-
programmed to delete. 
But he says the measures could go a long 
way toward protecting evidence without 
giving police “carte blanche” to conduct 
warrantless searches. 
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“Can Police Search a Seized Cell Phone Without a Warrant?” 
FindLaw 
Kelly Cheung 
May 23, 2013 
Seized cell phones are safe from a 
warrantless search by police, the First 
Circuit recently held. The court ruled that a 
police cell phone search for data is not 
constitutional when a person is arrested 
unless officers get a warrant first. 
For Brima Wurie, his cell phone was the one 
important item that was searched by police 
officers the evening he was arrested for 
possessing crack cocaine. Because police 
looked through his seized cell phone without 
a warrant, they knew to search Wurie's 
house, where they found 215 grams of 
cocaine -- a huge difference from the 3.5 
grams found in his possession. 
The Fourth Amendment, which Wurie 
claims was violated in his case, protects 
people's right to feel secure in their persons, 
homes, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable search and seizures. The First 
Circuit had to decide if the search-incident-
to-arrest exception to a warrantless search 
includes a police search of an arrestee's 
seized cell phone. 
The court considered various case 
precedents that involved items like clothing, 
footlockers, cigarette packages, and cell 
phones. It ultimately focused on both the 
nature and scope of the search conducted on 
the confiscated cell phone. 
According to the court, what is 
distinguishable about a seized cell phone is 
that it does not hold any evidence that can 
be destroyed before police get a warrant. An 
arrestee is away from it at that point. The 
seized phone itself also does not pose any 
immediate safety threat to the arresting 
officers to justify a warrantless search of it 
either. 
The government attempted to create an 
argument that the phone data could get 
overwritten remotely. But the court stated 
that there were simple methods for police to 
address that concern. For example, police 
can simply turn the phone off, take the 
battery out, or copy the data before it gets 
wiped clean. 
In Wurie's case, police could have just 
waited to get a warrant to search Wurie's 
seized cell phone, the court held. There was 
no need to go through the confiscated cell 
phone before obtaining a warrant. With the 
suspect under arrest, the evidence in this 
case would have still been there safely at his 
house. 
As technology advances, our arrest and 
warrant rules may need to be modified as 
technology changes our lives. There's a huge 
privacy concern when it comes to cell 
phones, and this court recognized that. 
The privacy concerns far outweigh the need 
for police to search a seized cell phone 
without a warrant. Cell phones are more like 
our papers and effects protected under the 
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Fourth Amendment. They carry a lot of 
personal information that most of us 
wouldn't even want our family members 
looking at, let alone a police officer. Hence, 
the utility of a password protection feature 
that would have prevented police from 
snooping so soon in Wurie's case. 
Police search of seized cell phones is an 
important issue that affects most people. The 
Florida Supreme Court found that 
warrantless cell phone searches are 
unconstitutional just a few weeks ago. 
However, four other federal circuit courts 
have ruled in favor of searching a person's 
cell phone after arrest, as the Associated 
Press reported. It will be interesting to see if 
and how the U.S. Supreme Court will weigh 
in on this very private issue. 
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Paroline v. U.S. 
 
12-8561 
 
Ruling Below: In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012), cert granted, 2013 WL 
497856 (U.S. 2013). 
 
Following defendant's conviction for possession of material involving sexual exploitation of 
children, child depicted in images requested restitution. The United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Texas denied the request. Child petitioned for writ of mandamus. A divided 
panel initially refused petition, but on rehearing, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. In a 
separate case, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana awarded 
restitution against defendant convicted of possession of child pornography. Defendant appealed. 
The Court of Appeals vacated. Rehearing en banc was granted for both cases.  The Fifth Circuit 
held that: victim was limited to mandamus review; restitution statute was not subject to general 
proximate cause requirement; and victim's petition for writ of mandamus would be granted. 
 
Question Presented: What, if any, causal relationship or nexus between the defendant's conduct 
and the victim's harm or damages must the government or the victim establish in order to recover 
restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 2259? 
 
 
IN RE AMY UNKNOWN, Petitioner. 
United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, Doyle Randall Paroline, Defendant–Appellee, 
v. 
Amy Unknown, Movant–Appellant. 
United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, 
v. 
Michael Wright, Defendant–Appellant. 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit 
Decided on November 19, 2012 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
GARZA, Circuit Judge 
The original opinion in this matter was 
issued by the en banc court on October 1, 
2012. A petition for rehearing en banc is 
currently pending before the en banc court. 
The petition for rehearing en banc is granted 
in part. Accordingly, we WITHDRAW our 
previous opinion and replace it with the 
following opinion. 
The issue presented to the en banc court is 
whether 18 U.S.C. § 2259 requires a district 
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court to find that a defendant's criminal acts 
proximately caused a crime victim's losses 
before the district court may order 
restitution, even though that statute only 
contains a “proximate result” requirement in 
§ 2259(b)(3)(F). All our sister circuits that 
have addressed this question have expanded 
the meaning of § 2259(b)(3)(F) to apply to 
all losses under § 2259(b)(3), thereby 
restricting the district court's award of 
restitution to a victim's losses that were 
proximately caused by a defendant's 
criminal acts. A panel of this court rejected 
that reading, and instead focused on § 2259's 
plain language to hold that § 2259 does not 
limit a victim's total recoverable losses to 
those proximately resulting from a 
defendant's conduct. A subsequent panel 
applied that holding to another appeal, yet 
simultaneously questioned it in a special 
concurrence that mirrored the reasoning of 
our sister circuits. To address the 
discrepancy between the holdings of this and 
other circuits, and to respond to the concerns 
of our court's special concurrence, we 
granted rehearing en banc and vacated the 
panel opinions. 
This en banc court holds that § 2259 only 
imposes a proximate result requirement in § 
2259(b)(3)(F); it does not require the 
Government to show proximate cause to 
trigger a defendant's restitution obligations 
for the categories of losses in § 
2259(b)(3)(A)-(E). Instead, with respect to 
those categories, the plain language of the 
statute dictates that a district court must 
award restitution for the full amount of those 
losses. We VACATE the district court's 
judgment in United States v. Paroline, and 
REMAND for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. We AFFIRM 
the district court's judgment in United States 
v. Wright. 
I 
We review a set of appeals arising from two 
separate criminal judgments issued by 
different district courts within this circuit. 
Both appeals involve restitution requests by 
Amy, a young adult whose uncle sexually 
abused her as a child, captured his acts on 
film, and then distributed them for others to 
see. The National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children, which reports that it has 
found at least 35,000 images of Amy's abuse 
among the evidence in over 3,200 child 
pornography cases since 1998, describes the 
content of these images as “extremely 
graphic.” The Government reports that 
restitution has been ordered for Amy in at 
least 174 child pornography cases across the 
United States in amounts ranging from $100 
to $3,543,471. 
A 
In the consolidated cases In re Amy and In 
re Amy Unknown a panel of this court 
reviewed Amy's mandamus petition and 
appeal, both of which challenged the district 
court's order denying Amy restitution in 
connection with a criminal defendant's 
sentence. 
In the case underlying Amy's mandamus 
petition and appeal, Doyle Paroline 
(“Paroline”) pled guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 2252 
for possessing 150 to 300 images of minors 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct. At 
least two images were of Amy. Pursuant to 
Amy's right to restitution under the Crime 
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Victims' Rights Act the Government and 
Amy moved the district court to order 
restitution under § 2259. Amy supported this 
request with her psychiatrist's report, which 
itemized her future damages for specific 
categories of treatment and estimated total 
damages nearing $3.4 million. 
The district court denied Amy restitution. 
The district court held that § 2259 required 
the Government to prove that by possessing 
images depicting Amy's sexual abuse, 
Paroline proximately caused the injuries for 
which she sought restitution…. Amy 
petitioned for mandamus, asking this court 
to direct the district court to order Paroline 
to pay her the full amount of the restitution 
she had requested. 
Over one dissent, that panel denied her relief 
because it was not clear or indisputable that 
§ 2259 mandates restitution irrespective of 
proximate cause. Amy sought rehearing and 
filed a separate notice of appeal from the 
district court's restitution order; her 
mandamus petition and appeal were 
consolidated. The panel assigned to hear 
Amy's appeal granted her rehearing request. 
That panel then granted mandamus and 
rejected a requirement of proof of proximate 
cause in § 2259 because “[i]ncorporating a 
proximate causation requirement where 
none exists is a clear and indisputable error,” 
but declined to reach the question of 
whether crime victims such as Amy have a 
right to an appeal. The panel remanded for 
the district court's entry of a restitution 
order.  
B 
In United States v. Wright, a separate panel 
of this court heard the appeal of Michael 
Wright (“Wright”). Like Paroline, Wright 
pled guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 2252 for 
possession of over 30,000 images of child 
pornography, which included images of 
Amy's abuse. The Government sought 
restitution for Amy under § 2259, 
supporting its request with the same 
psychiatric report Amy provided in 
Paroline's case. The district court awarded 
Amy $529,661 in restitution, explaining that 
“[t]his amount was reached by adding the 
estimated costs of the victim's future 
treatment and counseling at $512,681.00 and 
the costs of the victim's expert witness fees 
at $16,980.00.” The district court did not 
explain why it awarded no restitution for the 
other amounts that Amy had requested and 
made no reference to a proximate cause 
requirement. Observing that Amy had been 
awarded restitution in another district court, 
the district court further explained that “[t]he 
restitution ordered herein is concurrent with 
any other restitution order either already 
imposed or to be imposed in the future 
payable to this victim.” Wright appealed to 
contest the restitution order. 
The Wright panel first found that the appeal 
waiver in Wright's plea agreement did not 
foreclose his right to appeal the restitution 
order. Then, applying Amy's holding, the 
Wright panel concluded that Amy was 
entitled to restitution but that the district 
court had given inadequate reasons for the 
award it assessed. The panel remanded for 
further findings regarding the amount of the 
award. The three members on the Wright 
panel, however, joined a special concurrence 
that questioned Amy's holding and 
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suggested that the court rehear both cases en 
banc, in part because this court was the first 
circuit to hold that a proximate cause 
requirement does not attach to the “full 
amount of ... losses” under § 2259(b)(3).  
This court held the mandates in both Amy 
and Wright. A majority of this court's 
members voted to rehear these opinions en 
banc to resolve the question of how to award 
restitution under § 2259 and to address other 
related questions raised by these appeals.  
II 
In rehearing Amy and Wright en banc, we 
address the following issues: (1) whether the 
Crime Victims' Rights Act (“CVRA”) grants 
crime victims a right to an appeal or, if not, 
whether this court should review Amy's 
mandamus petition under the standard this 
court has applied to supervisory writs; (2) 
whether 18 U.S.C. § 2259 requires the 
Government to show a defendant's criminal 
acts proximately caused a victim's injuries 
before a district court may award restitution; 
and (3) whether, in light of our holding with 
respect to § 2259, the district courts in Amy 
and Wright erred. 
A 
Amy petitioned for mandamus and, after this 
court initially denied her relief, appealed 
from the district court's restitution order. In 
the panel opinion in Amy, this court granted 
her mandamus on rehearing under our 
traditional mandamus inquiry, which this 
court held in In re Dean applies to appeals 
under the CVRA. In Amy, the panel declined 
to decide whether the CVRA entitled her to 
bring a direct appeal, even though Dean 
seemingly foreclosed that argument. Amy 
asks the en banc court to construe the CVRA 
to guarantee crime victims the right of 
appeal and alternatively asks the court to 
hear her mandamus petition under our 
supervisory mandamus power, which would 
hold her mandamus petition to a less 
onerous standard of review than Dean 
requires. 
1 
The CVRA grants crime victims, including 
Amy, “[t]he right to full and timely 
restitution as provided in law,” and makes 
explicit that crime victims, their 
representatives, and the Government may 
move the district court to enforce that right. 
The CVRA further commands that “[i]n any 
court proceeding involving an offense 
against a crime victim, the court shall ensure 
that the crime victim is afforded [this 
right].” Where a district court denies a 
victim relief, the CVRA provides that 
[T]he movant may petition the court of 
appeals for a writ of mandamus. The court 
of appeals may issue the writ on the order of 
a single judge pursuant to circuit rule or the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The 
court of appeals shall take up and decide 
such application forthwith within 72 hours 
after the petition has been filed. 
The CVRA further grants the Government, 
“[i]n any appeal in a criminal case,” the 
authority to “assert as error the district 
court's denial of any crime victim's right in 
the proceeding to which the appeal relates,” 
and makes clear that “[n]othing in this 
chapter shall be construed to impair the 
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prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney 
General or any officer under his direction.” 
Amy's argument effectively requires us to 
address two questions: first, whether the 
CVRA entitles crime victims to an appeal; 
and second, whether the CVRA entitles 
crime victims' mandamus petitions through 
the review standards governing an appeal. 
First, we observe that the plain text of the 
CVRA expressly grants crime victims only a 
right to mandamus relief and makes no 
mention of any right of crime victims to an 
appeal. In contrast, the CVRA grants the 
Government the right to mandamus while 
also retaining the Government's right to a 
direct appeal. In interpreting the statute, 
absent contrary indication, we presume that 
Congress “legislated against the background 
of our traditional legal concepts,” including 
that crime victims have no right to appeal.  
Amy fails to show any language in the 
statute that reflects Congress' intent to 
depart from this principle…. The cases Amy 
cites are unconvincing. They allowed non-
parties to appeal discrete pre-trial issues 
with constitutional implications, which were 
unrelated to the merits of the criminal cases 
from which they arose…. Because nothing 
in the CVRA suggests that Congress 
intended to grant crime victims the right to 
an appeal or otherwise vary the historical 
rule that crime victims do not have the right 
of appeal, we conclude that the CVRA 
grants crime victims only mandamus review. 
Next, we consider whether the CVRA 
nonetheless requires appellate courts to 
apply the standard of review governing a 
direct criminal appeal to mandamus 
petitions, and conclude it does not. When 
assessing the meaning of the term 
“mandamus” in the CVRA, we presume that 
this “statutory term ... ha[s] its common-law 
meaning,” absent contrary indication.  The 
Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he 
remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be 
invoked only in extraordinary situations.” … 
Certain aspects of the CVRA convince us 
that Congress intended mandamus in its 
traditional sense when it selected the word 
“mandamus.” Reading the statute's 
provisions together, the CVRA seems to 
intentionally limit victims' right to review as 
an extraordinary remedy because it 
authorizes review only where a district court 
fails to fulfill a statutory duty; the statute 
does not extend victims' right to review to 
situations where a district court acts on a 
discretionary matter. To explain, the CVRA 
lists eight rights that it ensures crime 
victims, including the right to restitution. 
The restrictive statement, “A crime victim 
has the following rights,” precedes the list of 
those rights and supports the conclusion that 
the CVRA's grant of rights is exclusive…. 
Under this reading, only the Government 
would retain a right to appeal even 
seemingly discretionary actions, and could 
elect to appeal the district court's order to 
the extent it exercises its own prosecutorial 
discretion to do so. If we were to instead 
read the CVRA as extending a right of 
appeal to victims, we would expand the 
rights granted to crime victims and 
simultaneously erode the CVRA's attempt to 
preserve the Government's discretion…. 
The very short timeline in which appellate 
courts must act, and the fact that a single 
circuit judge may rule on a petition, confirm 
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the conclusion that Congress intended to 
limit crime victims’ appellate relief under 
the CVRA to traditional mandamus review. 
These requirements reflect that appellate 
courts must grant relief quickly, but rarely, 
as “a drastic remedy generally reserved for 
really ‘extraordinary’ cases.”  
Amy has failed to show that Congress 
intended to grant crime victims anything 
other than traditional mandamus relief under 
the CVRA. While, as Amy insists, it may be 
more difficult for a crime victim to enforce 
rights through mandamus than appeal, this 
limitation reflects the express language of 
the statute and honors the common law 
tradition in place when the CVRA was 
drafted. 
2 
… 
Because we hold that the CVRA entitles 
Amy to only mandamus relief, we dismiss 
her appeal. Under our traditional mandamus 
inquiry, we will grant Amy's requested 
mandamus only if (1) she has no other 
adequate means to attain the desired relief; 
(2) she has demonstrated a clear and 
indisputable right to the issuance of a writ; 
and (3) in the exercise of our discretion, we 
are satisfied that the writ is appropriate. 
B 
Wright appeals from the district court's 
restitution order. This court reviews the 
legality of the restitution order de novo. If 
the restitution order is legally permitted, we 
then review the amount of the order for an 
abuse of discretion.  
III 
To resolve Amy's mandamus petition and 
Wright's appeal, we must first ascertain the 
level of proof required to award restitution 
to Amy and crime victims like her under 18 
U.S.C. § 2259. The parties' dispute turns on 
the interpretation and effect of the words 
“proximate result” in § 2259(b)(3)(F). 
A 
Our analysis again begins with the text of 
the statute. If § 2259's language is plain, our 
“sole function” is to “enforce it according to 
its terms” so long as “the disposition 
required by the text is not absurd.” The 
Supreme Court has explained that 
“[s]tatutory construction ‘is a holistic 
endeavor.’ ” …  
Only after we apply principles of statutory 
construction, including the canons of 
construction, and conclude that the statute is 
ambiguous, may we consult legislative 
history. For statutory language to be 
ambiguous, however, it must be susceptible 
to more than one reasonable interpretation or 
more than one accepted meaning. … 
The language of 18 U.S.C. § 2259 reflects a 
broad restitutionary purpose. Section 
2259(a) mandates that district courts “shall 
order restitution for any offense under this 
chapter,” including the offense to which 
Paroline and Wright pled guilty. Section 
2259(b)(1) specifies that a restitution order 
“shall direct the defendant to pay the victim 
... the full amount of the victim's losses.” 
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Section 2259(b)(3) defines the term “the full 
amount of the victim's losses,” contained in 
§ 2259(b)(1), as 
[A]ny costs incurred by the victim for— 
(A) medical services relating to physical, 
psychiatric, or psychological care; 
(B) physical and occupational therapy or 
rehabilitation; 
(C) necessary transportation, temporary 
housing, and child care expenses; 
(D) lost income; 
(E) attorneys' fees, as well as other costs 
incurred; and 
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as 
a proximate result of the offense. 
Section 2259(b)(4) reinforces that “[t]he 
issuance of a restitution order under this 
section is mandatory,” and instructs that “[a] 
court may not decline to issue an order 
under this section because of—(i) the 
economic circumstances of the defendant; or 
(ii) the fact that a victim has, or is entitled 
to, receive compensation for his or her 
injuries from the proceeds of insurance or 
any other source.” … 
B 
The district court in Paroline rejected Amy's 
argument that § 2259 requires an award of 
“the full amount of [her] losses.” Instead, 
resorting to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power Co. v. 
Mor, which explained that “[w]hen several 
words are followed by a clause which is 
applicable as much to the first and other 
words as to the last, the natural construction 
of the language demands that the clause be 
read as applicable to all,” the district court 
extended the “proximate result” language 
contained in § 2259(b)(3)(F) to apply to the 
losses described in subsections (A) through 
(E). In construing the statute, the district 
court expressed its concern that “a 
restitution order under section 2259 that is 
not limited to losses proximately caused by 
the defendant's conduct would under most 
facts, including these, violate the Eighth 
Amendment,” and that an alternative 
“interpretation would be plainly inconsistent 
with how the principles of restitution and 
causation have historically been applied.” In 
reversing the district court's holding, the 
Amy panel rejected a generalized proximate 
cause requirement and stressed that the 
causation requirement in the definition of 
“victim,” together with § 3664's mechanism 
for joint and several liability, surmounts any 
Eighth Amendment concerns.  
Unlike the district court in Paroline, the 
Wright district court seemed to accept 
Amy's argument to a limited degree, as it 
awarded all of the restitution she requested 
for her future treatment and counseling, and 
the costs of her expert witness fees. 
Although the Wright panel accepted Amy's 
holding as binding precedent in reviewing 
the district court's restitution award, 
Wright's special concurrence, tracing the 
reasoning of the district court in Amy and 
challenging the panel's decision not to limit 
§ 2259 to damages proximately caused by a 
defendant's criminal actions, presaged this 
en banc rehearing.  
In this en banc rehearing, Amy maintains 
that § 2259 is a mandatory statute requiring 
district courts to award full restitution to 
victims of child pornography. In her view, 
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the plain language of the statute dictates that 
the proximate result language in § 
2259(b)(3)(F) is limited to that category of 
losses and does not apply to the categories 
of losses described in § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(E). 
The Government contends that § 2259(b)(3) 
conditions all of a victim's recoverable 
losses on a showing that those losses 
proximately resulted from the offense. 
Drawing on Porto Rico Railway, the 
Government asserts that the statutory text 
reflects Congress' intent to condition all 
recoverable losses on a showing of 
proximate cause. Without citing to 
precedent, the Government urges us “to 
presume that Congress adhered to the usual 
balance in the law of remedies: to hold 
defendants fully accountable for the losses 
associated with their conduct but in a 
manner that respects the deeply-rooted 
principle of proximate causation.”…  
Paroline similarly construes the “proximate 
result” language in the statute and relies on 
the construction of other restitution statutes 
to support his position. Both Paroline and 
Wright draw on legislative materials to 
assert that in drafting § 2259, Congress 
intended to incorporate a proximate cause 
requirement. 
C 
1 
Our plain reading of § 2259 leads us to the 
following conclusion: Once a district court 
determines that a person is a victim, that is, 
an “individual harmed as a result of a 
commission of a crime” under the chapter 
that relates to the sexual exploitation and 
abuse of children, § 2259 requires the 
district court to order restitution for that 
victim. The restitution order that follows 
must encompass “the full amount of the 
victim's losses.” Those losses include five 
categories of specific losses—medical 
services related to physical, psychiatric, or 
psychological care; physical and 
occupational therapy or rehabilitation; 
necessary transportation, temporary housing, 
and childcare expenses; lost income; and 
attorney's fees and costs—and one category 
of “other losses suffered by the victim as a 
proximate result of the offense.” The rule of 
the last antecedent, recently applied by the 
Supreme Court in Barnhart v. Thomas, 
instructs that “a limiting clause or phrase,” 
such as the “proximate result” phrase in § 
2259(b)(3)(F), “should ordinarily be read as 
modifying only the noun or phrase that it 
immediately follows.” … 
a 
First, the Government, Paroline, Wright, and 
Judge Davis's dissenting opinion press the 
importance of Porto Rico Railway and other 
caselaw relied on by the district court. As 
did the Amy panel, however, we doubt 
Porto Rico Railway's applicability here. 
Porto Rico Railway concerned the following 
statute: “Said District Court shall have 
jurisdiction of all controversies where all of 
the parties on either side of the controversy 
are citizens or subjects of a foreign state or 
states, or citizens of a state, territory, or 
district of the United States not domiciled in 
Porto Rico ....” … The Supreme Court 
explained, “When several words are 
followed by a clause which is applicable as 
much to the first and other words as to the 
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last, the natural construction of the language 
demands that the clause be read as 
applicable to all.”  
Deprived of its context, Porto Rico 
Railway's rule can be contorted to support 
the statutory interpretation urged by the 
Government and apply the “proximate 
result” language in § 2259(b)(3)(F) to the 
five categories of loss that precede it. But 
applying that rule here to require generalized 
proximate cause would disregard that the list 
in Porto Rico Railway's statute is 
significantly different than the one central to 
this appeal. … The Supreme Court 
expressed its concern that a different 
construction would have left the reader with 
a fragmented phrase, which would be overly 
broad in application, and which, in turn, 
would have failed to satisfy the statute's 
overarching purpose to curtail federal courts' 
jurisdiction. 
Section 2259, in contrast, begins with an 
introductory phrase composed of a noun and 
verb (“ ‘full amount of the victim's losses' 
includes any costs incurred by the victim 
for—”) that feeds into a list of six items, 
each of which are independent objects that 
complete the phrase. …Of course, we do not 
sit “as a panel of grammarians,” but we 
cannot ignore that “the meaning of a statute 
will typically heed the commands of its 
punctuation.” The structural and 
grammatical differences between § 2259 and 
the statute in Porto Rico Railway forcefully 
counsel against applying Porto Rico 
Railway to the current statute to reach the 
Paroline district court's reading. 
Seatrain, the other case relied on by the 
district court, is similarly inapplicable. … 
At least three circuits agree that under rules 
of statutory construction, we cannot read the 
“proximate result” language in § 
2259(b)(3)(F) as applying to the categories 
of losses in § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(E). But we do 
not ignore that other circuits have used tools 
of statutory construction to conclude that the 
proximate result language in § 2259(b)(3)(F) 
applies to the five categories of loss that 
preceded it. These circuits, however, 
reached this conclusion for reasons we do 
not find compelling. … 
b 
Next, we consider the Government's 
assertion that principles of tort liability limit 
the award of restitution under § 2259 to 
losses proximately caused by a defendant's 
criminal actions. At least three of our sister 
circuits have accepted this view and derived 
a proximate cause requirement not from “the 
catch-all provision of § 2259(b)(3)(F), but 
rather [from] traditional principles of tort 
and criminal law and [from] § 2259(c)'s 
definition of ‘victim’ as an individual 
harmed ‘as a result’ of the defendant's 
offense.”  
In United States v. Monzel, a case that has 
served as a springboard for other circuits 
evaluating § 2259, the D.C. Circuit 
explained that “[i]t is a bedrock rule of both 
tort and criminal law that a defendant is only 
liable for harms he proximately caused,” and 
“a restitution statute [presumably] 
incorporates the traditional requirement of 
proximate cause unless there is good reason 
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to think Congress intended the requirement 
not to apply.” The D.C. court posited that 
“[a]lthough § 2259 is a criminal statute, it 
functions much like a tort statute by 
directing the court to make a victim whole 
for losses caused by the responsible party,” 
and found nothing in the text of § 2259 
indicating Congress' intent to eliminate “the 
ordinary requirement of proximate cause.” 
Rather, “[b]y defining ‘victim’ as a person 
harmed ‘as a result of’ the defendant's 
offense,' ” the court inferred that “the statute 
invokes the standard rule that a defendant is 
liable only for harms that he proximately 
caused.” The D.C. Circuit worried that 
without such a limitation, “liability would 
attach to all sorts of injuries a defendant 
might indirectly cause, no matter how 
‘remote’ or tenuous the causal connection.”  
… The D.C. Circuit criticized this court's 
decision in Amy because “a ‘general’ 
causation requirement without a subsidiary 
proximate causation requirement is hardly a 
requirement at all”; “[s]o long as the victim's 
injury would not have occurred but for the 
defendant's offense, the defendant would be 
liable for the injury.” … We do not accept 
this reasoning, however, and refuse to inject 
the statute with a proximate cause 
requirement based on traditional principles 
of liability. 
The Supreme Court has explained that we 
“ordinarily” should “resist reading words or 
elements into a statute that do not appear on 
its face.” But the Supreme Court has also 
explained that the absence of certain 
language in a statute does not necessarily 
mean that Congress intended courts to 
disregard traditional background principles. 
… 
In interpreting the omission of intent in a 
different statute, the Supreme Court 
cautioned that “far more than the simple 
omission of the appropriate phrase from the 
statutory definition [of the offense] is 
necessary to justify dispensing with” a mens 
rea requirement.  
…In assessing whether Congress intended a 
broad proximate cause limitation, we cannot 
ignore that § 2259 expresses causal 
requirements, yet isolates them to two 
discrete points: the definition of victim as an 
“individual harmed as a result of a 
commission of a crime,” and the limitation 
of “any other losses” to those that are the 
“proximate result of the offense.” Had 
Congress omitted all causal language and 
not required award of the full amount of 
losses, or positioned the proximate result 
language so that it would apply to all 
categories of losses, we could consider the 
possibility that Congress intended to bind all 
categories of losses with a proximate cause 
requirement. Instead, Congress resisted 
using the phrase “proximate cause” 
anywhere in § 2259, including § 
2259(b)(3)(F) and further required the court 
to order the “full amount of the victim's 
losses.” … 
This interpretation does not render the 
statute unworkable. The problem seeming to 
animate the cases in other circuits 
interpreting § 2259 to require proximate 
cause is how to allocate responsibility for a 
victim's harm to any single defendant. These 
courts ignore, however, that deciding that a 
 391 
defendant “must pay restitution for the 
losses he caused (whether proximately or 
not),” does not resolve how the court 
“determines how those losses should be 
allocated in cases where more than one 
offender caused them”—injecting the statute 
with traditional proximate causation 
limitations takes courts no closer to 
determining what each defendant must pay 
or to supplying crime victims with the “full 
amount of [their] losses.” By focusing on the 
question of proximate cause, our sister 
circuits have not made § 2259 any easier to 
apply and seemingly have ignored that § 
2259 has armed courts with tools to award 
restitution because it instructs courts to refer 
to the standards under § 3664. 
…. 
Any fears that Amy and victims like her 
might be overcompensated through the use 
of joint and several liability, as expressed 
under § 3664(h), are unwarranted. The use 
of joint and several liability does not mean 
that Amy may “recover more than her total 
loss: [rather,] once she collects the full 
amount of her losses from one defendant, 
she can no longer recover from any other.”  
Section 3664 provides “reasonable means” 
to defend against any theoretical 
overcompensation that could result. First, if 
Amy recovers the full amount of her losses 
from defendants, the Government and 
defendant may use this information to 
ensure that Amy does not seek further 
awards of restitution. Second, § 3664(k) 
suggests a means for ending defendants' 
existing joint and several restitution 
obligations once Amy receives the full 
amount of her losses; it allows for a district 
court, “on its own motion, or the motion of 
any party, including the victim, [to] adjust 
the payment schedule, or require immediate 
payment in full, as the interests of justice 
require.” … 
c 
Next, the Government asserts that not 
restricting the recovery of losses by 
proximate cause produces an absurd result—
constitutional implications that could be 
avoided if we were to read § 2259 as 
requiring proximate causation with respect 
to all categories of losses. Specifically, the 
Government is concerned that without a 
proximate cause limitation, § 2259 could be 
challenged on the ground that it subjects a 
defendant to excessive punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment. 
…The Government posits that by giving 
effect to the statute's plain text, this court 
could cause Eighth Amendment problems 
similar to that expressed by a recent 
Supreme Court case involving criminal 
forfeiture: Where criminal forfeiture “would 
be grossly disproportional to the gravity of 
[an] offense,” the Supreme Court held that it 
would violate the Excessive Fines Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment.  
First, we are not persuaded that restitution is 
a punishment subject to the same Eighth 
Amendment limits as criminal forfeiture. Its 
purpose is remedial, not punitive. Even so, 
restricting the “proximate result” language 
to the catchall category in which it appears 
does not open the door to grossly 
disproportionate restitution in a way that 
 392 
would violate the Eighth Amendment…. 
Fears over excessive punishment are 
misplaced. 
Any concern that individual defendants may 
bear a greater restitutionary burden than 
others convicted of possessing the same 
victim's images, moreover, does not 
implicate the Eighth Amendment or threaten 
to create an absurd result. Restitution is not 
tied to the defendant's gain; rather “so long 
as the government proved that the victim 
suffered the actual loss that the defendant 
has been ordered to pay, the restitution is 
proportional.” … 
The court, moreover, can ameliorate the 
impact of joint and several liability on an 
individual defendant by establishing a 
payment schedule that corresponds to the 
defendant's ability to pay.  
Ultimately, while the imposition of full 
restitution may appear harsh, it is not grossly 
disproportionate to the crime of receiving 
and possessing child pornography. In light 
of restitution's remedial nature, § 2259's 
built-in causal requirements, and the 
mechanisms described under § 3664, we do 
not see any Eighth Amendment concerns 
here or any other absurd results that our 
plain reading produces. 
2 
Accordingly, we hold that § 2259 requires a 
district court to engage in a two-step inquiry 
to award restitution where it determines that 
§ 2259 applies. First, the district court must 
determine whether a person seeking 
restitution is a crime victim under § 2259—
that is, “the individual harmed as a result of 
a commission of a crime under this chapter.” 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
“[t]he distribution of photographs and films 
depicting sexual activity by juveniles is 
intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of 
children,” and this court has elaborated that 
“children depicted in child pornography may 
be considered to be the victims of the crime 
of receiving child pornography.” This logic 
applies with equal force to defendants who 
possess child pornography: By possessing, 
receiving, and distributing child 
pornography, defendants collectively create 
the demand that fuels the creation of the 
abusive images. Thus, where a defendant is 
convicted of possessing, receiving, or 
distributing child pornography, a person is a 
victim under this definition if the images the 
defendant possesses, receives, or distributes 
include those of that individual. 
Second, the district court must ascertain the 
full amount of the victim's losses as defined 
under § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(F), limiting only § 
2259(b)(3)(F) by the proximate result 
language contained in that subsection, and 
craft an order guided by the mechanisms 
described in § 3664, with a particular focus 
on its mechanism for joint and several 
liability. 
IV 
Having resolved this important issue of 
statutory interpretation, we apply our 
holding to Amy's mandamus and Wright's 
appeal. 
A 
Under our traditional mandamus inquiry, we 
will grant Amy's petition for mandamus if 
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(1) she has no other adequate means to attain 
the desired relief; (2) she has demonstrated a 
clear and indisputable right to the issuance 
of a writ; and (3) in the exercise of our 
discretion, we are satisfied that the writ is 
appropriate in these circumstances. As the 
Supreme Court has noted, the “hurdles” 
limiting use of mandamus, “however 
demanding, are not insuperable.”  
We easily conclude that the first prong is 
met. Because we have held that the CVRA 
limits crime victims' relief to the mandamus 
remedy, Amy has no other means for 
obtaining review of the district court's 
decision not to order restitution. We are also 
satisfied that a writ is appropriate in these 
circumstances: The CVRA expressly 
authorizes mandamus, and awarding 
restitution would satisfy § 2259's broad 
restitutionary purpose. Next, we conclude 
that Amy has a “clear and indisputable” 
right to restitution in light of our holding 
today. First, Amy is a “victim” under § 
2259(c). Paroline possessed at least two of 
her images, and his possession of those 
images partly formed the basis of his 
conviction. Amy, as an “individual harmed 
as a result of [Paroline's] commission of a 
crime” falling within § 2259's scope, is thus 
a victim under § 2259. Because Amy is a 
victim, § 2259 required the district court to 
award her restitution for the “full amount of 
[her] losses” as defined under § 2259(b)(3). 
Because the district court awarded Amy 
nothing, it therefore clearly and indisputably 
erred. No matter what discretion the district 
court possessed and no matter how 
confounding the district court found § 2259, 
it was not free to leave Amy with nothing. 
On remand, the district court must enter a 
restitution order reflecting the “full amount 
of [Amy's] losses” in light of our holdings 
today. 
B 
Turning to Wright's appeal, Amy is eligible 
for restitution as a “victim” of Wright's 
crime of possessing images of her abuse for 
the same reasons she is eligible as a victim 
of Paroline's crime. It was therefore legal for 
the district court to order restitution to Amy. 
As such, Wright's appeal necessarily focuses 
on the amount of the district court's 
restitution award, which we review for an 
abuse of discretion. The district court 
awarded Amy $529,661 by adding Amy's 
estimated future counseling costs to the 
value of her expert witness fees. The district 
court did not explain why Wright should not 
be required to pay for any of the other losses 
Amy requested, and the record does not 
otherwise disclose why the district court 
reduced the Government's full request on 
Amy's behalf. While the district court erred 
in failing to award Amy the full amount of 
her losses, because the Government did not 
appeal Wright's sentence and Amy did not 
seek mandamus review, under Greenlaw v. 
United States, we must affirm Wright's 
sentence.  
V 
For the reasons above, we reject the 
approach of our sister circuits and hold that 
§ 2259 imposes no generalized proximate 
cause requirement before a child 
pornography victim may recover restitution 
from a defendant possessing images of her 
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abuse. We AFFIRM the district court in 
United States v. Wright. We VACATE the 
district court's judgment in United States v. 
Paroline, and REMAND for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
DENNIS, Circuit Judge, concurring in 
part in the judgment: 
I respectfully concur in the majority 
opinion's decision that the CVRA does not 
grant crime victims a right to a direct appeal 
from a district court's rejection of her claim 
for restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 2259; that 
the CVRA grants crime victims only a right 
to seek traditional mandamus review; and 
that the CVRA grants the government the 
right to seek mandamus and to retain its 
right to a direct appeal. 
I further agree with the majority that neither 
the Government nor the victim is required to 
prove that the victim's losses defined by 18 
U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(E) were a 
proximate result of the defendant's crime; it 
is only “any other loss suffered by the 
victim” that must be proved to be “a 
proximate result of the offense.” Section 
2259(c) defines “victim” as an “individual 
harmed as a result of a commission of a 
crime under this chapter,” but it does not 
require a showing that the victim's losses 
included in § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(E) be a 
“proximate result of the offense.” From this, 
I infer that the statute places only a slight 
burden on the victim or the government to 
show that the victim's losses or harms 
enumerated in those subsections plausibly 
resulted from the offense. Once that 
showing has been made, in my view, a 
presumption arises that those enumerated 
losses were the proximate result of the 
offense, which the defendant may rebut with 
sufficient relevant and admissible evidence. 
Finally, I agree with the majority's 
conclusion that where a defendant is 
convicted of possessing child pornography, 
a person is a victim under the statute if the 
images include those of that individual. In 
these cases, I agree that the government and 
the victim have made a sufficient showing, 
unrebutted by the defendant, that the victim 
is entitled to restitution of losses falling 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(E). 
Therefore, I concur in that part of the 
majority's judgment that vacates the district 
courts' judgments and remands the cases to 
them for further proceedings. 
In remanding, however, I would simply 
direct the district courts to proceed to issue 
and enforce the restitution orders in 
accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3664 and 
3663A, as required by § 2259(b)(2)….  
W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
joined by KING, JERRY E. SMITH and 
GRAVES, Circuit Judges: 
I agree with my colleagues in the majority 
that we should grant mandamus in In re Amy 
and remand for entry of a restitution award. 
I also agree that we should vacate the award 
entered in Wright and remand for further 
consideration on the amount of the award. 
The devil is in the details, however, and I 
disagree with most of the majority's 
analysis. 
I disagree with my colleagues in the 
majority in two major respects: 
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1. Although I conclude that the proximate 
cause proof required by the restitution 
statutes can be satisfied in these cases, I 
disagree with the majority that the statute 
authorizes restitution without any proof that 
the violation proximately caused the victim's 
losses. 
2. I agree with the majority that the district 
court must enter a restitution award against 
every offender convicted of possession of 
the victim's pornographic image; but I 
disagree with the majority that in cases such 
as these two, where the offenses of multiple 
violators contribute to the victim's damages, 
the district court must enter an award against 
each offender for the full amount of the 
victim's losses. No other circuit that has 
addressed this issue has adopted such a one 
size fits all rule for the restitution feature of 
the sentence of an offender. Other circuits 
have given the district courts discretion to 
assess the amount of the restitution the 
offender is ordered to pay.  
I. 
THE STATUTES 
At bottom, this is a statutory interpretation 
case, and I begin with a consideration of the 
structure and language of the statutes at 
issue that facially belie the majority's 
position that victims may be awarded 
restitution for losses not proximately caused 
by offense conduct. Section 2259 
specifically governs mandatory restitution 
awards for crimes related to the sexual 
exploitation and abuse of children. A 
number of provisions in the statute make it 
clear that proof of a causal connection is 
required between the offenses and the 
victim's losses. 
Section 2259(b)(2) expressly incorporates 
the general restitution procedures of 18 
U.S.C. § 3664 and states that “[a]n order of 
restitution under this section shall be issued 
and enforced in accordance with section 
3664 in the same manner as an order under 
section 3663A.” Section 3664(e) states that 
“[t]he burden of demonstrating the amount 
of the loss sustained by a victim as a result 
of the offense shall be on the attorney for the 
Government.”  
This language requiring proof of causation 
from § 3664(e) is consistent with the 
language defining “victim” found in § 
2259(c), who is defined as “the individual 
harmed as a result of a commission of crime 
under this chapter....”  
Section 2259(a) states that the court “shall 
order restitution for any offense under this 
chapter.” Section 2259(b)(3) states that the 
victim's losses are defined as those suffered 
by the victim “as a proximate result of the 
offense.” … 
In interpreting [§ 2259(b)(3)] we should 
follow the fundamental canon of statutory 
construction established by the Supreme 
Court in Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power 
Co. v. Mor. In that case, the Court held that 
“[w]hen several words are followed by a 
clause which is applicable as much to the 
first and other words as to the last, the 
natural construction of the language 
demands that the clause be read as 
applicable to all.” Applying this cardinal 
rule of statutory interpretation, I conclude 
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that subsection (F)'s “as a proximate result 
of the offense” language applies equally to 
the previous five subcategories of losses, 
(A) through (E). … 
In contrast, the majority concludes that once 
the district court determines that a person is 
a victim (an individual harmed as a result of 
an offense under § 2259) the district court 
must order restitution without further proof 
of causation. 
The majority's reading of § 2259(b)(3) is 
patently inconsistent with the rule of 
statutory interpretation announced in Porto 
Rico Railway, which makes it clear that the 
clause should be read to apply to all 
categories of loss. My conclusion that Porto 
Rico Railway's rule of interpretation applies 
in this case is made even clearer when we 
consider the multiple references in the 
statutes discussed above expressly reflecting 
Congressional intent to require proof of 
causation…. 
Other circuits have used different analyses 
but all circuits to confront this issue have 
interpreted the statute as using a proximate 
causation standard connecting the offense to 
the losses. This circuit is the only circuit that 
has interpreted § 2259 and concluded that 
proximate cause is not required by the 
statute. 
For the above reasons, I conclude that the 
statutes at issue require proof that the 
defendant's offense conduct proximately 
caused the victim's losses before a 
restitution award can be entered as part of 
the defendant's sentence. 
II. 
CAUSATION 
In cases such as the two cases before this 
court where the conduct of multiple 
offenders collectively causes the victim's 
damages, I would follow the position 
advocated by the Government and adopted 
by the First Circuit and the Fourth Circuit to 
establish the proximate cause element 
required by § 2259. Under this “collective 
causation” theory, it is not necessary to 
measure the precise damages each of the 
over 100 offenders caused. As the First 
Circuit in Kearney stated: “Proximate cause 
exists where the tortious conduct of multiple 
actors has combined to bring about harm, 
even if the harm suffered by the plaintiff 
might be the same if one of the numerous 
tortfeasors had not committed the tort.” The 
court relied on the following statement of 
the rule from Prosser and Keeton: 
When the conduct of two or more actors 
is so related to an event that their 
combined conduct, viewed as a whole, is 
a but-for cause of the event, and 
application of the but-for rule to each of 
them individually would absolve all of 
them, the conduct of each is a cause in 
fact of the event. 
The court explained further: 
Proximate cause therefore exists on the 
aggregate level, and there is no reason to 
find it lacking on the individual level. 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts has 
recognized this: causation exits even 
where “none of the alternative causes is 
sufficient by itself, but together they are 
sufficient” to cause the harm. 
I agree with the Government and the First 
and Fourth Circuits that this definition of 
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proximate cause is appropriate in this 
context and under this standard the causation 
requirement in both cases before us is 
satisfied. 
III. 
AMOUNT OF THE AWARD 
The most difficult issue in these cases—
where multiple violators combine to cause 
horrendous damage to a young victim—is 
establishing some standards to guide the 
district court in setting an appropriate 
restitution award for the single offender 
before the court. 
I agree that Amy is a victim in both cases 
before us. Defendant Paroline (in In re Amy) 
and defendant Wright possessed Amy's 
pornographic images and the statute requires 
the court to enter an award against them. 
I agree that Amy is entitled to a restitution 
award from all of her offenders in a sum that 
is equal to the amount of her total losses. 
But in cases such as these where multiple 
violators have contributed to the victim's 
losses and only one of those violators is 
before the court, I disagree that the court 
must always enter an award against that 
single violator for the full amount of the 
victim's losses. I agree that § 3664(h) gives 
the court the option in the appropriate case 
of entering an award against a single 
defendant for the full amount of the victim's 
losses even though other offenders 
contributed to these losses. I also agree that 
in that circumstance the defendant can seek 
contribution from other offenders jointly 
liable for the losses. We have allowed such 
contribution claims in analogous non-sex 
offender cases.  
In concluding that an award for the full 
amount of the victim's losses is required the 
majority relies on § 3664(h) which provides: 
If the court finds that more than 1 defendant 
has contributed to the loss of a victim, the 
court may make each defendant liable for 
payment of the full amount of restitution or 
may apportion liability among the 
defendants to reflect the level of 
contribution to the victim's loss and 
economic circumstances of each defendant. 
The majority simply ignores the second 
clause in § 3664(h) emphasized above. That 
subsection plainly gives the court the option 
of either (1) assessing a restitution award 
against the single defendant in an amount 
that is equal to the victim's total losses or (2) 
apportioning liability among the defendants 
to reflect each defendant's level of 
contribution to the victim's loss taking into 
consideration a number of factors including 
the economic circumstances of each 
defendant. It would be surprising if 
Congress had not given courts this option. 
After all, restitution is part of the defendant's 
criminal sentence and § 3664(h), consistent 
with sentencing principles generally, gives 
the sentencing judge discretion to fix the 
sentence based on the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the defendant's 
circumstances, background, and nature of 
his conduct. … 
I agree with the majority that the defendants 
in both cases before us having been 
convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252 
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must be ordered to pay restitution to Amy. 
We should leave the calculation of the 
appropriate award against each defendant to 
the district court in the first instance. I 
would give the district court the following 
general guidelines: 
The court must recognize that Amy's losses 
are an aggregation of the acts of the person 
who abused and filmed her assault, those 
who distributed and redistributed her 
images, and those who possessed those 
images. The culpability and liability for 
restitution of any one defendant regarding 
Amy's loss is dependent at least in part on 
the role that defendant played with respect 
to her exploitation. 
The court should first compute the victim's 
probable future losses based on evidence of 
the damages she will likely incur from the 
date of the defendant's offense conduct into 
the foreseeable future. The court should 
consider all items of damage listed in § 
2259(b)(3) as well as any other losses 
suffered by the defendant related to the 
conduct of the violators of this chapter…. 
The district court is not required to justify 
any award with absolute precision, but the 
amount of the award must have a factual 
predicate. In determining whether it should 
cast the single defendant before it for the 
total amount of the victim's losses or in 
fixing the amount of a smaller award the 
court should consider all relevant facts 
including without limitation the following: 
1. The egregiousness of the defendant's 
conduct including whether he was involved 
in the physical abuse of this victim or other 
victims, and whether he attempted to make 
personal contact with victims whose images 
he viewed or possessed. 
2. For defendants who possessed images of 
the victim, consider the number of images 
he possessed and viewed, and whether the 
defendant circulated or re-circulated those 
images to others. 
3. The financial means of the defendant and 
his ability to satisfy an award. 
4. The court may consider using the 
$150,000 liquidated civil damage award 
authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 2255 or a 
percentage thereof as a guide in fixing the 
amount of the award. 
5. The court may also consider as a guide 
awards made in similar cases in this circuit 
and other circuits. 
6. Any other facts relevant to the defendant's 
level of contribution to the victim's loss and 
economic circumstances of the defendant. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, I would grant mandamus and 
vacate the judgment in In re Amy and 
remand that case to the district court to enter 
an award consistent with the principles 
outlined above. I would also vacate the 
judgment in Wright and remand for entry of 
judgment consistent with the above 
guidelines. 
LESLIE H. SOUTHWICK, Circuit 
Judge, dissenting: 
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We are confronted with a statute that does 
not provide clear answers. I join others in 
suggesting it would be useful for Congress 
“to reconsider whether § 2259 is the best 
system for compensating the victims of child 
pornography offenses.” The goal is clear: 
providing meaningful restitution to victims 
of these crimes. How to order restitution in 
individual cases in light of that goal is a 
difficult question. 
Our task today is to effectuate the scheme 
according to the congressional design as best 
as we can discern it. Both of the other 
opinions have ably undertaken this difficult 
task. I agree with Judge Davis that this 
circuit should not chart a solitary course that 
rejects a causation requirement. The reasons 
why I believe the statute requires causation 
are different than he expresses, though. I 
agree with the majority, relying on the last-
antecedent rule, that the phrase “as a 
proximate result of the offense” that is in 
Section 2259(b)(3)(F) only modifies the 
category of loss described in (F).  
Though I agree with the majority in that 
respect, I find persuasive the reasoning of 
the Second, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits that 
causation “is a deeply rooted principle in 
both tort and criminal law that Congress did 
not abrogate when it drafted § 2259.” … 
True, the positioning of the phrase 
“proximate result” solely within subsection 
(F) could be a sign that Congress meant to 
eliminate causation for damages falling 
under subsections (A)-(E). Any such 
implication is thoroughly defeated, though, 
by other provisions of the statute. First, as 
the D.C. Circuit has recognized, Section 
2259 calls for restitution to go to a “victim” 
of these crimes, a term defined as “the 
individual harmed as a result of a 
commission of a crime under this chapter.” 
Second, the statute directs that an order of 
restitution should be issued and enforced “in 
the same manner as an order under section 
3663A.” … 
I understand the contours of this proximate-
cause requirement in much the same manner 
as does Judge Davis, including his analysis 
of “collective causation.” I also agree that 
the option of “apportion[ing] liability among 
the defendants to reflect the level of 
contribution to the victim's loss and 
economic circumstances of each defendant” 
belies the majority's notion that each case 
calls for an award equal to the total loss 
incurred by a victim. Yet by making 
restitution “mandatory” for all these crimes 
of exploitation, including possession and 
distribution of child pornography, Congress 
made its “goal of ensuring that victims 
receive full compensation” plain. 
Awards must therefore reflect the need to 
make whole the victims of these offenses. 
As Amy's suffering illustrates, the 
“distribution of photographs and films 
depicting sexual activity by juveniles is 
intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of 
children.” They constitute an indelible 
“record of the children's participation and 
the harm to the child is exacerbated by their 
circulation.”  
In light of the unique nature of prosecutions 
for child pornography and the clear 
congressional intent to maximize awards, 
any doubts about the proper amount of 
 400 
restitution should be resolved in favor of the 
child. This concern is largely a matter of a 
difference of emphasis from the views 
expressed by Judge Davis. I am concerned 
that his emphasis on the discretion of a 
district court, though clearly that discretion 
exists and can be exercised under the terms 
of Section 3664, tends towards accepting 
inappropriately low, even nominal awards. I 
would not accept that a forward-looking 
estimate of the number of future defendants 
and awards should be used to estimate a 
percentage of overall liability to be assigned 
a particular defendant. That puts too much 
weight on the interests of the defendants. 
Over-compensation is an unlikely 
eventuality. Were it to occur, then at that 
point district courts might be able to shift to 
evening up contributions among past and 
future defendants. 
In summary, proximate cause must be 
shown and the principle of aggregate 
causation is the method for proving its 
existence. By statute, district courts can 
award all damages to each defendant but 
also have discretion to make lesser awards if 
properly explained. This means that I agree 
with requiring additional proceedings as to 
both defendants, but disagree that each 
district court is required to impose a 
restitution award of the full amount of 
damages. 
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“Supreme Court Takes Up Case on Child Porn Victim Restitution” 
Huffington Post 
Mark Sherman 
June 27, 2013 
The Supreme Court said Thursday it will 
take up a case about when victims of child 
pornography can recover money from 
people convicted of viewing their abuse. 
The justices agreed to review a question that 
has divided lower courts: Must there be a 
link between the crime of viewing child 
pornography and the victims' injuries before 
victims are entitled to restitution? 
A woman identified as Amy is seeking 
financial payments from Texas resident 
Doyle Randall Paroline, who pleaded guilty 
to possessing between 150 and 300 images 
of child pornography on his computer. Amy 
was among the girls depicted. 
Amy is seeking more than $3.3 million from 
Paroline to cover the cost of her lost income, 
attorneys' fees and psychological care. 
Last year, the full 5th U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals in New Orleans said in a 10-5 
decision that victims do not have to show a 
link between the crime and their injuries. 
Amy, now her early 20s and living in 
Pennsylvania, was a child when her uncle 
sexually abused her and widely circulated 
images of the abuse, according to court 
records. The National Center for Missing 
and Exploited Children said it has found at 
least 35,000 images of Amy's abuse in more 
than 3,200 child pornography cases since 
1998. 
In at least 174 cases, Amy has been awarded 
restitution in amounts ranging from $100 to 
more than $3.5 million. She has collected 
more than $1.5 million, one of her attorneys 
has said. 
In another case involving Amy and a second 
woman, the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals in San Francisco threw out a 
restitution order because it found there was 
not a sufficient link between a man 
convicted of possessing child pornography 
and the women. 
That is why Amy's lawyers also urged the 
Supreme Court to hear Paroline's appeal, in 
an effort to resolve the split among federal 
judges. 
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“High Court to Decide Who Owes Restitution to Child Porn Victims - Woman 
Filing Against Men who Viewed Images Years Later” 
The Blade 
Paula Reed Ward 
July 7, 2013 
It is self-evident that a child is harmed 
during the creation of child pornography. 
But it is less clear if that person is harmed 
years later when someone views those 
images on the Internet. 
The decision on how harm is calculated 
could be the difference between a victim 
being compensated or receiving nothing at 
all. 
The issue has been raised in the Western 
District of Pennsylvania and in federal 
courts across the country for five years, but 
now the U.S. Supreme Court will weigh in. 
The high court agreed late last month to hear 
the case involving “Amy,” who was 
sexually abused by her uncle at the ages of 8 
and 9. He photographed that abuse and 
distributed the images online starting in 
1998. 
The Block News Alliance does not identify 
victims of sexual abuse; Amy is the name 
used in court documents for the victim. 
According to the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children, more than 
35,000 pornographic images of Amy have 
been found in 3,200 criminal cases since. 
Amy began filing requests for restitution in 
September, 2008, against defendants 
convicted of possessing images of her. She 
has made similar filings in every U.S. 
district court in the country. 
But the rulings have been split. In some 
districts, restitution of the full amount she is 
seeking — $3.4 million — has been granted. 
But in others, Amy has been awarded 
nothing. 
The legal question turns on a single phrase. 
The Mandatory Restitution for Sexual 
Exploitation of Children Act of 1994 
declares that a person harmed as a result of 
child pornography shall be paid by the 
defendant “the full amount of the victim’s 
losses,” which include: 
■ Medical services relating to physical, 
psychiatric, or psychological care. 
■ Physical and occupational therapy or 
rehabilitation. 
■ Necessary transportation, temporary 
housing, and child-care expenses. 
■ Lost income. 
■ Attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs 
incurred. 
■ Any other losses suffered by the victim as 
“a proximate result of the offense.” 
The issue turns on the phrase “as a 
proximate result of the offense.” It means a 
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direct causal link between the offense and 
the loss. 
Defense attorneys for Doyle Paroline, a 
defendant from the Eastern District of Texas 
whose case will go to the Supreme Court, 
argue that victims of child pornography 
must be able to prove the losses they 
suffered were the “proximate result” of their 
individual clients’ viewing online images of 
them taken when they were young children. 
But the attorney for Amy says that the 
phrase “proximate result” should only apply 
to the last subsection for “any other losses,” 
because the phrase does not appear in any 
other part of the list of losses in the statute. 
The question of restitution has been brewing 
since Amy filed her first request against a 
man convicted of possession in Connecticut. 
That defendant, a British foreign national 
who was the vice president of global patents 
for Pfizer and a millionaire, was the first test 
case. 
The judge in the district court there awarded 
$200,000, although the case later ended with 
a settlement among the parties. 
In the case in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, a defendant named Kelly 
Hardy was also ordered by U.S. District 
Judge Nora Barry Fischer to pay restitution. 
Ultimately, the parties reached an agreement 
for Hardy to pay $1,000. 
As of May, restitution for Amy has been 
ordered in 174 cases, ranging from $100 to 
$3.5 million, although some cases have been 
rejected on appeal or are pending. She has 
collected $1.6 million. 
But in the case involving Paroline, the 
district court judge in Tyler, Texas, said he 
did not have to pay restitution because the 
government failed to show the specific harm 
caused to Amy by the man viewing her 
images. 
“Certainly, Amy was harmed by Paroline’s 
possession of Amy’s two pornographic 
images, but this does little to show how 
much of her harm, or what amount of her 
losses, was proximately caused by 
Paroline’s offense,” wrote U.S. District 
Judge Leonard Davis. “There is no doubt 
that everyone involved with child 
pornography — from the abusers and 
producers to the end-users and possessors — 
contribute to Amy’s ongoing harm.” 
While the judge said he was sympathetic to 
what Amy has experienced — and will 
throughout her lifetime — that is not enough 
to dispense with the “proximate cause” 
requirement. 
However, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals overturned Judge Davis, writing 
that the proximate cause requirement applies 
only to the last category to the last 
subsection, “any other losses suffered by the 
victim.” 
The 5th Circuit, though, is the only circuit in 
the country to have found that way. 
Ten other circuits have ruled against 
restitution. 
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“The Supreme Court is going to have its 
work cut out for it,” said Stanley Schneider, 
who will represent Paroline at the Supreme 
Court. “You have all these underlying issues 
that need to be discussed.” 
One of the most obvious to him as to 
whether his client should be liable for any 
payment, Mr. Schneider said, is the timing 
of his arrest. Amy had already created her 
restitution model — and submitted requests 
in a number of jurisdictions — before 
Paroline was arrested in January 2009. 
“It’s an interesting anomaly,” Mr. Schneider 
said. “How can someone be liable for [harm 
that occurred] before you committed your 
criminal act?” 
Additionally, Mr. Schneider argues that 
Amy suffers harm from the viewing of her 
images only because she requests 
notification when defendants are arrested for 
possessing them. 
But, he continued, it is her perception that 
causes any ill effects, not that a defendant 
viewed it. 
Attorneys for Amy have argued that she is 
not seeking to collect more than she has 
asserted. Once she has collected $3.4 
million, Amy would stop filing, they have 
said. 
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“D.C. Circuit Weighs Child Pornography Restitution Case” 
Blog of Legal Times 
May 13, 2013 
The thorny question of how to calculate 
restitution to victims of child pornography 
came back before the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit last week, with the U.S. 
Department of Justice defending a proposed 
formula. 
Friday's arguments marked the second time 
the court considered the case of Michael 
Monzel. Monzel pleaded guilty to one count 
each of distribution and possession of child 
pornography. A trial judge ordered Monzel 
to pay $5,000 to a victim known by the 
pseudonym "Amy," but on remand from the 
D.C. Circuit reduced the award to zero, 
finding the government didn't produce 
evidence on how much of Amy's losses he 
caused. 
The government appealed, arguing U.S. 
District Judge Gladys Kessler was wrong to 
reduce the award and that its proposed 
formula – dividing a victim's total losses by 
the number of individuals found criminally 
responsible and then adjusting based on 
certain factors – represented a fair solution. 
Monzel's lawyer, Federal Public Defender 
A.J. Kramer, said the formula was arbitrary 
and that Kessler was right to reduce the 
award after the government presented no 
evidence linking his client to specific losses. 
Courts across the country have struggled to 
find a consistent way to calculate damages 
in child pornography cases. As lawyers on 
both sides noted, there are often an 
unpredictable number of defendants, 
especially if the images are distributed 
online, and it can be difficult to know the 
extent an individual defendant who viewed 
or possessed an image was responsible for 
harming the victim. 
Judge Brett Kavanaugh told Patty Stemler, 
chief of the appellate section of the Justice 
Department's criminal division, that he was 
interested in reaching a decision that would 
apply to similar cases in the future. 
However, the court expressed concern that 
under the government's formula, individuals 
convicted earlier would bear more of a 
burden. Stemler said the amount owed by 
each defendant would be lowered as needed 
until a certain threshold. 
Kavanaugh asked if the Justice Department 
had recommended legislation to Congress 
addressing the restitution issue. Stemler said 
they were working on it, but had yet to 
submit something. 
Specific to Monzel's case, Judge Judith 
Rogers asked Stemler why the government 
didn't provide more information to Kessler 
on remand estimating Amy's losses that 
could be attributed to Monzel. Kessler had 
called the estimates stale, Rogers said. 
Stemler said the government was never 
asked for more information and followed the 
D.C. Circuit's first decision saying Kessler 
could request more evidence or a formula. 
The court heard from a lawyer representing 
Amy's interests, Paul Cassell of the appellate 
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clinic at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney 
College of Law. Cassell said Kessler was 
wrong to not follow a federal statute known 
as Masha's Law, which gave victims of child 
pornography the right to file a civil lawsuit 
and set minimum damages at $150,000 for 
each violation of federal child pornography 
laws. 
Cassell said his team was preparing to take 
the case to the U.S. Supreme Court to ask 
that defendants pay at least $150,000 in 
accordance with Masha's Law. 
When asked how the court should calculate 
losses attributable to Monzel, Kramer said 
several courts found there was no answer 
and that the statute surrounding criminal 
restitution was "unworkable." Absent 
evidence from the government, Kramer said, 
Kessler was justified in finding Monzel 
couldn't be responsible for paying specific 
losses. 
Rogers compared the situation to the 
administration of payments to victims of the 
terrorist of attacks on September 11, 2001, 
saying the court was tasked with finding a 
reasonable approach, as opposed to a perfect 
solution for allotting payments. Kramer said 
the government's formula was arbitrary and 
ran afoul of a requirement that restitution be 
tied to the defendant's role in contributing to 
the victim's losses. 
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“Should Child Porn 'Consumers' Pay Victim Millions? Supreme Court to 
Decide.” 
Christian Science Monitor 
Warren Richey 
June 27, 2013 
The US Supreme Court on Thursday agreed 
to examine whether anyone convicted of 
possessing images of child pornography can 
be required to pay a multimillion dollar 
restitution award to the abused child 
depicted in the illicit images – even if the 
individual had no direct contact with the 
child-victim. 
Under the Mandatory Restitution for Sexual 
Exploitation of Children Statute, Congress 
said that a judge “shall order restitution” for 
the victim in a child pornography case in 
“the full amount of the victim’s losses.” 
The law applies to those who personally 
engage in physical abuse of a child while 
producing pornographic images of the 
abuse. But the question in the appeal is 
whether the same law requires anyone who 
views or possesses the resulting child 
pornography to also pay the total amount of 
restitution. 
The issue has arisen in hundreds of cases 
across the country involving possession of 
child pornography. The vast majority of 
courts have declined to require child 
pornography consumers (as opposed to 
producers) to pay the full amount of 
restitution. Only one federal appeals court, 
the New Orleans-based Fifth US Circuit 
Court of Appeals, has ordered full restitution 
under such circumstances. 
On Thursday, the Supreme Court agreed to 
examine a case from the Fifth Circuit and 
decide whether the government or the victim 
must be able to prove there is a causal 
relationship between the defendant’s 
conduct and harm to the victim and the 
victim’s claimed damages. 
The issue arises in the case of an East Texas 
man, Doyle Paroline, who faced a restitution 
demand of $3.4 million after pleading guilty 
to possessing child pornography. 
Investigators found 280 images on his 
computer. He was sentenced to two years in 
prison and 10 years of supervised release. 
After his conviction, experts at the National 
Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children determined the identity of one of 
the children whose images were on 
Paroline’s computer. They identify her in 
court papers by the pseudonym “Amy.” 
They found at least two images of Amy. 
Lawyers working on her behalf filed the 
request for full restitution. 
Amy had been sexually abused as a child by 
her uncle. The uncle recorded the abuse on 
film and distributed the images on the 
Internet. The National Center for Missing 
and Exploited Children has found at least 
35,000 copies of images of Amy’s abuse 
among the evidence in 3,200 child 
pornography cases since 1998. 
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The images are said to be “extremely 
graphic.” 
According to federal prosecutors, restitution 
has been ordered for Amy in more than 170 
child pornography cases. The amounts range 
from $100 to $3.5 million. The vast majority 
of defendants in child pornography cases are 
said to be of limited means and therefore 
unable to pay make significant restitution 
payments. 
The images of Amy’s abuse were traded on 
the Internet and are said to have gone “viral” 
among consumers of child pornography 
worldwide. 
Amy has said in court filings that because 
images of her abuse continue to be sought 
out, traded, and viewed, she feels as if she is 
being abused “over and over again.” 
She noted: “It feels like I am being raped by 
each and every [person who is looking at my 
pictures],” according to a brief filed on her 
behalf at the high court. 
The central issue in the case is whether the 
law simply requires full payment of 
restitution in child pornography cases, or 
whether prosecutors or the victim must be 
able to prove a causal relationship showing 
the specific actions of a defendant caused 
specific harms to the victim. 
In some cases, judges have taken the total 
amount of damages claimed by a child-
victim and divided it by the number of other 
defendants ordered to pay restitution to that 
child-victim. 
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the 
statute requires judges to order defendants to 
pay the full amount. 
The appeals court explained that the law 
would not allow “Amy” to collect the full 
amount of her losses several times over. 
Instead, her claims would end once she’d 
received the full amount of her claimed 
losses from one or more defendants. 
In urging the high court to take up a similar 
case, lawyers for Amy and another child-
victim said that unlike the Fifth Circuit, 10 
other federal courts of appeal have ruled that 
child pornography victims must be able to 
show that a defendant’s actions were the 
proximate cause of the harms for which they 
seek restitution. 
“The practical effect of this clearly-
acknowledged circuit split is that child 
pornography victims in the Fifth Circuit are 
now receiving restitution for the full amount 
of their losses, as commanded by Congress,” 
wrote University of Utah Law 
Professor Paul Cassell in his brief to the 
court in a similar child pornography 
restitution case. 
He noted that while the defendant in the 
Fifth Circuit case was ordered to pay Amy 
$3 million, the ordered restitution to Amy in 
a Ninth Circuit case was $0. 
In identical cases involving the same victim 
and the same crime, the restitution award 
showed a $3 million variance, Cassell said. 
“Allowing such disparate results contradicts 
the commitment to fair and equal treatment 
 409 
of criminal defendants – and crime victims,” 
he wrote. 
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Kansas v. Cheever 
12-609 
Ruling Below: State v. Cheever, 284 P.3d 1007 (Kan. 2012), cert granted, 133 S.Ct. 1460 (U.S. 
2013). 
Defendant was convicted in the Greenwood District Court, of capital murder, four counts of 
attempted capital murder of law enforcement officers, criminal possession of a firearm based on 
a previous felony conviction for aggravated robbery, and manufacture of methamphetamine.  
Cheever subsequently appealed.  The Supreme Court of Kansas held that allowing State's expert 
to testify in rebuttal to defendant's voluntary intoxication defense violated defendant's Fifth 
Amendment rights.  Additionally, the trial court's error in admitting testimony of State's 
psychiatric expert in violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment rights was not harmless error, 
and prosecutor's comment (which was made during the penalty-stage closing argument, stating 
that jury could consider mitigating circumstances, but did not have to) was not improper. 
Question Presented: Whether, when a criminal defendant affirmatively introduces expert 
testimony that he lacked the requisite mental state to commit capital murder of a law 
enforcement officer due to the alleged temporary and long-term effects of the defendant’s 
methamphetamine use, the state violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination by rebutting the defendant’s mental state defense with evidence from a court-
ordered mental evaluation of the defendant. 
 
 
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, 
v. 
Scott D. CHEEVER, Appellant. 
Supreme Court of Kansas 
Decided on August 24, 2012 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
PER CURIAM 
A jury convicted Scott D. Cheever of capital 
murder for the killing of Greenwood County 
Sheriff Matthew Samuels, four counts of 
attempted capital murder of law 
enforcement officers Robert Keener, Travis 
Stoppel, Mike Mullins, and Tom Harm, 
criminal possession of a firearm based on a 
previous felony conviction for aggravated 
robbery, and manufacture of 
methamphetamine. Cheever was sentenced 
to death on the capital offense. In addition, 
he was given a controlling sentence of 737 
months for the attempted capital murder 
convictions, which included concurrent 
sentences of 146 months for the 
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manufacturing conviction and 8 months for 
the firearm conviction. Cheever filed a 
timely appeal of his convictions and 
sentences. We have jurisdiction 
under K.S.A. 21–4627(a). 
We conclude that allowing the State's 
psychiatric expert, Dr. Michael Welner, to 
testify based on his court-ordered mental 
examination of Cheever, when Cheever had 
not waived his privilege under the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States 
Constitution in that examination by 
presenting a mental disease or defect 
defense at trial, violated Cheever's privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination 
secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. Because we are unable to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Welner's testimony did not contribute to the 
capital murder and attempted capital murder 
verdicts obtained in this case, this 
constitutional error cannot be declared 
harmless. Consequently, Cheever's 
convictions for capital murder and attempted 
capital murder must be reversed and 
remanded for a new trial. 
Cheever did not challenge his convictions 
and sentences for manufacture of 
methamphetamine and criminal possession 
of a firearm. We affirm those convictions 
and sentences. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND 
On January 19, 2005, Scott D. Cheever shot 
and killed Greenwood County Sheriff 
Matthew Samuels at Darrell and Belinda 
Coopers' residence near Hilltop, Kansas. 
Samuels, acting on a tip, had gone to the 
Coopers' residence, along with Deputy 
Michael Mullins and Detective Tom Harm, 
to attempt to serve an outstanding warrant 
for Cheever's arrest. Cheever, along with the 
Coopers, Matt Denney, and Billy Gene 
Nowell, had been cooking and ingesting 
methamphetamine in the early morning 
hours prior to Samuels' arrival. In the 
ensuing attempts to remove the wounded 
Samuels from the residence and arrest 
Cheever, Cheever also shot at Mullins, 
Harm, and two state highway patrol 
troopers, Robert Keener and Travis Stoppel. 
…There was little discrepancy in the 
pictures painted by the various accounts [at 
trial]. 
Shortly before Samuels, Mullins, and Harm 
arrived at the Coopers, Belinda had received 
a telephone call informing her that the police 
were on their way to the house to look for 
Cheever. Belinda told Cheever the police 
were coming and asked him to get his stuff 
together and leave, but Cheever's car had a 
flat tire. 
When Samuels arrived at the Cooper's 
house, Cheever and Denney were hiding in 
an upstairs bedroom. Cheever had two guns 
with him—a .44 caliber Ruger revolver and 
a .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol. As he 
hid upstairs, Cheever heard the officers pull 
up to the house and heard Darrell yell that 
the cops were there and that he was going to 
tell them Cheever was not there. Cheever 
also heard Darrell answer the door and tell 
Samuels Cheever was not there. Cheever 
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heard Darrell agree to allow Samuels inside 
to look around. 
Cheever heard Samuels calling out his name 
as he looked for Cheever on the first floor. 
The doorway to the upstairs had a piece of 
carpet covering it and Samuels asked 
Belinda where the doorway led. Belinda said 
it went upstairs. Samuels pulled the carpet 
back and yelled for Cheever. Cheever 
looked over at Denney and told him, “Don't 
move, don't make a sound, just stay right 
where you are.” Samuels then went through 
the doorway to go upstairs. 
Cheever heard Samuels' steps on the stairs. 
Cheever had the loaded and cocked .44 in 
his hand when he stepped out of the 
bedroom and looked down the stairway. 
Cheever saw Samuels coming up the stairs. 
Cheever pointed his gun and shot Samuels. 
Cheever then stepped back into the bedroom 
and told Denney not to go out of the window 
because they would shoot him. Cheever 
returned to the stair railing, looked down the 
stairs, saw Samuels, and shot him again. 
Cheever stepped back into the bedroom and 
saw that Denney had left through the 
window. Cheever then shot at Mullins and 
Harm as they tried to get the wounded 
Samuels out of the stairwell. Later, he shot 
at Keener and Stoppel, who were part of the 
SWAT team that entered the house to arrest 
Cheever. 
Cheever asserted a voluntary intoxication 
defense, based on the theory that 
methamphetamine use had rendered him 
incapable of forming the necessary 
premeditation to support the murder and 
attempted murder charges. Cheever's 
evidence in support of his defense consisted 
of his own testimony and the testimony of 
his expert witness, Dr. Roswell Lee Evans, 
Jr., a doctor of pharmacy with a specialty in 
psychiatric pharmacy. 
The jury found Cheever guilty on all counts 
as charged. At the penalty phase, the jury 
unanimously found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the three alleged aggravating 
circumstances had been proven to exist and 
that they were not outweighed by any 
mitigating circumstances found to exist and 
therefore sentenced Cheever to death. The 
trial court subsequently accepted the jury's 
verdict and imposed a sentence of death. 
While the facts of the case are relatively 
straightforward, the procedural history of the 
case is less so. The case was originally filed 
in Greenwood County District Court shortly 
after the crime. At about the same time, this 
court found the Kansas death penalty 
scheme unconstitutional in State v. Marsh. 
The state proceeding was dismissed after 
federal authorities initiated prosecution in 
the United States District Court under the 
Federal Death Penalty Act. 
The federal case went to jury trial in 
September 2006, but 7 days into jury 
selection, the case was suspended when 
Cheever's defense counsel became unable to 
proceed. The federal case was subsequently 
dismissed without prejudice and the state 
case was refiled, went to trial, and resulted 
in the convictions and sentences before us in 
this appeal. Additional facts will be included 
in the discussion where relevant to the 
issues. 
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I. COURT-ORDERED MENTAL 
EXAMINATION 
During the course of the federal 
proceedings, Judge Monte Belot ordered 
Cheever to undergo a psychiatric 
examination with Dr. Michael Welner, a 
forensic psychiatrist hired by the 
government. While the precise 
circumstances leading to Judge Belot's order 
are not in the record before us, the record is 
sufficient to show that the mental 
examination was ordered because Cheever 
had raised the possibility that he would 
assert a defense based on mental condition. 
… Welner's interview of Cheever lasted 5 
and 1/2 hours, was videotaped, and resulted 
in a 230–page transcript. 
Welner's examination first became an issue 
at trial during the State's cross-examination 
of Cheever. The State sought to use the 
transcript of Cheever's interview with 
Welner to impeach Cheever's testimony that 
he did not hear Samuels ask if he could go 
upstairs. Defense counsel objected, arguing 
that because the defense had not filed a 
notice of intent to rely on a mental disease 
or defect defense, the State was not entitled 
to use Welner's examination of Cheever. 
The trial court allowed the impeachment as 
“a prior inconsistent statement given to a 
witness who will testify” after the State 
confirmed Welner would be called as a 
rebuttal witness to Cheever's voluntary 
intoxication defense. 
Cheever's expert witness in support of his 
voluntary intoxication defense was Dr. 
Roswell Lee Evans, Jr., a doctor of 
pharmacy, who specialized in psychiatric 
pharmacy, the pharmacological effects of 
drugs, including illegal drugs such as 
methamphetamine. Evans testified that 
methamphetamine is a very intense 
stimulant drug that has three 
pharmacological phases: the initial rush, the 
long-term intoxication, and the neurotoxic 
phase. Evans explained that the initial rush 
is a virtually instantaneous very extreme 
high that lasts approximately 30 minutes. 
Following the initial rush is the long-term 
intoxication period. He testified that the 
intoxication lasts about 13 to 14 hours… 
Evans testified that while methamphetamine 
is not pharmacologically addictive, the 
intense pleasure of the initial rush makes the 
drug psychologically addictive. … However, 
methamphetamine users develop a tolerance 
to the initial rush, leading them to increase 
the frequency of use or the dosage, which 
then extends the long-term intoxication 
stage. 
The neurotoxic phase, Evans testified, 
develops in chronic, long-term users. He 
said that the neurotoxic effect of long-term 
use can change the structure of the brain, 
resulting in the loss of gray matter and 
consequential loss of brain function, 
including loss of cognitive functions that 
deal with planning, assessing consequences, 
abstract reasoning, and judgment. Evans 
testified that long-term use can cause 
paranoid psychosis which, due to 
impairment of the brain functions 
responsible for judgment and impulse 
control, can result in violence. According to 
Evans, chronic users in a state of paranoid 
psychosis begin to react…to all sorts of 
stimuli based on their paranoid ideations… 
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[Evans’] testimony primarily indicated that 
these changes persist only as the result of 
continued drug use and would abate after a 
period of nonuse ranging from 4 to 6 
months. 
Testifying about Cheever specifically, Evans 
said that at the time of the crimes, Cheever's 
drug use had progressed to the point that he 
had developed neurotoxicity and was 
showing symptoms of psychosis, evidenced 
by doing “really stupid judgment kind of 
stuff.” … 
Ultimately, Evans testified it was his 
opinion that at the time Cheever committed 
these crimes, Cheever was both under the 
influence of recent methamphetamine use 
and impaired by neurotoxicity due to long-
term methamphetamine use, which affected 
his ability to plan, form intent, and 
premeditate the crime. With respect to 
shooting Samuels, Evans testified that there 
“was no judgment. There was no judgment 
at all. This man just did it.” 
On cross-examination, the State made clear 
that Evans was not a medical doctor, not a 
psychiatrist, not a neurologist, and not a 
psychologist. The State characterized Evans 
as a “pharmacist.” 
At the conclusion of Evans' testimony, the 
defense rested. The State then sought to 
present Welner as a rebuttal witness. 
Defense counsel objected, arguing that 
because Cheever had not asserted a mental 
disease or defect defense in this case, the 
State could not use Welner's examination. 
The State contended that Welner's testimony 
was proper rebuttal to Cheever's voluntary 
intoxication defense. … The trial court ruled 
that Welner's testimony was admissible as 
rebuttal to the voluntary intoxication 
defense. 
Welner's testimony began with a long 
discourse on his qualifications, his 
substantial fee, and the extensive 
methodology he applies to cases under his 
review. Welner also described in detail the 
materials he reviewed prior to interviewing 
Cheever, the 5 and 1/2 hour interview 
process, and the psychological testing that 
was conducted on Cheever. 
Welner testified that based on his 
examination, it was his opinion that on 
January 19, 2005, Cheever's perceptions and 
decision-making ability were not impaired 
by methamphetamine use. Welner told the 
jury that Cheever had the ability to control 
his actions, he had the ability to think the 
matter over before he shot Samuels, and he 
had the ability to form the intent to kill. 
Addressing the relationship between 
Cheever's level of suspicion on the day of 
the crimes and his use of methamphetamine, 
Welner testified that while Cheever was 
suspicious that morning, his suspicions were 
reality based… Welner also concluded that 
there was no change in Cheever's level of 
suspicion after he used methamphetamine. 
Addressing the relationship between 
Cheever's level of suspicion and violence, 
Welner testified that Cheever's conduct 
demonstrated that his suspicions were not a 
trigger for violence. He considered it 
significant that, although Cheever had 
suspicions about the others taking his 
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manufacturing supplies or swindling him in 
some way, Cheever did not react with 
violence. Instead, Cheever attempted to gain 
control over the situation and defuse the 
perceived threats by giving Denney a 
walkie-talkie to monitor the area and 
personally engaging with Nowell, whom he 
did not trust. … 
Welner also addressed whether Cheever had 
suffered any “longstanding-effects” or 
“brain damage” as a result of 
methamphetamine use. He noted that 
neuropsychological testing conducted by 
another doctor showed Cheever had high-
average executive functioning and response 
inhibition.… 
Focusing specifically on the shooting of 
Samuels, Welner described Cheever's 
decision-making process: 
“The decision-making ability, as I've—as 
I've assessed it in this case, began with 
his—his decision-making once it became 
clear that the police were there. He made 
a decision not to try to flee, not to try to 
run. … And he made a decision to shoot 
when he did. 
“And then he engaged Matthew Denney 
and then went back and made a decision 
to shoot again. And then when he stopped 
shooting he made a decision to stop 
shooting.” 
Welner testified he considered and 
ultimately discounted other factors that 
could possibly explain Cheever's crimes, 
such as psychiatric conditions or disorders. 
He also considered and ultimately 
discounted environmental phenomena that 
could influence Cheever's efforts to avoid 
being taken into custody. … 
Cheever argues that his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination was violated when the trial 
court allowed the State to use the court-
ordered mental examination by Welner 
when Cheever had not waived his privilege 
in that examination by asserting a mental 
disease or defect defense at trial. 
A. Preservation/Standard of Review 
The State argues that Cheever's 
constitutional challenge to the admission of 
evidence from the court-ordered 
examination was not properly preserved for 
review because he did not object on Fifth 
Amendment grounds at trial.  
Although Cheever disputes the State's 
contention that his objection was insufficient 
to preserve his constitutional claim, he 
argues alternatively that preservation is not 
fatal to his claim. In support, Cheever relies 
on the following language of K.S.A. 21–
4627(b): 
“[in a death penalty case] [t]he supreme 
court of Kansas shall consider the 
question of sentence as well as any errors 
asserted in the review and appeal 
and shall be authorized to notice 
unassigned errors appearing of record if 
the ends of justice would be served 
thereby.”  
Cheever asserts that because Welner's 
testimony played a large role in the guilt and 
penalty phases, it serves the ends of justice 
to determine whether the use of that 
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evidence violated his constitutional privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination. 
We hold that lack of preservation is not an 
obstacle to our review, but not because of 
our authority to notice unassigned errors 
under K.S.A. 21–4627(b), as Cheever 
argues. K.S.A. 21–4627(b) provides two 
distinct exceptions in death penalty cases to 
general rules concerning appellate review: It 
requires the court to consider all errors 
asserted on appeal, and it authorizes the 
court to notice unassigned errors appearing 
in the record if doing so serves the ends of 
justice. 
The first exception applies to errors raised 
by the parties. …Thus, the statute imposes a 
mandatory exception in death penalty 
appeals to the various statutes and rules 
barring consideration of unpreserved issues.  
The second exception applies to unassigned 
errors. An unassigned error is one not raised 
by the parties but noticed by the court on its 
own during its review of the record.  In 
contrast to our duty to consider all asserted 
errors, our review of unassigned errors is 
permissive and conditional.  
On this issue and throughout his brief, 
Cheever misses the distinction between 
these two provisions. Because Cheever 
raises the Fifth Amendment issue in his 
brief, it is not an unassigned error; it is an 
asserted error. Accordingly, we must review 
Cheever's constitutional claim, 
notwithstanding the State's contention that 
Cheever's failure to raise that specific 
ground at trial precludes appellate review. 
Having determined that this issue is 
reviewable, we next address the standard of 
review. Because Cheever challenges the 
legal basis for the admission of this 
evidence, our standard of review is de novo.  
B. Analysis 
Cheever relies primarily on Estelle v. 
Smith, Buchanan v. Kentucky, and several 
related cases to argue that because he had 
not waived the privilege by presenting 
evidence of a mental disease or defect at 
trial, the State was precluded by the Fifth 
Amendment from using statements he made 
during Welner's examination, conducted as 
part of the federal case, against him. The 
State responds that its use of Welner's 
examination was proper rebuttal and 
impeachment. 
In Smith, the United States Supreme Court 
held that a court-ordered pretrial psychiatric 
examination implicated the defendant's 
rights under the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, made applicable 
to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, when the defendant neither 
initiated the exam nor put his mental 
capacity into issue at trial. 
In Smith, the trial court ordered a 
competency examination of the defendant. 
Defense counsel had not raised an issue of 
competency or sanity and was unaware that 
the examination was ordered.  The 
psychiatrist interviewed the defendant and 
provided a report to the trial court in which 
he concluded the defendant was competent 
to stand trial. During the penalty phase of 
the defendant's capital trial, the State called 
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the psychiatrist to testify as to the 
defendant's future dangerousness—one of 
three factors the State was required to 
establish to obtain the death penalty under 
Texas law. The psychiatrist's testimony 
included his conclusions that the defendant 
was a “severe sociopath” with no regard for 
property or human life, that he would 
continue his criminal behavior if given the 
opportunity, and that he had no remorse for 
his actions. 
The Court determined that under the 
“distinct circumstances” of the case, the 
Fifth Amendment privilege applied to the 
examination. The Court emphasized that the 
Fifth Amendment is not implicated by an 
order requiring a criminal defendant to 
submit to a competency examination “for 
the limited, neutral purpose of determining 
... competency to stand trial.”  Further, as 
long as the examination is conducted 
consistent with that limited purpose and 
used for that neutral purpose, there is no 
Fifth Amendment issue.  
The Court noted that although the scope of 
the examination went beyond the question of 
competency, it was not the conduct of the 
examination that triggered the Fifth 
Amendment, but its use against the 
defendant at trial to establish an element 
necessary to obtain a verdict of death.  The 
Court observed that there would have been 
no Fifth Amendment issue if the 
psychiatrist's findings had been used solely 
for the purpose of determining 
competency.  But because “the State used 
[Smith's] own statements, unwittingly made 
without an awareness that he was assisting 
the State's efforts to obtain the death 
penalty[,]” the Fifth Amendment privilege 
applied.  
The Court made clear that its ruling applied 
only to situations in which the defendant 
“neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor 
attempts to introduce any psychiatric 
evidence” at trial.  The Court explained that 
where a defendant has placed his or her 
mental state in issue, a court-ordered 
psychiatric examination may be the only 
way the State can rebut the defense… 
In Buchanan, the Court addressed the 
situation it had distinguished 
in Smith. In Buchanan, the defense joined 
with the prosecution in requesting a court-
ordered mental examination of the defendant 
and presented evidence supporting a mental-
state-based defense at trial. The Court held 
that under those circumstances, allowing the 
State to use the results of the mental 
examination for the limited purpose of 
rebutting that defense did not violate the 
defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege.  
In addition to the Smith/Buchanan line of 
precedent, Cheever also relies on Battie v. 
Estelle  and Gibbs v. Frank. In Battie, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the 
argument that a defendant waives his or her 
Fifth Amendment privilege by requesting or 
submitting to a psychiatric examination to 
determine sanity at the time of the crime. 
The court explained that waiver occurs when 
the defense introduces psychiatric 
testimony, in the same manner as would the 
defendant's election to testify at trial.  
We explore Gibbs in some depth, because 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals examined 
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and applied the Smith and Buchanan line of 
precedent to a situation with similarities to 
Cheever's case. 
The defendant in Gibbs was tried twice for 
the 1984 murder of a security guard in 
Pennsylvania. In the first trial, the defense 
requested that an expert be appointed for the 
purpose of determining whether to raise a 
mental infirmity defense. After the 
examination, the defense notified the State 
of its intent to raise such a defense and, 
consequently, the State secured an order for 
its own psychiatric examination. The State's 
psychiatrist gave the 
defendant Miranda warnings, and the 
defendant made several inculpatory 
statements. At trial, Gibbs offered expert 
testimony to establish a diminished capacity 
defense, and the State called its own expert 
witness to rebut the testimony. The 
defendant was found guilty and sentenced to 
death, but his conviction was ultimately 
reversed. 
At his second trial, the defendant presented 
an identity defense, not a mental-state-based 
defense. Nevertheless, the State was 
permitted to call its expert psychiatric 
witness to testify about the inculpatory 
statements the defendant had made during 
his examination. The defendant was 
convicted, and the conviction was affirmed 
on direct appeal. On federal habeas review, 
the Third Circuit addressed the defendant's 
claim that his Fifth Amendment privilege 
was violated when the State was permitted 
to introduce its psychiatrist's testimony 
despite the fact that the defendant did not 
raise the diminished capacity defense at his 
second trial.  
The Third Circuit examined and synthesized 
the Supreme Court's precedent to determine 
the applicable rules for resolving the issue: 
“…A compelled psychiatric interview 
implicates Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights. Before submitting to that 
examination, the defendant must receive 
Miranda warnings and…counsel must be 
notified. …The Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
do not necessarily attach, however, when the 
defendant himself initiates the psychiatric 
examination.  Similarly, the Fifth—but not 
Sixth—Amendment right can be waived 
when the defendant initiates a trial defense 
of mental incapacity or disturbance, even 
though the defendant had not been given 
Miranda warnings. But that waiver is not 
limitless; it only allows the prosecution to 
use the interview to provide rebuttal to the 
psychiatric defense. Finally, the state has no 
obligation to warn about possible uses of the 
interview that cannot be foreseen because of 
future events, such as uncommitted crimes.”  
Applying this synthesis, the Third Circuit 
held that while the psychiatrist's testimony 
was admissible in the first trial at which the 
defendant had presented a mental capacity 
defense, it was not admissible at the 
subsequent trial…. 
Kansas statutes and caselaw are consistent 
with Smith, Buchanan, Battie, 
and Gibbs. Under K.S.A. 22–3219(1), in 
order to present a mental disease or defect 
defense at trial, a criminal defendant must 
file a pretrial notice of the intent to do so. 
Filing such a notice is deemed to be consent 
to a court-ordered mental examination.  
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…The court-ordered examination remains 
privileged unless and until the defendant 
presents evidence supporting a mental 
disease or defect defense at trial.  
In Williams, the defendant filed a notice of 
intent to raise an insanity defense and then 
scheduled and paid for a psychiatric 
examination of the defendant. The State 
filed a motion to compel discovery of the 
report, arguing that K.S.A. 22–
3219 required its release. The district court 
ordered the defendant to produce the report. 
The defendant then withdrew the notice of 
intent to use the insanity defense and asked 
the district court to vacate its order. The 
district court refused, stating the report had 
to be produced, regardless of whether it was 
going to be used. Defense counsel refused to 
comply, arguing that because the notice was 
withdrawn, the defendant retained his Fifth 
Amendment privilege in the report. Defense 
counsel was held in contempt and they 
appealed. 
A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the 
contempt order and held that the trial 
court's initial order to produce the report 
was consistent with K.S.A. 22–3219(2), 
because the defendant had filed a notice of 
intent to assert an insanity defense.  After 
the defendant withdrew his intent to assert 
an insanity defense, however, the district 
court's refusal to reconsider its order to 
produce was erroneous… 
In summary, we hold that K.S.A. 22–
3219 and our caselaw are in harmony with 
the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
as construed in the Smith and Buchanan line 
of precedent. Read together, the following 
rules apply. 
Where a defendant files a notice of intent to 
assert a mental disease or defect defense 
under K.S.A. 22–3219, the Fifth 
Amendment does not prevent the court from 
ordering the defendant to submit to a mental 
examination.  The filing of such a notice 
constitutes consent to a court-ordered mental 
examination by an expert for the State, 
making Miranda warnings 
unnecessary.  Consent to the examination, 
however, does not waive the defendant's 
Fifth Amendment privilege so as to entitle 
the State to use the examination against the 
defendant at trial. Waiver does not occur 
unless or until the defendant presents 
evidence at trial that he or she lacked the 
requisite criminal intent due to a mental 
disease or defect. If the defendant withdraws 
the notice to assert a mental disease or 
defect defense or does not present evidence 
supporting that defense at trial, the Fifth 
Amendment privilege remains intact and the 
State may not use the mental examination as 
evidence against the defendant.  If, however, 
the defendant presents evidence supporting a 
mental disease or defect defense, the State 
may use the court-ordered examination for 
the limited purpose of rebutting the 
defendant's mental disease or defect 
defense.  
Applying these rules to Cheever's case, 
Cheever retained a Fifth Amendment 
privilege in the Welner examination. 
Cheever could waive his privilege and allow 
use of the report under the proper 
circumstances. Absent such a waiver, 
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however, the report was privileged under the 
Fifth Amendment. 
1. Did Cheever waive the privilege, thus 
entitling the State to use the examination 
for rebuttal? 
The State contends that Cheever presented 
expert testimony at trial regarding his mental 
state, and therefore it was entitled to use the 
examination to rebut that defense. Cheever 
contends that he did not present evidence of 
a mental disease or defect defense. Cheever 
argues his evidence was limited to showing 
voluntary intoxication, which is not a mental 
disease or defect under Kansas law and, 
therefore, the State was not entitled to use 
the examination for rebuttal. 
The only mental capacity defense 
recognized in Kansas is the mental disease 
or defect defense, as defined by K.S.A. 22–
3220: 
“It is a defense to a prosecution under any 
statute that the defendant, as a result of 
mental disease or defect, lacked the mental 
state required as an element of the offense 
charged. Mental disease or defect is not 
otherwise a defense.”  
It is well established that voluntary-
intoxication-induced temporary mental 
incapacity at the time of the crime is not 
evidence of a mental disease or defect. 
Evidence of permanent mental incapacity 
due to long-term use of intoxicants, 
however, may support a mental disease or 
defect defense.  
In Kleypas, the defendant attempted to 
introduce expert witness testimony that he 
had experienced a blackout at the time of the 
offenses due to voluntary intoxication and 
chronic cocaine use. The State objected that 
the defendant was attempting an end run 
around the procedural and substantive 
consequences of asserting a mental defect 
defense after having withdrawn his 
previously filed notice of intent to assert 
such a defense. The trial court agreed. On 
appeal, we held that the defendant's expert 
testimony did not relate to a mental disease 
or defect but solely to voluntary 
intoxication, and thus the trial court erred in 
refusing to allow the defendant to present 
that evidence. … 
Cheever's voluntary intoxication defense 
was based on evidence that his mental state 
at the time of the crime was a product of a 
combination of immediate voluntary 
ingestion of methamphetamine and long-
term use of the drug. Cheever did not 
present evidence, however, that his use of 
methamphetamine had caused permanent 
mental impairment. Evans testified that 
while neurotoxic changes could potentially 
be permanent, in most cases, those changes 
abate after a 4– to 6–month period of 
nonuse. Evans did not testify that Cheever 
had sustained permanent damage. In fact, he 
testified that psychological testing done on 
Cheever some 6 months after his arrest was 
unlikely to be useful for determining his 
mental state at the time of the crime because 
he would no longer have been suffering the 
effects of the drug. 
Accordingly, we find that Cheever's 
evidence showed only that he suffered from 
a temporary mental incapacity due to 
voluntary intoxication; it was not evidence 
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of a mental disease or defect within the 
meaning of K.S.A. 22–3220. … Therefore, 
we conclude that allowing Welner to testify 
in rebuttal to the voluntary intoxication 
defense violated Cheever's constitutional 
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. 
2. Impeachment 
Cheever also argues that allowing the State 
to use statements he made to Welner to 
impeach his testimony at trial violated his 
Fifth Amendment privilege. The State 
contends that because there is no evidence 
Cheever's statements to Welner were 
unlawfully coerced and Cheever does not 
make such a claim, there was no reason to 
exclude that evidence. In its brief, the State 
argues: 
“Whether viewed as a constitutional 
claim or otherwise, there is no basis for 
exclusion of Dr. Welner's testimony. The 
exclusion of relevant evidence obtained 
by the State in a criminal prosecution is a 
judicially created remedy designed to 
safeguard the rights of defendants 
through its deterrent effect.  The ‘primary 
purpose of the exclusionary rule “is to 
deter future unlawful police conduct.” ’ 
…Because there was no allegation of 
government misconduct here, the 
exclusion of Dr. Welner's testimony by 
the trial court was not warranted.”… 
We hold the exclusionary rule argument has 
no relevance here. Cheever's statements to 
Welner are not excluded as a sanction for 
governmental misconduct; they are 
inadmissible because they are protected by 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination.  
Although not argued by the parties, we note 
there is conflicting federal caselaw on the 
question of whether a defendant's statements 
made during a court-ordered mental 
examination, while not admissible to rebut a 
mental-state defense, may nevertheless be 
used to impeach the defendant's trial 
testimony. … 
We conclude that under the circumstances, 
resolution of this issue must await another 
day. … In addition, as discussed below, the 
erroneous admission of Welner's testimony 
requires reversal and remand of the capital 
murder and attempted capital murder 
convictions. Thus, even if we were also to 
determine that Cheever's statements were 
properly admitted for impeachment, that 
determination would not change the 
outcome in this case. 
Last, we address an additional point about 
the admissibility of Welner's testimony. The 
trial court suggested that Welner's testimony 
was admissible for rebuttal because Evans 
relied on Welner's report in reaching his 
conclusions. During the arguments over 
Cheever's objection to the State calling 
Welner to testify in rebuttal to Evans, the 
State interjected that Evans had testified he 
relied on Welner's report. Defense counsel 
confirmed the State's representation. The 
trial court then stated “that fact standing 
alone probably allows the State to call him 
to give his own point of view.” 
Although defense counsel confirmed the 
State's representation, the record does not. 
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Evans never stated that he relied upon 
Welner's report. Evans specifically testified 
that he did not watch the video of Welner's 
interview or read the transcript of the 
interview. … 
…In any event, we need not speculate about 
the legal basis for the trial court's suggestion 
that Evans' reliance upon Welner's report 
provided an alternate ground for allowing 
Welner to testify, because the record plainly 
fails to establish that Evans actually did rely 
upon Welner's report to arrive at his own 
opinions. 
C. Harmless Error Analysis 
Because the admission of Welner's 
testimony violated Cheever's Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination, we apply the federal 
constitutional harmless error test 
of Chapman v. 
California.  Under Chapman, an error that 
violates a criminal defendant's constitutional 
rights requires reversal unless the party who 
benefitted from the error—here, the State—
“proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of ... did not affect the 
outcome of the trial in light of the entire 
record, i.e., proves there is no reasonable 
possibility that the error affected the 
verdict.”  
In Satterwhite v. Texas, the United States 
Supreme Court considered whether the 
erroneous admission of the defendant's 
court-ordered psychiatric examination was 
harmless error under Chapman. Because of 
parallels with Cheever's case, we set out in 
detail the Court's discussion of the evidence 
at issue and its effect on the outcome: 
“Dr. Grigson [who conducted the 
examination of the defendant] was the 
State's final witness.… He stated 
unequivocably [sic ] that, in his expert 
opinion, Satterwhite ‘will present a 
continuing threat to society by continuing 
acts of violence.’ He explained that 
Satterwhite has ‘a lack of conscience’ and 
is ‘as severe a sociopath as you can be.’ 
…Dr. Grigson concluded his testimony 
on direct examination with perhaps his 
most devastating opinion of all: he told 
the jury that Satterwhite was beyond the 
reach of psychiatric rehabilitation. 
“The District Attorney highlighted Dr. 
Grigson's credentials and conclusions in 
his closing argument: 
‘Doctor James Grigson, Dallas 
psychiatrist and medical doctor. And he 
tells you: … Severe sociopath. Extremely 
dangerous. A continuing threat to our 
society. Can it be cured? Well, it's not a 
disease. It's not an illness. That's his 
personality. That's John T. Satterwhite.’ 
“The finding of future dangerousness was 
critical to the death sentence…. Having 
reviewed the evidence in this case, we 
find it impossible to say beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Dr. Grigson's 
expert testimony on the issue of 
Satterwhite's future dangerousness did 
not influence the sentencing jury.”  
Satterwhite involved the admission of 
evidence in the penalty phase of a capital 
murder proceeding, while here, Welner's 
testimony was admitted in the guilt stage. As 
the Court recognized 
in Satterwhite, assessing the prejudicial 
effect of error in the sentencing phase can be 
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more difficult because of the discretion the 
jury has in determining whether death is the 
appropriate punishment.  That difference 
notwithstanding, we find the Court's 
analysis of the prejudicial effect of the error 
in admitting psychiatric evidence instructive 
for the ways in which it parallels Cheever's 
case. … 
Arguably, it is possible the jury might have 
convicted Cheever even without Welner's 
testimony; however, that is not the standard 
we must apply under Chapman. “The 
question ... is not whether the legally 
admitted evidence was sufficient to support” 
the verdict, “but, rather, whether the State 
has proved ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error complained of did not contribute to 
the verdict obtained.’ ”  
Because this error violated Cheever's federal 
constitutional rights, we must reverse unless 
we can say with “the highest level of 
certainty that the error did not affect the 
outcome.”  After reviewing the entire 
record, we do not have that level of 
certainty; we cannot conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Welner's testimony 
did not contribute to the verdict in this case. 
Consequently, the error is not harmless, and 
Cheever's convictions for capital murder and 
attempted capital murder must be reversed 
and remanded for a new trial. 
Our decision reversing Cheever's 
convictions for capital murder and attempted 
capital murder make it unnecessary to 
resolve the other issues Cheever has raised. 
Nevertheless, because we are remanding the 
case for a new trial, we will address those 
issues that are likely to arise on remand in 
order to provide guidance to the trial court.  
II. FELONY MURDER AS A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF CAPITAL 
MURDER 
The trial court instructed the jury on first-
degree premeditated murder as a lesser 
included offense of capital murder. On 
appeal, Cheever argues that the first-degree 
murder instruction should have included the 
alternative theory of felony murder as a 
lesser included offense of capital murder. 
Cheever acknowledges he did not request 
such an instruction or object to its absence in 
the district court; thus the trial judge did not 
have an opportunity to address this issue…. 
With capital murder as the highest degree of 
homicide, first-degree murder is a lesser 
degree of capital murder under K.S.A. 21–
3107(2)(a) and is therefore a lesser included 
crime of capital murder. The crime of first-
degree murder may be committed in two 
ways: premeditated murder and felony 
murder. Accordingly, felony murder is a 
lesser included crime of capital murder and, 
where facts support it, should be included in 
instructions on lesser included crimes in 
capital murder cases…. 
III. VOIR DIRE COMMENTS 
MENTIONING APPELLATE REVIEW 
The trial court divided the prospective jurors 
into seven panels for voir dire. The trial 
court's introductory remarks to each panel 
were substantially similar and began by 
introducing the parties, their counsel, and 
court personnel, including the court reporter. 
In explaining the role of the court reporter, 
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the trial court told the prospective jurors that 
the court reporter's written record of the 
proceedings served two purposes: for 
reference during the trial and for appellate 
review should the case be appealed. 
The following remarks made to the seventh 
panel are representative of those made to all 
of the panels: 
“Almost everything is on the record that we 
do in here. 
“We refer back to that record from time to 
time during the trial to see what someone 
said, whether a question's already been 
asked, things of that nature, and if this case 
should go up on appeal to the appellate 
courts in Kansas in Topeka, a transcript is 
made of everything we do and that transcript 
is sent to the appellate court, along with the 
exhibits, and the appellate court decides all 
issues on appeal based on that record that 
we've made here in the trial court.” 
Cheever argues that the trial court's remarks 
violated the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution as applied 
in Caldwell v. Mississippi.  Cheever 
contends the trial judge's remarks in this 
case created the risk that the jurors would 
believe that the ultimate responsibility for 
Cheever's sentence rested with the appellate 
courts, thereby undermining the heightened 
reliability the Eighth Amendment demands 
of a jury's determination that death is the 
appropriate punishment. 
In Caldwell, the prosecutor argued to the 
jury that a decision to impose the death 
sentence would not be final because it was 
subject to review by the appellate court. The 
Supreme Court held the remarks rendered 
the death sentence unconstitutional. …  
State v. Nguyen provided this court with an 
opportunity to consider whether a trial judge 
commits judicial misconduct by mentioning 
to a jury the possibility that the case before 
it could be appealed. In explaining the 
process for the jury to submit questions or 
request readbacks during deliberations, the 
judge said: 
“ ‘I explained to you that if I get a 
question, and that will be through my 
bailiff, Ms. Mies, the foreman will write 
it down and date it. And I would request 
also that he write the time—he or she 
write the time on there. That question will 
be preserved, ‘cause defense, regardless, 
would have a right to appeal. As I told 
you, that a judge is under a microscope 
and that [to] be sure that any defendant 
receives the correct legal decisions. I can 
be challenged. And I welcome the 
challenges.’ ”  
…Although we found the comments were 
not prejudicial, we unequivocally stressed 
that “[a] trial court should not mention a 
defendant's right to appeal.” 
Nguyen was not a death penalty case; 
however, the reasoning is consistent 
with Caldwell. Accordingly, we take this 
opportunity to reiterate our general 
directive: It is improper for a trial court to 
make comments to the jury regarding 
appellate review. Moreover, we emphasize 
that the life-or-death stakes in a capital 
murder proceeding require extra vigilance 
on the part of the trial court to abide by this 
directive. We note the remarks in this case 
are not analogous to those that required 
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reversal in Caldwell. Nevertheless, 
under Nguyen, it is error for the trial judge to 
tell jurors, even prospective jurors, that the 
exhibits and transcripts of the proceedings 
will be reviewed by an appellate court. … 
IV. CHEEVER'S AGE AT THE TIME 
OF THE OFFENSE 
Cheever argues that his death sentence was 
imposed in violation of his right to jury trial 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution because the 
jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he was at least 18 years old at the time 
of the crime, a fact that he contends is 
necessary to render him eligible for the 
enhanced sentence of death. Cheever does 
not dispute that he was at least 18 years old 
at the time of the capital offense…. 
Resolution of this issue hinges on whether 
the fact Cheever was at least 18 years of age 
at the time of the crime is a fact necessary 
for imposition of the death penalty. Cheever 
argues that it is, relying primarily on Roper 
v. Simmons. Cheever points out 
that Roper held that being 18 years or older 
at the time of the offense is an eligibility 
requirement for the death penalty. … 
The State responds that the defendant's age 
is not within the scope of Apprendi because 
it is not a fact that increases the statutory 
maximum sentence. According to the State, 
death is the maximum authorized sentence 
under our capital sentencing statutes, with 
the defendant's age merely a fact that 
mitigates that sentence to life in prison. … 
We deem the State's arguments 
unpersuasive. First, we disagree that death is 
the maximum authorized sentence. … 
Second, the Supreme Court 
in Roper explicitly rejected the idea that the 
Eighth Amendment could be satisfied by 
treating the defendant's youth as a mitigating 
circumstance. Instead, the Court drew a 
bright line, holding that the age of 18 or 
older is a requirement for death eligibility.  
Third, under our statutory scheme, the fact 
the defendant was at least 18 is a 
prerequisite to imposition of the death 
penalty. … 
Accordingly, we conclude that the fact the 
defendant was at least 18 years old at the 
time of the crime is a fact necessary to 
subject the defendant to the death penalty 
and therefore within the scope of Sixth 
Amendment protection….  
V. PENALTY-PHASE INSTRUCTIONS 
ON MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
…We note that the [penalty-phase] 
instruction at issue followed PIK Crim.3d 
56.00–D. That pattern instruction did not 
conform to our directive in Kleypas. In 
2008, PIK Crim.3d 56.00–D was amended 
to inform the jury that mitigating 
circumstances do not need to be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In any retrial of 
this case, the most current version of the 
PIK Crim.3d instructions on mitigating 
evidence should be used. 
VI. MERCY INSTRUCTION 
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Cheever challenges the mitigating 
circumstances instruction on another 
ground, specifically, the following part: 
“Mitigating circumstances are those which 
in fairness may be considered as extenuating 
or reducing the degree of moral culpability 
or blame or which justify a sentence of less 
than death, even though they do not justify 
or excuse the offense. 
“The appropriateness of exercising mercy 
can itself be a mitigating factor in 
determining whether the State has proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the death 
penalty should be imposed.” 
Cheever argues that by characterizing mercy 
as a mitigating circumstance and placing it 
in the context of the weighing equation, the 
instruction prevents the jurors from being 
able to give full effect to mercy as a basis 
for a sentence less than death, in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment. Cheever argues that 
the jurors must be allowed the opportunity 
to extend mercy and impose a life 
sentence after determining that the 
mitigators do not outweigh the aggravators 
and death is the appropriate sentence by law. 
… 
Cheever's argument is the same argument 
we considered and rejected 
in Kleypas … Cheever offers nothing new to 
support revisiting [previous] decisions…. 
VII. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
DURING PENALTY STAGE 
Cheever contends that certain comments 
concerning consideration of mitigating 
circumstances made by the prosecutor 
during the penalty-stage closing argument 
constitute prosecutorial misconduct. 
The first comment at issue was made during 
the State's closing argument rebuttal: 
“Ladies and gentlemen, let's start off by 
looking at these mitigating circumstances 
offered to you by the defendant, which 
Judge Ward has contained in the 
instructions. First of all, it's important to 
remember that these are contentions only. 
The judge, by instructing you about these, is 
not suggesting to you that they are true. 
What he's telling you is that the defendant 
has put these before you, you can consider 
them if you choose, but you don't have to. Or 
you can give them as little weight as you 
choose to give them.” Cheever contends the 
highlighted remark told the jury that it did 
not have to consider mitigating 
circumstances. Cheever argues that because 
the Eighth Amendment is violated when a 
capital sentencing jury is precluded from 
considering relevant mitigating evidence 
that might serve as a basis for a life 
sentence, the remark was improper. 
The prosecutor's comment in this case was 
part of an argument that the mitigating 
circumstances identified in the instructions 
were only contentions and, as such, the jury 
did not have to accept them as established 
simply because they were listed in the 
instructions. That comment was not an effort 
to “cut off in an absolute manner” the jury's 
consideration of Cheever's mitigating 
evidence.  The larger argument, moreover, 
was consistent with the law and the 
instructions. It was not improper…. 
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The second comment concerned Cheever's 
mitigating circumstance that he “was 
addicted to methamphetamine and he was 
under its influence at the time of the crime.” 
The prosecutor argued: 
“The defendant tells us he was addicted to 
methamphetamine, and that's the reason, 
that's a mitigator. Well, tell that to Robert 
Sanders ‘cause he wasn't on 
methamphetamine that night. Now, you've 
already decided methamphetamine did not 
play a role in the capital murder of Matt 
Samuels. And you should reject it now, too.” 
…The point of the prosecutor's comment 
was simply that because the evidence 
showed Cheever committed a violent 
criminal act when he was not under the 
influence of methamphetamine, the jury 
should give little weight to Cheever's 
mitigating circumstance that he was under 
the influence of methamphetamine at the 
time of the crime. As such, it was not 
improper. 
The last comment at issue concerned the 
jury's rejection of Cheever's voluntary 
intoxication defense in the guilt stage: 
“[Y]ou've already decided 
methamphetamine did not play a role in the 
capital murder of Matt Samuels. And you 
should reject it now.” According to Cheever, 
this remark suggested to the jury that 
because it rejected the voluntary intoxication 
defense at the guilt stage, it could reject 
Cheever's mitigating circumstance that he 
was under the influence of 
methamphetamine at the time of the crime. 
Although the prosecutor said 
“you should reject it,” the remark crossed 
the line between comment on the weight of 
the evidence as it relates to specific 
mitigating circumstances and argument to 
the jury that it could not consider a 
mitigating circumstance as a matter of 
law. Not only is such an argument an 
incorrect statement of the law, it could lead 
a juror to refuse to consider legally relevant 
mitigating evidence, in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment. We strongly suggest the 
State avoid this argument on remand. 
The convictions and sentences for 
manufacture of methamphetamine and 
criminal possession of a firearm are 
affirmed. The convictions for capital murder 
and attempted capital murder are reversed, 
and the case is remanded for a new trial. 
ROSEN, J., concurring: 
I concur with the majority but write 
separately only to comment on Cheever's 
argument that jurors be allowed the 
opportunity to consider mercy after finding a 
determination of death is warranted. 
As a result of our decision in State v. 
Stallings, capital defendants are denied the 
statutory right of allocution to the sentencing 
jury. Thus, a capital defendant is deprived of 
any meaningful opportunity to make a plea 
for mercy, indeed for his or her very life, 
before the sentencing jury makes a decision 
whether the defendant is to be put to death. I 
dissented from the decision in Stallings and 
write here to make clear my opinion that 
Cheever, like all criminal defendants, should 
be afforded an opportunity to offer a direct 
allocutory statement in mitigation to his 
sentencer. 
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“U.S. Justices Agree to Weigh Defendant's Self-Incrimination Claim” 
Reuters 
Lawrence Hurley 
February 25, 2013 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed on Monday 
to consider whether a criminal defendant's 
right against self-incrimination is violated 
when a psychiatrist who examined him 
testifies about his mental state. 
Scott Cheever was sentenced to death for 
killing Greenwood County, Kansas, Sheriff 
Matthew Samuels while officers sought to 
enforce a warrant for his arrest in January 
2005. 
Cheever's defense was that he was 
intoxicated after using methamphetamine 
and therefore incapable of the premeditation 
necessary for him to be convicted of murder 
and attempted murder. 
The legal question is whether Cheever's 
Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination was violated when the state 
called a psychiatrist who had examined 
Cheever to testify in order to rebut the claim 
that the defendant was incapable of rational 
thought. 
The psychiatrist's testimony was based in 
part on what Cheever had said to him during 
the evaluation. The Kansas Supreme Court 
ruled in Cheever's favor. 
Oral argument and a decision are expected 
in the U.S. Supreme Court's next term, 
which begins in October and runs until June 
2014. 
The case is Kansas v. Cheever, U.S. 
Supreme Court, No. 12-609. 
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“Kansas Supreme Court Overturns Conviction of Death-Row Inmate in 
Sheriff’s Killing” 
 
The Wichita Eagle 
Hurst Laviana 
August 24, 2012 
The Kansas Supreme Court on Friday 
overturned the capital murder conviction of 
a death-row inmate who shot and killed 
Greenwood County Sheriff Matt Samuels. 
The court said in its ruling that prosecutors 
violated Scott Cheever’s right against self-
incrimination when they allowed an expert 
witness to discuss the results of a mental 
exam that Cheever was required by a federal 
judge to take. 
The Kansas Supreme Court has yet to 
uphold a death sentence imposed under the 
state’s 1994 capital murder law. 
Attorney General Derek Schmidt said his 
office was reviewing Friday’s ruling but 
didn’t indicate whether the state would retry 
the case. 
“We will be consulting with appropriate 
parties over the next few days to determine 
the best course of action to ensure justice is 
served,” Schmidt said. 
Cheever, now 31, is a special management 
inmate at the Lansing Correctional Facility. 
Cheever was convicted of shooting Samuels 
on Jan. 19, 2005, near the Greenwood 
County town of Virgil. Acting on a tip, 
witnesses at Cheever’s trial testified, 
Samuels went to the home to serve an arrest 
warrant on Cheever. Cheever and other 
residents of the home had been cooking and 
using meth before Samuels and a deputy 
arrived. Cheever, who was hiding in an 
upstairs bedroom, shot Samuels as he 
climbed the stairs. Cheever never denied 
shooting Samuels. 
Although Cheever was originally charged 
with capital murder in Greenwood County 
District Court, the case was moved to 
federal court because the constitutionality of 
the state’s death penalty was being 
challenged at the time. In the summer of 
2006, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the law, and Cheever’s 
case was moved back to state court. 
During Cheever’s time in the federal court 
system, U.S. District Judge Monte Belot 
ordered him to undergo a psychiatric 
examination by Michael Welner, a forensic 
psychiatrist hired by the government. It was 
Welner’s testimony at the state court trail 
that would eventually result in Cheever’s 
conviction being overturned. 
During his jury trail, Cheever’s lawyers 
relied on a voluntary intoxication defense, 
arguing that Cheever’s heavy use of meth 
prevented him from forming the intent or 
premeditation to commit murder. 
Lee Evans, dean of the school of pharmacy 
at Auburn University, was called as an 
expert witness by the defense to testify that 
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Cheever’s use of meth kept him from 
making sound decisions. 
With respect to shooting Samuels, Evans 
testified, there “was no judgment. There was 
no judgment at all. This man just did it.” 
Welner, who was called by prosecutors as a 
rebuttal witness, disagreed. 
"He made a decision to shoot when he did," 
he told the jury. “And when he stopped 
shooting, he made a decision to stop 
shooting." 
The Greenwood County jury convicted 
Cheever of capital murder on Oct. 30, 2007, 
then sentenced him to death two days later. 
In a 53-page opinion that overturned the 
conviction, the Kansas Supreme Court said 
the Fifth Amendment does not prevent a 
judge from ordering a defendant to submit to 
a mental exam. But the court said it does 
prevent the state from using the exam 
against the defendant at trial. 
“Welner was the last witness the jury heard 
during the guilt phase of the trail, and his 
testimony was extensive and devastating,” 
the ruling said. “He employed a method of 
testifying that virtually put words into 
Cheever’s mouth. He focused on the events 
surrounding the shootings, giving a moment-
by-moment recounting of Cheever’s 
observations and actual thoughts to rebut the 
sole defense theory that he did not 
premeditate the crimes.” 
In addition to capital murder, Cheever was 
convicted on four counts of attempted 
capital murder for firing at two state 
troopers and two sheriff’s deputies. The 
court also overturned those convictions. 
Cheever’s convictions for manufacturing 
methamphetamine and criminal possession 
of a firearm were upheld. 
Samuels’ death prompted changes in the 
Kansas criminal code to make it more 
difficult to purchase the ingredients used in 
making meth. Changes in the law restricting 
the purchase of certain allergy medications 
and increased penalties were known as the 
Matt Samuels Act. 
  
 431 
Fernandez v. California 
12-7822 
Ruling Below: California v. Fernandez, 208 Cal.App.4th 100 (App. 2d Dist. 2012), cert 
granted, 133 S.Ct. 2388 (U.S. 2013). 
Defendant was convicted of second degree robbery and willful infliction of corporal injury on a 
spouse, cohabitant, or child's parent. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals, held that 
warrantless search of apartment over defendant's objection was lawful, where defendant was 
arrested and no longer present when co-tenant consented to search. 
Question Presented: Whether, under Georgia v. Randolph, a defendant must be personally 
present and objecting when police officers ask a co-tenant for consent to conduct a warrantless 
search or whether a defendant’s previously stated objection, while physically present, to a 
warrantless search is a continuing assertion of Fourth Amendment rights which cannot be 
overridden by a co-tenant. 
 
 
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Walter FERNANDEZ, Defendant and Appellant. 
Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California 
Decided on August 1, 2012 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
SUZUKAWA, J. 
A jury convicted defendant Walter 
Fernandez of second degree robbery and 
willful infliction of corporal injury on a 
spouse, cohabitant, or child's parent; as to 
count 1, the jury further found that (1) in the 
commission of the offense, the defendant 
personally used a dangerous and deadly 
weapon, to wit, a knife, within the meaning 
of section 12022, subdivision (b) (1), and (2) 
the offense was committed for the benefit of, 
at the direction of, or in association with a 
criminal street gang, within the meaning of 
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). 
Defendant pled nolo contendere to 
possession of a firearm by a felon, short 
barreled shotgun or rifle activity. The trial 
court imposed a sentence of 14 years. 
In this appeal from the judgment, defendant 
contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress evidence seized 
during a warrantless search of his apartment; 
(2) the trial court abused its discretion by 
admitting evidence that a suspect was 
arrested for attempted murder in defendant's 
apartment; (3) there was insufficient 
evidence to support the true finding on the 
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gang allegation; and (4) the trial court erred 
in denying defendant's Pitchess motion. 
In the published portion of the opinion, we 
conclude the trial court properly denied 
defendant's suppression motion. In the 
unpublished portion, we reject defendant's 
remaining claims, with the exception of his 
contention of Pitchess error. We 
conditionally reverse the section 273.5, 
subdivision (a) conviction for the trial court 
to conduct an in camera review of one 
officer's personnel file; in all other respects, 
we affirm the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. Prosecution Case 
A. Percipient Testimony 
1. Abel Lopez 
On October 12, 2009, at about 11:00 a.m., 
Abel Lopez was approached after cashing a 
check near the corner of 14th Street and 
Magnolia in Los Angeles by a man with 
light skin, a grey sweater, and a tattoo on his 
bald head. The man, whom Lopez later 
identified as defendant, asked what 
neighborhood Lopez was from. Lopez said, 
“I'm from Mexico.” Defendant laughed and 
said Lopez was in his territory and should 
give him his money. He then said, “The 
D.F.S. rules here. They rule here.” 
Defendant took a knife out of his pocket and 
pointed it towards Lopez's chest. Lopez put 
up his hands to protect himself and 
defendant cut Lopez's wrist. 
Lopez tried to run away and, while running, 
took out his cell phone and called 911. He 
told the 911 operator he needed help 
because someone wanted to kill him. 
Defendant then whistled loudly and three or 
four men ran out of a building on 14th Street 
and Magnolia. They hit Lopez in the face 
and all over his body, knocking him to the 
ground, where they continued to hit and kick 
him. When he got up, Lopez did not have 
his cell phone or wallet. He saw the men 
running back to the building from which 
they had come. As a result of the attack, 
Lopez suffered a deep cut on his left wrist 
and bruising and swelling over his body. 
Several minutes after the attack, the police 
and paramedics arrived. Lopez participated 
in a field showup, where he identified 
defendant. 
2. Detective Clark and Officer Cirrito 
Detective Kelly Clark and Officer Joseph 
Cirrito responded to a police radio dispatch 
on October 12, 2009. Because the police 
dispatcher indicated possible involvement 
by members of the Drifters gang in an 
assault with a deadly weapon, Clark and 
Cirrito drove to an alley near Magnolia and 
14th Street where they knew Drifters 
gathered. As they stood in the alley, two 
men walked by and one said, “[T]he guy is 
in the apartment.” The speaker appeared 
very scared and walked away quickly. When 
he returned, he again said, “He's in there. 
He's in the apartment.” Immediately 
thereafter, the detectives saw a tall, light-
skinned, Hispanic or white male wearing a 
light blue t-shirt and khaki pants run through 
the alley and into the house where the 
witness was pointing. The house had been 
restructured into multiple apartments and 
was a known gang location. A minute or so 
later, the officers heard sounds of screaming 
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and fighting from the apartment building 
into which the suspect had run. 
Clark and Cirrito called for backup and, 
once additional officers arrived, knocked on 
the door of the unit from which they had 
heard screaming. The door was opened by 
Roxanne Rojas, who was holding a baby and 
appeared to be crying. Her face was red and 
she had a big bump on her nose that looked 
fresh. She had blood on her shirt and hand 
that appeared to come from a fresh injury. 
Cirrito asked what happened and she said 
she had been in a fight. Cirrito then asked if 
anyone else was inside the apartment, and 
she said only her son. When Cirrito asked 
her to step outside so he could conduct a 
sweep of the apartment, defendant stepped 
forward. He was dressed only in boxer 
shorts and seemed very agitated. He said, 
“You don't have any right to come in here. I 
know my rights.” Cirrito removed him from 
the residence and took him into custody. 
While Cirrito and Clark arrested defendant 
at the rear of the house, two men ran out of 
the front of the house. Officers detained 
them for questioning. 
After defendant was removed from the 
scene, officers secured the apartment. Clark 
then went back to Rojas, told her that 
defendant had been identified as a robbery 
suspect, and asked for Rojas's consent to 
search the apartment. Rojas gave consent, 
orally and in writing. During the ensuing 
search, officers found Drifters gang 
paraphernalia, a butterfly knife, boxing 
gloves, and clothing, including black pants 
and a light blue shirt. None of the items 
stolen from the victim was ever found. 
The officers interviewed Rojas about her 
injuries. She said that when defendant 
entered the apartment, she confronted him 
about his relationship with a woman named 
Vanessa. They argued, and defendant struck 
Rojas in the face. The officers also spoke to 
Rojas's four-year-old son, Christian, who 
told them defendant had a gun. Officers 
recovered a sawed-off shotgun from a 
heating unit where Christian told them it 
was hidden. … 
B. Expert Testimony 
1. Defendant's Active Gang Membership 
Cirrito testified for the prosecution as a gang 
expert, opining that defendant was an active 
member of the Drifters, a Latino street gang. 
He said that the Drifters began as a “car 
club,” but moved into criminal activities in 
the 1980's. By the 1990's, they began to 
engage in more violent crimes, such as 
assaults, carjackings, attempted murders, 
and narcotics sales. As of October 2009, 
there were about 140 active Drifters 
members. In 2009, defendant told officers he 
had been a member of the Drifters (12th 
Street Bagos clique) for nine years. 
The Drifters' territory includes a 
“stronghold” in the area between 14th Street 
and 15th Street, and between Hoover and 
Menlo. The stronghold is an area where 
gang members can retreat if there is danger, 
and from which members can escape 
through secret passageways. … 
Cirrito testified that a “moniker” is a 
nickname typically given to a gang member. 
Defendant's moniker is “Blocks.” The 
moniker “Blocks” appeared in a Drifters 
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“roll call” (list of active gang members) on a 
water heater near defendant's apartment. 
“Blocks” also appeared in tagging on a 
garage door a few days after defendant's 
arrest, which read “D.F.S. [Drifters], Bagos, 
Block [s].” “Bagos” is the Drifters clique in 
the area in which defendant lives. 
Cirrito testified that an art book recovered 
from defendant's bedroom on October 12, 
2009, also evidences defendant's gang 
membership. Specifically, he noted that the 
book contains a roll call with monikers and 
references to “D.F.S. 13,” “D.F.S. 12th 
Street, Bagos,” “Blocks,” “Rox,” “ Roxy, 
12th Street,” “Drifters,” and “Drifters 13.” 
Cirrito said that “13” indicates an affiliation 
with the Mexican mafia, the “M.A.”… 
In summary, Cirrito opined that defendant 
was an active member of the Drifters 
because he had tattoos that reference the 
Drifters gang; he goes by the moniker 
“Blocks”; he admitted to officers that he has 
been a member of the Drifters; he had gang 
paraphernalia in his home; he lived in a 
Drifters stronghold; and during the incident 
for which he was arrested, he said, “Where 
are you from? D.F.S. rules here.” 
2. Cirrito's Opinion That the Robbery 
Was Gang-related 
Cirrito testified that gang members care 
deeply about their gang's reputation in the 
community because “reputation means 
everything to them.” He said that gangs 
want respect from rival gangs, but they also 
want to terrorize the neighborhoods in which 
they operate so people will be afraid to come 
forward and talk about the gang's criminal 
activities. A gang makes itself known in the 
community in several ways, primarily by 
committing crimes and tagging. 
The Drifters establish their territory “[b]y 
committing crimes in—just open daylight. 
There's fear and intimidation.... [S]ome of 
these younger people ... want to be gang 
members. Some of them, it's almost peer 
pressure. Some of them are actually forced 
because they live in that neighborhood. 
They get beat up. They're getting—I'll say 
attacked or pocket checked, and, eventually, 
they give in to just be part of this gang.” 
Cirrito opined that Drifters members 
individually and collectively engage in a 
pattern of criminal gang activity. Their 
primary activities are robbery, grand theft 
auto, assault with a deadly weapon, 
narcotics, and attempted murder. … 
II. Defense Case 
Roxanne Rojas testified that on October 12, 
2009, she and defendant were living 
together in the apartment where defendant 
was arrested. At about 11:00 a.m., defendant 
left the apartment to buy tacos and 
cigarettes; Rojas remained home with their 
two-month-old daughter and four-year-old 
son. While defendant was gone, a woman 
named Vanessa came to the apartment, and 
she and Rojas fought. Rojas and Vanessa 
were both injured during the fight. When 
defendant returned to the apartment through 
the back door, Vanessa left out the front 
door. Defendant saw that Rojas was injured 
and began to yell at her. Moments later, an 
officer arrived. The officer asked Rojas to 
let him in, and Rojas “didn't say yes. I didn't 
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say no. I said let me get my children.” Rojas 
agreed that defendant has a Drifters tattoo, 
but said he was no longer active in the gang. 
Defendant testified that he had been 
involved with the Drifters earlier in his life. 
He was “forcibly jumped in” when he was 
18 or 19 years old and he “had to basically 
like go with the flow.” He was never heavily 
involved with the Drifters; “[i]t always was 
just about like simply like me living there ... 
like I'm out there doing stuff in the 
neighborhood ... hanging out with people I 
grew up with.” He admitted that he had been 
convicted of receiving stolen property and 
served time in prison. He said he was 
released in 2007 and turned his life around. 
He began working and got an apartment in 
Marina del Rey for himself, Rojas, and her 
son. When Rojas got pregnant with her 
second child, the family moved to a two-
bedroom apartment on 15th Street and 
Magnolia, but he had nothing to do with the 
Drifters. 
Defendant testified that on the morning of 
October 12, 2009, he woke up late, played 
with his son, and then went out to get tacos 
for the family. On 14th Street, he was 
approached by a Hispanic man who 
appeared to be drunk. The man said, “Crazy 
Riders,” which is rival gang from the area. 
Defendant ignored him and kept walking. 
The man continued to talk to him and then 
“got into the point where he's coming at 
me.” Defendant pushed him away, and the 
two men got into a fist fight. When it was 
over, defendant continued to the liquor store 
to buy cigarettes and then went home. 
Defendant never saw the man again. When 
he returned home, Rojas told him a girl had 
come to the house looking for him, and she 
and the girl had gotten into a fight. 
Defendant was upset that Rojas had let the 
girl in, and he and Rojas began yelling at 
one another. He did not hit Rojas during the 
argument. The police arrived a few minutes 
later and arrested him. 
On cross-examination, defendant conceded 
that he has four prior felony convictions for 
theft-related crimes. He said “Blocks” or 
“Blockhead” is his nickname, but it is not a 
gang moniker. 
III. Sentencing and Appeal 
On October 8, 2010, defendant pled nolo 
contendere to counts 3, 4, and 5 (firearms 
and ammunition possession). In connection 
with defendant's plea, the parties agreed that 
defendant's son would not be called as a 
witness in the jury trial and the prosecution 
would not reference a gun seized at 
defendant's home after his arrest. On 
October 25, 2010, the jury convicted 
defendant of counts 1 and 2 (second degree 
robbery and corporal injury on a spouse, 
cohabitant, or child's parent); as to count 1, 
the jury further found that (1) in the 
commission of the offense, defendant had 
personally used a dangerous and deadly 
weapon, and (2) the offense was committed 
for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 
association with a criminal street gang. 
As to count 1, the court sentenced defendant 
to 14 years (midterm of three years, plus an 
additional consecutive term of 10 years 
pursuant to § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A), plus 
an additional term of one year pursuant to § 
12022, subd. (b)(1)). As to count 2, the court 
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sentenced defendant to the midterm of three 
years, to run concurrent with the principal 
term. As to counts 3, 4, and 5, the court 
sentenced defendant to the midterm of two 
years, to run concurrent with the principal 
term. 
Defendant timely appealed. 
DISCUSSION 
Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred 
by denying his motion to suppress evidence 
seized in his apartment during a warrantless 
search; (2) the trial court abused its 
discretion by admitting evidence that a 
suspect was arrested for attempted murder in 
defendant's apartment; (3) there was 
insufficient evidence to support the true 
finding on the gang allegation; and (4) the 
trial court erred by denying defendant's 
Pitchess motion. We consider these issues 
below. 
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err by 
Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion 
pursuant to section 1538.5 to suppress 
evidence seized during a warrantless search 
of his apartment following his arrest. 
Specifically, defendant sought to exclude (1) 
a Mossberg New Haven 20–gauge shotgun, 
(2) Remington 20–gauge shotgun 
ammunition, (3) a knife with a four and a 
half-inch stainless steel blade, (4) any 
currency seized during the search, and (5) 
any other evidence seized, including 
clothing, notebooks, and boxing gloves. The 
trial court denied the motion to suppress. We 
review the order de novo to determine 
whether, on the facts found by the trial court 
on the basis of substantial evidence, the 
search or seizure was reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.  
Defendant contends that the trial court erred 
by denying the motion to suppress, noting 
that the officers did not obtain a search 
warrant and he objected to their entry into 
his apartment. Citing Georgia v. Randolph, 
he urges that Rojas's subsequent consent to a 
search of their apartment was invalid and 
any evidence obtained was inadmissible. 
The Attorney General disagrees, contending 
that Rojas's consent provided a 
constitutionally permissible basis for the 
search once defendant was lawfully 
removed from the apartment. 
We begin by discussing Randolph, in which 
the United States Supreme Court held that 
police officers may not constitutionally 
conduct a warrantless search of a home over 
the express refusal of consent by a 
physically present resident, even if another 
resident consents to a search. We then 
discuss the split of authority among the 
federal circuit courts as to Randolph's 
application to a case like the present one, 
where consent to search is given by a 
defendant's cotenant after the defendant is 
arrested and removed from the residence. 
We conclude that under the circumstances of 
the present case, the search was lawful. 
A. Georgia v. Randolph 
In Randolph, defendant's wife, Janet 
Randolph, called police to the family home 
and complained that her husband was a 
cocaine user. An officer asked defendant's 
permission to search the house; he refused. 
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The officer then sought Mrs. Randolph's 
consent to search, which she gave. In 
defendant's bedroom, the officer discovered 
cocaine and drug paraphernalia.  
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence 
as products of a warrantless search. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari “to resolve 
a split of authority on whether one occupant 
may give law enforcement effective consent 
to search shared premises, as against a co-
tenant who is present and states a refusal to 
permit the search.”  
The court noted that to the Fourth 
Amendment rule ordinarily prohibiting the 
warrantless entry of a person's house as 
unreasonable per se, “one ‘jealously and 
carefully drawn’ exception, recognizes the 
validity of searches with the voluntary 
consent of an individual possessing 
authority. That person might be the 
householder against whom evidence is 
sought, or a fellow occupant who shares 
common authority over property, when the 
suspect is absent. The exception recognized 
in those cases “ ‘does not rest upon the law 
of property, with its attendant historical and 
legal refinements, but rests rather on mutual 
use of the property by persons generally 
having joint access or control for most 
purposes, so that it is reasonable to 
recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has 
the right to permit the inspection in his own 
right and that the others have assumed the 
risk that one of their number might permit 
the common area to be searched.’ ”  
The “constant element” in assessing Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness in the consent 
cases, the Supreme Court explained, is “the 
great significance given to widely shared 
social expectations, which are naturally 
enough influenced by the law of property, 
but not controlled by its rules. Matlock 
accordingly not only holds that a solitary co-
inhabitant may sometimes consent to a 
search of shared premises, but stands for the 
proposition that the reasonableness of such a 
search is in significant part a function of 
commonly held understanding about the 
authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in 
ways that affect each other's interests.” Such 
an understanding includes an assumption 
tenants “usually make about their common 
authority when they share quarters. They 
understand that any one of them may admit 
visitors, with the consequence that a guest 
obnoxious to one may nevertheless be 
admitted in his absence by another. As 
Matlock put it, shared tenancy is understood 
to include an ‘assumption of risk,’ on which 
police officers are entitled to rely[.]”  
The situation differs, however, when a 
cohabitant is present and denying entrance: 
“[I]t is fair to say that a caller standing at the 
door of shared premises would have no 
confidence that one occupant's invitation 
was a sufficiently good reason to enter when 
a fellow tenant stood there saying, ‘stay 
out.’ Without some very good reason, no 
sensible person would go inside under those 
conditions.... The visitor's reticence without 
some such good reason would show not 
timidity but a realization that when people 
living together disagree over the use of their 
common quarters, a resolution must come 
through voluntary accommodation, not by 
appeals to authority.” “In sum, there is no 
common understanding that one co-tenant 
generally has a right or authority to prevail 
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over the express wishes of another, whether 
the issue is the color of the curtains or 
invitations to outsiders.”  
Applying these principles, the court 
concluded that “[s]ince the co-tenant 
wishing to open the door to a third party has 
no recognized authority in law or social 
practice to prevail over a present and 
objecting co-tenant, his disputed invitation, 
without more, gives a police officer no 
better claim to reasonableness in entering 
than the officer would have in the absence of 
any consent at all.” It held that “a 
warrantless search of a shared dwelling for 
evidence over the express refusal of consent 
by a physically present resident cannot be 
justified as reasonable as to him on the basis 
of consent given to the police by another 
resident.”  
The court then reaffirmed the continuing 
vitality of Matlock and Rodriguez, 
explaining as follows: “Although the 
Matlock defendant was not present with the 
opportunity to object, he was in a squad car 
not far away; the Rodriguez defendant was 
actually asleep in the apartment, and the 
police might have roused him with a knock 
on the door before they entered with only 
the consent of an apparent co-tenant. If those 
cases are not to be undercut by today's 
holding, we have to admit that we are 
drawing a fine line; if a potential defendant 
with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the 
door and objects, the co-tenant's permission 
does not suffice for a reasonable search, 
whereas the potential objector, nearby but 
not invited to take part in the threshold 
colloquy, loses out. 
“This is the line we draw, and we think the 
formalism is justified. So long as there is no 
evidence that the police have removed the 
potentially objecting tenant from the 
entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible 
objection, there is practical value in the 
simple clarity of complementary rules, one 
recognizing the co-tenant's permission when 
there is no fellow occupant on hand, the 
other according dispositive weight to the 
fellow occupant's contrary indication when 
he expresses it. For the very reason that 
Rodriguez held it would be unjustifiably 
impractical to require the police to take 
affirmative steps to confirm the actual 
authority of a consenting individual whose 
authority was apparent, we think it would 
needlessly limit the capacity of the police to 
respond to ostensibly legitimate 
opportunities in the field if we were to hold 
that reasonableness required the police to 
take affirmative steps to find a potentially 
objecting co-tenant before acting on the 
permission they had already received. There 
is no ready reason to believe that efforts to 
invite a refusal would make a difference in 
many cases, whereas every co-tenant 
consent case would turn into a test about the 
adequacy of the police's efforts to consult 
with a potential objector. Better to accept the 
formalism of distinguishing Matlock from 
this case than to impose a requirement, time 
consuming in the field and in the courtroom, 
with no apparent systemic justification. The 
pragmatic decision to accept the simplicity 
of this line is, moreover, supported by the 
substantial number of instances in which 
suspects who are asked for permission to 
search actually consent, albeit imprudently, 
a fact that undercuts any argument that the 
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police should try to locate a suspected 
inhabitant because his denial of consent 
would be a foregone conclusion.” 
The case before it, the court concluded, 
“invites a straightforward application of the 
rule that a physically present inhabitant's 
express refusal of consent to a police search 
is dispositive as to him, regardless of the 
consent of a fellow occupant. Scott 
Randolph's refusal is clear, and nothing in 
the record justifies the search on grounds 
independent of Janet Randolph's consent. 
The State does not argue that she gave any 
indication to the police of a need for 
protection inside the house that might have 
justified entry into the portion of the 
premises where the police found the 
powdery straw (which, if lawfully seized, 
could have been used when attempting to 
establish probable cause for the warrant 
issued later). Nor does the State claim that 
the entry and search should be upheld under 
the rubric of exigent circumstances, owing 
to some apprehension by the police officers 
that Scott Randolph would destroy evidence 
of drug use before any warrant could be 
obtained.”  
B. United States v. Murphy 
In Murphy, the Ninth Circuit extended 
Randolph to hold that if a defendant 
expressly withholds consents to search, a 
warrantless search conducted after the 
defendant has left or been removed from the 
residence is invalid even if a cotenant 
subsequently consents. In Murphy, the 
defendant was living in a storage unit rented 
by Dennis Roper. Officers arrested the 
defendant, who refused to consent to a 
search of the storage unit; later, they arrested 
Roper, who consented to a search. During 
the search, officers seized a 
methamphetamine lab. 
The defendant challenged the validity of 
Roper's consent to the search. The Ninth 
Circuit held that the search violated the 
Fourth Amendment, rejecting the 
government's contention that the present 
case was distinguishable from Randolph 
because the defendant was not present when 
Roper consented to the search. It explained: 
“The ... distinction that the government 
attempts to make between this case and 
Randolph is that in the former, unlike in the 
latter, the objecting co-tenant was not 
physically present when the other tenant 
gave consent to the search. Here, Murphy 
refused consent and was subsequently 
arrested and removed from the scene. Two 
hours later, officers located Roper and 
obtained consent from him to search the 
units. Roper did not know that Murphy had 
previously refused consent and Murphy was 
not present to object once again to the 
second search. We see no reason, however, 
why Murphy's arrest should vitiate the 
objection he had already registered to the 
search. We hold that when a co-tenant 
objects to a search and another party with 
common authority subsequently gives 
consent to that search in the absence of the 
first co-tenant the search is invalid as to the 
objecting co-tenant. 
“We find support for our holding in the 
Randolph Court's treatment of the related 
issue of police removal of a tenant from the 
scene for the purpose of preventing him 
from objecting to a search. The Court held 
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that third party consent to a search is valid 
only ‘[s]o long as there is no evidence that 
the police have removed the potentially 
objecting tenant from the entrance for the 
sake of avoiding a possible objection.’ If the 
police cannot prevent a co-tenant from 
objecting to a search through arrest, surely 
they cannot arrest a co-tenant and then seek 
to ignore an objection he has already made. 
… Once a co-tenant has registered his 
objection, his refusal to grant consent 
remains effective barring some objective 
manifestation that he has changed his 
position and no longer objects. The rule that 
Randolph establishes is that when one co-
tenant objects and the other consents, a valid 
search may occur only with respect to the 
consenting tenant. It is true that the consent 
of either co-tenant may be sufficient in the 
absence of an objection by the other, either 
because he simply fails to object or because 
he is not present to do so. Nevertheless, 
when an objection has been made by either 
tenant prior to the officers' entry, the search 
is not valid as to him and no evidence seized 
may be used against him. Rather, as in this 
case, in the absence of exigent 
circumstances, the police must obtain a 
warrant before conducting the search.”  
C. Subsequent Case Law 
Four federal circuit courts and at least two 
state Supreme Courts have rejected the 
Ninth Circuit's analysis in Murphy; they 
hold that even if a defendant expressly 
refuses to allow officers to search his 
residence, a cohabitant's consent given after 
a defendant leaves or is lawfully removed 
will support a warrantless search. United 
States v. Hudspeth is one such case. There, 
officers executed a search warrant at the 
defendant's workplace and discovered child 
pornography on the defendant's computer. 
The defendant was arrested for possession of 
child pornography. The arresting officer 
asked the defendant for permission to search 
his home computer; he refused. Law 
enforcement officers then went to the 
defendant's home, where his wife gave 
permission to seize the home computer. On 
that computer, investigators found additional 
child pornography. The defendant was 
indicted for possession of child pornography 
and pled guilty after unsuccessfully moving 
to suppress the evidence seized during the 
searches of his work and home computers.  
As relevant here, the Eighth Circuit held that 
the warrantless search of the defendant's 
home computer did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. It explained as follows: “The 
legal issue of whether an officer's 
knowledge of the prior express refusal by 
one co-tenant negates the later obtained 
consent of another authorized co-tenant is a 
matter of first impression in this court. We 
will answer this compound legal question by 
answering the separate legal questions 
involved. 
“First, we know Mrs. Hudspeth was a co-
tenant authorized to give the officers consent 
to search.... 
“Second, unlike Randolph, the officers in 
the present case were not confronted with a 
‘social custom’ dilemma, where two 
physically present co-tenants have 
contemporaneous competing interests and 
one consents to a search, while the other 
objects. … Thus, this rationale for the 
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narrow holding of Randolph, which 
repeatedly referenced the defendant's 
physical presence and immediate objection, 
is inapplicable here. … 
“The Randolph opinion repeatedly referred 
to an ‘express refusal of consent by a 
physically present resident.’ … Hudspeth 
was not at the door and objecting and does 
not fall within Randolph's ‘fine line.’ ... 
“The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit 
warrantless searches and seizures, nor does 
the Fourth Amendment always prohibit 
warrantless searches and seizures when the 
defendant previously objected to the search 
and seizure. ‘What [Hudspeth] is assured by 
the Fourth Amendment itself, however, is ... 
no such search will occur that is 
“unreasonable.” ’ As the Supreme Court 
explains, ‘it is reasonable to recognize that 
any of the co-inhabitants has the right to 
permit the inspection in his [or her] own 
right.’ And the absent, expressly objecting 
co-inhabitant has ‘assumed the risk’ that 
another co-inhabitant ‘might permit the 
common area to be searched.’ The 
authorized co-tenant may give consent for 
several reasons including an unawareness of 
contraband on the premises, or a desire to 
protect oneself or others…. 
The Seventh Circuit followed Hudspeth (and 
declined to follow Murphy ) in United States 
v. Henderson. There, police were called to 
the home of the defendant and his wife, 
Patricia, to investigate a report of domestic 
abuse. Patricia admitted police into the 
home, where in “unequivocal terms” the 
defendant ordered them out. The officers 
arrested the defendant for domestic battery 
and took him to jail. After his arrest and 
removal from the scene, Patricia signed a 
consent-to-search form and led the police on 
a search that uncovered firearms, crack 
cocaine, and items indicative of drug 
dealing. The defendant was indicted on 
federal weapon and drug charges. … 
“Here, it is undisputed that Henderson 
objected to the presence of the police in his 
home. Once he was validly arrested for 
domestic battery and taken to jail, however, 
his objection lost its force, and Patricia was 
free to authorize a search of the home. This 
she readily did. Patricia's consent rendered 
the warrantless search reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment, and the evidence need 
not have been suppressed.”  
At least two other federal circuit courts and 
two state Supreme Courts have followed 
Hudspeth and Henderson and declined to 
follow Murphy.  
D. Analysis 
We conclude that Randolph does not require 
exclusion of the evidence obtained in the 
warrantless search of defendant's home. We 
begin by noting that, like the federal 
appellate cases discussed above, the facts 
here differ in a critical way from those of 
Randolph. While the defendant in Randolph 
was present and continued to object to a 
search of his home, in the present case 
defendant had been arrested and removed 
from the apartment before Rojas consented 
to a search. Thus, unlike in Randolph, there 
was in this case no co-tenant “who is present 
and states a refusal to permit the search.”  
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Defendant's absence from the home when 
Rojas consented to a search of the apartment 
is, we believe, determinative. … [T]he 
Randolph court distinguished between cases 
in which a defendant was present and 
objected to a search, on the one hand, and 
cases in which a defendant was not present 
and therefore could not object to a search, 
on the other. The court recognized that it 
was “drawing a fine line,” but believed its 
formalism was justified so long as there was 
no evidence that police had removed a 
potentially objecting tenant from the scene 
for the sake of avoiding a possible objection.  
We believe that the line we draw is 
consistent with that drawn by the Supreme 
Court in Randolph. As in Randolph, the line 
we draw is a clear one, distinguishing 
between cases in which a defendant is 
present and objecting to a search, and those 
in which a defendant has been lawfully 
arrested and thus is no longer present when a 
cotenant consents to a search of a shared 
residence. It thus preserves the “simple 
clarity of complementary rules” established 
by Randolph.  
Further, our rule preserves the law 
enforcement prerogatives recognized by 
Randolph. As we have said, Randolph 
expressly reaffirmed the holdings of 
Matlock and Rodriguez, noting that “it 
would needlessly limit the capacity of the 
police to respond to ostensibly legitimate 
opportunities in the field if we were to hold 
that reasonableness required the police to 
take affirmative steps to find a potentially 
objecting co-tenant before acting on the 
permission they had already received.” We 
believe that requiring officers who have 
already secured the consent of a defendant's 
cotenant to also secure the consent of an 
absent defendant would similarly and 
needlessly limit the capacity of law 
enforcement to respond to “ostensibly 
legitimate opportunities in the field.”  
We note, as the Seventh Circuit did in 
Henderson, that the rule advocated by 
defendant and adopted by the Ninth Circuit 
in Murphy permits “a one-time objection” 
by one cotenant to “permanently disable the 
other [co-tenant] from ever validly 
consenting to a search of their shared 
premises.” Like Henderson, we think such a 
rule “extends Randolph too far.”  
Finally, like the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and 
Eighth Circuits, we believe that the 
defendant's presence was indispensible to 
the decision in Randolph. We again quote 
Henderson, which well articulated the 
analysis: “[T]he fact of a conflict between 
present co-occupants plays a vital role in the 
Randolph majority's ‘social expectations' 
premise; a third party, attuned to societal 
customs regarding shared premises, would 
not, ‘[w]ithout some very good reason,’ 
enter when faced with a disputed invitation 
between cotenants. The calculus shifts, 
however, when the tenant seeking to deny 
entry is no longer present. His objection 
loses its force because he is not there to 
enforce it[.]”  
For all of these reasons, we conclude that 
Rojas's consent to a search of the apartment 
she shared with defendant was valid, and 
thus the trial court did not err in denying 
defendant's motion to exclude. 
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DISPOSITION 
The conviction on count 2, willful infliction 
of corporal injury on a spouse, cohabitant, or 
child's parent, is conditionally reversed, with 
directions to the trial court to review 
relevant portions of Officer Cirrito's 
personnel records in chambers. If the trial 
court determines that the records contain no 
relevant information, it shall reinstate the 
judgment as to count 2. If it determines that 
the records contain some relevant 
information, it shall give defendant a 
reasonable opportunity to investigate the 
disclosed material and order a new trial if he 
demonstrates a reasonable probability of a 
different outcome had the evidence been 
disclosed; otherwise, the court shall reinstate 
the judgment as to count 2. In all other 
respects, the judgment is affirmed. 
We concur: EPSTEIN, P.J., and 
WILLHITE, J. 
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“SCOTUS to Hear Fernandez, a Calif. 'Warrantless Search' Case” 
FindLaw 
William Peacock 
May 22, 2013 
In 2009, the search for a robbery suspect led 
police to the doorstep of convicted-felon 
Walter Fernandez. Police were investigating 
nearby when they heard the screams of his 
girlfriend and cohabitant, Roxanne Rojas. 
Once backup arrived, they knocked on the 
door and Rojas, with a bruised nose and 
bloody hand, answered. 
Fernandez came to the door and refused to 
allow the police to enter, stating, “You don’t 
have any right to come in here. I know my 
rights.” He was taken into custody, and later 
identified as the suspect in the nearby 
robbery. 
A short time later, the officers returned, 
notified Rojas that Fernandez was a suspect 
in a robbery, and asked for consent to 
search. She gave both written and verbal 
consent. The search turned up a shotgun, 
ammunition, a butterfly knife, and gang 
paraphernalia. 
Fernandez argued that, under the Supreme 
Court's holding in Georgia v. 
Randolph(2006) and the Ninth Circuit's 
holding in United States v. Murphy (2008), 
the evidence found in the search should have 
been suppressed. The California Court of 
Appeal upheld the trial court's admission of 
the evidence and explicitly rejected Murphy. 
Earlier this week, the U.S. Supreme 
Court agreed to hear the case, and to resolve 
the split in lower courts' interpretations 
of Randolph. 
Randolph's Fine Line 
The Randolph decision was simple, yet 
limited. After noting that they had upheld 
warrantless searches stemming from a 
cohabitant's consent, including one case 
where a defendant was not present to object 
(he was in a squad car nearby) and in 
another case, where the defendant was 
asleep inside the apartment, the court stated: 
If those cases are not to be undercut by 
today's holding, we have to admit that we 
are drawing a fine line; if a potential 
defendant with self-interest in objecting 
is in fact at the door and objects, the co-
tenant's permission does not suffice for a 
reasonable search ... So long as there is 
no evidence that the police have removed 
the potentially objecting tenant from the 
entrance for the sake of avoiding a 
possible objection, there is practical value 
in the simple clarity of complementary 
rules ... 
A fine line indeed, but what about situations 
like these, where the defendant objects, is 
taken into custody, and later, his cohabitant 
consents? 
The Murphy Rule 
In Murphy, a man living in a storage unit 
(with a meth lab) refused to allow a search. 
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The man who leased the unit was also 
arrested, and this time, he consented to a 
search, not knowing of Murphy's prior 
refusal. The Ninth Circuit held the search 
impermissible, noting that: 
If the police cannot prevent a co-tenant 
from objecting to a search through arrest, 
surely they cannot arrest a co-tenant and 
then seek to ignore an objection he has 
already made. Nor, more generally, do we 
see any reason to limit the Randolph rule 
to an objecting tenant's removal by 
police. Once a co-tenant has registered 
his objection, his refusal to grant consent 
remains effective barring some objective 
manifestation that he has changed his 
position and no longer objects. 
A Finer Fine Line 
The California court rejected the Ninth 
Circuit's approach, and instead followed the 
reasoning of at least four other federal 
circuit courts and two state supreme courts. 
These courts rely upon the physical 
presence requirement, limiting Randolph's 
protections to physically present objecting 
defendants. Their holdings draw an even 
more fine line: if the defendant refuses to 
allow a search and is then arrested, a 
cohabitant's consent is sufficient. 
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“Search Allowed by Roommate to High Court” 
San Francisco Chronicle 
Bob Egelko 
May 21, 2013 
The U.S. Supreme Court took up a 
California case Monday to decide whether 
police can enter and search a home, over the 
objections of a suspect who lives there, by 
arresting the suspect and getting a 
roommate's consent for the entry. 
The justices ruled in 2006 that the Fourth 
Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable 
searches bars police, in nonemergencies, 
from entering a home without a warrant if a 
resident objects, even if another resident 
consents. But lower courts have been 
divided on whether the refusal prohibits 
officers from entering the home in the 
future, if the objector is not present. 
To resolve that question, the court granted 
review Monday of an appeal by a Los 
Angeles man convicted of a gang-related 
robbery after police searched his apartment 
without a warrant. The case will be heard in 
the term that starts in October, with a ruling 
due by June 2014. 
According to court records, police 
investigating a robbery and assault in a gang 
neighborhood in October 2009 went 
to Walter Fernandez's apartment after 
hearing sounds of screaming and fighting. A 
woman came to the door, showing signs of 
injuries, but when officers started to enter, 
Fernandez stepped forward and objected, 
saying, "You don't have any right to come 
in here." 
Officers arrested Fernandez, then secured 
the apartment and told the woman 
Fernandez was a robbery suspect. They 
entered, with her consent, and found gang 
paraphernalia, a knife and a gun, a state 
appeals court said in an August 2012 ruling. 
Fernandez, identified by the robbery victim 
as the man who had stabbed him and called 
on accomplices to beat him, was convicted 
of robbery and domestic violence in 2010, 
and sentenced to 14 years in prison. Ten 
years of his sentence stemmed from the jury' 
finding that the robbery was gang-related, 
based in part on evidence found in 
the apartment. 
In upholding the search, the state's Second 
District Court of Appeal said a resident's 
authority to prohibit a warrantless police 
entry applies only when that resident is 
present. Once Fernandez had been taken 
away, the court said, he no longer had the 
power to prevent his cohabitant from 
admitting police to the apartment she shared. 
Fernandez's Supreme Court appeal argued 
that police should have gone to a judge to 
get a warrant, which they could have done 
quickly after securing the apartment. 
Otherwise, defense lawyer Gerald 
Peters said Monday, "all you would do in 
every case is, if the person objects, you 
arrest him and remove him. Then what good 
is the Fourth Amendment?" 
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The case is Fernandez vs. California, 12- 7822. 
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“Can Police Search the Home of a Defendant by Getting Consent to Enter 
from his Co-Tenant?” 
California Crime Blog 
Aaron J. Sussman 
August 2, 2012 
If a defendant objects to police entry into his 
home and is subsequently arrested, can 
police enter his home without a warrant 
premised on the consent to enter from the 
defendant’s co-tenant? In a remarkable 
recent published decision, The People v. 
Walter Fernandez, the California Court of 
Appeals answered this question, creating a 
rare split between the law that governs 
California’s state prosecutions and 
California’s federal prosecutions. Read 
below for more details. 
Walter Fernandez was wanted for a gang-
related assault with a knife. Police saw the 
defendant running into an apartment 
building and followed him to an apartment 
from which screaming was heard; they 
knocked on the door. A woman, Roxanne 
Rojas, answered the door; she was bleeding 
from a fresh injury, so officers performed a 
protective sweep of the apartment, 
discovering Fernandez and two others. 
Fernandez said “You don’t have any right to 
come in here. I know my rights.” Fernandez 
was arrested and removed from the scene. 
Then, officers returned to the apartment, 
knocked on the door, and asked Rojas if she 
would consent to a search of the apartment; 
she consented, and officers found gang 
paraphernalia and a butterfly knife. 
Fernandez was charged with second degree 
robbery with the use of a deadly weapon 
(the knife) and association with a criminal 
street gang. He was found guilty, but he 
appealed his conviction, arguing that he had 
expressed his refusal to consent to the search 
of the apartment, that the search of the 
apartment was therefore unconstitutional, 
and thus that the evidence found in the 
apartment should not have been admitted at 
trial. 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits 
unreasonable searches and seizures. As the 
home is considered inviolate, searches of the 
home without a warrant are presumptively 
invalid. (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 
U.S. 573, 586.) However, a search is not 
unreasonable if police have a person with 
actual authority, apparent authority, or 
common authority over the premises has 
consented to the search. (Illinois v. 
Rodriguez (1990) 497 U.S. 177.) But, in a 
2006 decision, Georgia v. Randolph, the 
Supreme Court held that “a warrantless 
search of a shared dwelling for evidence 
over the express refusal of consent by a 
physically present resident cannot be 
justified as reasonable as to him on the basis 
of consent given to the police by another 
resident.” (Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 
U.S. 103, 120 (emphasis added).) 
The question here, though, was what police 
can do when the physically absent defendant 
objects to the police entry while the present 
co-tenant consents. Courts have split on this 
decision. Most notably, the Ninth Circuit – 
the federal court of appeals that hears 
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appeals from federal trials in many states, 
including California – held that “when a co-
tenant objects to a search and another party 
with common authority subsequently gives 
consent to that search in the absence of the 
first co-tenant, the search is invalid as to the 
objecting co-tenant.” (United States v. 
Murphy, (2008) 516 F.3d 1117, 1124.) But 
most courts have disagreed, holding that a 
non-present defendant’s objection does not 
nullify the consent of a present co-tenant.  
The California Court of Appeals decided to 
go with the majority of courts that have 
addressed the question, therefore 
disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit and 
holding that a tenant’s consent to police 
entry is valid despite the fact that a co-
tenant, who was not present, would not have 
consented. The California Court of Appeals 
held that the line to be drawn “is a clear one, 
distinguishing between cases in which a 
defendant is present and objecting to a 
search, and those in which a defendant has 
been lawfully arrested and thus is no longer 
present when a co-tenant consents to a 
search of a shared residence.” The court 
relied upon the narrow language of 
Randolph, which seemed to limit its holding 
to circumstances when the co-tenant was 
physically present, and which received a 
decisive fifth vote from Justice Breyer, 
whose concurring opinion noted plainly that 
“The Court’s opinion does not apply where 
the objector is not present ‘and 
object[ing].’” 
This decision creates a rare split in the 
courts’ interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment; while federal trial courts in 
California are required to follow the Ninth 
circuit’s decision in Murphy (holding that 
non-consent from a non-present co-tenant 
vitiates consent by a present co-tenant), state 
trial courts in California must not follow the 
California Court of Appeals’ decision in 
Fernandez (holding that non-consent by a 
non-present co-tenant does not vitiate 
consent by a present co-tenant). It’s an 
interesting split, perhaps one that the 
California Supreme Court or the United 
States Supreme Court would want to 
examine. 
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“California Robbery Case Leads Supreme Court to Reconsider Police Search 
Laws” 
McClatchy 
Michael Doyle 
May 20, 2013 
A tattooed inmate in one of California’s 
most remote prisons will now get his 
moment in the Supreme Court sun, along 
with a shot at clarifying the rules governing 
certain law enforcement searches. 
Beating the legal odds, Los Angeles gang 
veteran Walter Fernandez succeeded 
Monday in convincing the court to hear his 
challenge to an apartment search. Fernandez 
had objected to the search, but his girlfriend 
eventually assented after Fernandez was 
taken into custody. This prompted a 
constitutional question that has divided 
lower courts. 
“There’s this long-lasting issue, as to what 
extent a cohabitant can give consent to a 
search,” Thousand Oaks, Calif.-based 
defense attorney Gerald P. Peters said in a 
telephone interview Monday. “This is not a 
totally unique problem; it’s actually a 
foreseeable problem.” 
In a 2006 case arising from a Georgia drug 
bust, the Supreme Court ruled invalid a 
warrantless search of a shared dwelling over 
the express refusal of consent by an 
individual who was present. That ruling was 
based on the Fourth Amendment, which 
protects individuals against “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.” 
Lower appellate courts have disagreed, 
though, about how far this rule extends. 
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which covers Western states, ruled in a 2008 
case involving an alleged Oregon 
methamphetamine lab that a co-tenant’s 
refusal to offer consent remains in effect 
even after the individual is absent. But in a 
Missouri child pornography case, the 8th 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals came to the 
opposite conclusion, reasoning that a wife’s 
consent sufficed once the resisting husband 
was gone. 
Resolving such circuit splits often motivates 
the Supreme Court to take up a case, though 
the odds are always long. The court receives 
about 8,000 petitions annually and hears 
only about 75. The odds are stacked even 
more against petitions like Fernandez’s, 
designated as in forma pauperis, which are 
often impoverished prisoners’ cases for 
which filing fees don’t have to be paid. 
During the court’s 2011 term, only seven 
such cases were heard out of more than 
6,000 on the docket. 
“I think it’s a good thing,” Peters said of the 
court’s decision to hear the Fernandez case. 
“The Supreme Court has been strangely 
good for criminal defendants in a number of 
cases, and maybe that will carry forward.” 
But another possibility, Peters 
acknowledged, is that the high court could 
use the Fernandez case to strike down the 
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9th Circuit’s defendant-friendly rule, which 
can impede some police searches. 
“The conflict in the state and federal courts 
is heavily lopsided against (the Fernandez) 
petition,” California Deputy Attorney 
General Louis W. Karlin noted in the state’s 
legal filing. 
Peters represents Fernandez, now serving a 
14-year sentence on firearms, robbery and 
domestic abuse charges at California’s High 
Desert State Prison. The maximum security 
facility in Lassen County, in the arid 
northeast corner of the state, is about 550 
miles from the neighborhood where 
Fernandez once joined a street gang called 
the Drifters. 
Though the gang’s identity was tattooed on 
his back, among other places, Fernandez 
says he was trying to turn his life around and 
had moved away from gang involvement 
following release from prison on earlier, 
theft-related charges. 
“It always was just about . . . me living 
there, hanging out with people I grew up 
with,” Fernandez explained at the 2010 trial 
that led to his most recent convictions. 
Fernandez was living with Roxanne Rojas in 
October 2009 when police investigating a 
street robbery responded to sounds of 
fighting from their apartment. At the front 
door, an agitated Fernandez told police that 
“you don’t have any right to come in here,” 
according to subsequent trial testimony. 
Police recognized one of his scalp tattoos 
from a description given by the robbery 
victim, and Fernandez was arrested and 
taken away. 
About an hour later, amid circumstances that 
remain in dispute, police returned and 
secured permission from Rojas to search the 
apartment, in which they found a .20-gauge 
shotgun, ammunition, a butterfly knife and 
assorted Drifters gang paraphernalia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
